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If we think that the environment is less important than the economy, 
then we should try holding our breath while we count our money. 
This thesis examines the legal framework governing the oil and gas 
industry in Nigeria. The oil and gas industry in Nigeria is beset by many 
institutional ills, including a lack of political will by regulators to be 
accountable for enforcing laws and regulations, to be accountable for 
environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, and an inadequate 
compensation regime, amongst other mishaps. This thesis contends that 
a regional approach to holding multinational corporations accountable 
for human rights violations is the preferable alternative to improving the 
institutional ills currently affecting the current framework governing the 
oil and gas industry.  
The thesis considers the impact of the voluntary framework but avers 
that a regional approach and institution holding multinational 
corporations (MNCs) to account is the preferable approach to addressing 
human rights violations by MNCs in Nigeria. It, therefore, advocates the 
strengthening of the African Charter. This is because the current 
regulation models have not recorded significant successes in holding 
MNCs accountable in Africa and Nigeria specifically. The void created in 
the regulatory sector by the non-performance of government regulatory 
bodies and the non-implementation of existing legal enactments is 
gradually being filled by the African Commission in Nigeria. The regional 
institution has proven by their antecedents that they have a major role 
to play in the accountability paradigm in the oil and gas industry.  
vi 
 
This thesis will demonstrate how legal and policy-making institutions in 
the African Union (AU) can add a regional accountability layer and 
strengthen solutions within the continent, including providing effective 
corporate accountability and oversight within Nigeria. Furthermore, it 
argues that remedies to victims of corporate human rights violations in 
Africa may be found at the regional level. Africa needs to be the leading 
character in its affairs and move away from its continuous feature in 
international relations. This means having to take the lead in making 
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There are several factors shaping the contemporary world today. 
Globalization is one of them. A multinational corporation is a business 
organization with its business activities located in more than two 
countries and these MNCs often provide foreign direct investment.1 
Multinational corporations have expanded into the global market and 
their nature and power is one of the pertinent aspects of globalization 
today. Multinational corporations have become crucial for industrial and 
economic growth, especially in developing societies.  
States and multinational corporations are the backbones of businesses 
in the world joined together by globalization.2 MNCs, a category of non-
state actor (NSA), are known for their driving force in the process of 
globalization.3 They are seen by the world, often rightfully so, as the 
controlling factor behind industrial and economic development. 4 
Multinational corporations must have their origins in a particular country. 
This is where the corporation was incorporated. They generally have no 
limit as to where they can operate. A large multinational corporation 
 
1 Arnold Lazarus, < https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/bkogut/files/Chapter_in_smelser-
Baltes_2001.pdf > accessed 11 June 2020. 
2 Grazia Ietto-Gillies , ‘The Role of Transnational Corporations in the Globalisation Process’, in Jonathan 
Michie (ed.), Handbook of Globalisation ( Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003), 139 at144. 
3 Ibid.; see also Karsten Nowrot, ‘Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of Influential Non-
state Actors: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibility’ (2006), 80 Philippine Law 
Journal 563. 
4 Emmanuel Bruno Ongo Nkoa, ‘Does Foreign Direct Investment Improve Economic Growth in CEMAC 
Countries’ (2013), 8 EJBE 43 at 48; Abimbola Babatunde, ‘Trade Openness, Infrastructure, FDI and 
Growth in Sub-Saharan African Countries’ (2011), 12 JMPP 27 at 33; United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UCTAD) World Investment Report (ST/CTC/143)< 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir1992overview_en.pdf >accessed 16 June 2020. 
2 
 
may operate in 100 countries located outside its home country.5 Indeed, 
there are corporations in different parts of the world that render services 
on land, sea and through aviation. Countries need them to boost their 
economies, hence they seek their presence, even when they are 
incorporated outside their jurisdiction. They seek countries that are rich 
in natural resources to explore, and are drawn to areas where they can 
make enormous profit, afford cheap labour, and most times there is 
weak governance, which is known as “race to the bottom”. 6  The 
perspective that some multinational corporations are more economically 
powerful than many states is self-evident, as they are considered a 
major phenomenon of the international economy today.7  
The issue of human rights accountability of corporations during 
international operations gives rise to a number of challenges which this 
study will address. Firstly, conceptual challenge is an issue. By their very 
nature, corporations are a business concept designed to promote 
business.8
 
Secondly, we have a challenge which relates to the nature 
and function of international law.9
 
Historically, international law has 
been understood to be a system of rules designed to govern inter-state 
relations. 10  The concept of wanting corporate accountability in 
international law is seen by some scholars as being misplaced and is 
therefore contested.11 A portion of the contest is as a result of the fact 
 
5 Ibid. 
6 Sergio D Briquets and Jorge P Lopez: Corruption in Cuba: Castro and Beyond (University of Texas Press 
2010) 303. 
7 Nowrot (n3) 32. 
8 Freddy D. Mnyongani, ‘Accountability of Multinational Corporations for Human Rights Violations Under 
International Law’ (2016) 
<http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/21071/thesis_mnyongani_fd.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y






that international law is an actor-centred law, operating through its 
subjects. 12  They argue that corporations are not subjects of 
international law and therefore are not obligated through the legal 
system.13  
International relations have brought about new challenges to the 
phenomenon of globalization. In the period of globalization, non-state 
actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs)14have increased in 
records, stature and power. The development of these bodies is a 
challenge to the traditional approaches to accountability in international 
law. 
Non-state actors, a structure put in place to tackle the abuse of power 
by the state and its agents, are faced with power that arises from private 
entities such as MNCs.15 Theoretically, it is created to have a gap within 
the structure of accountability in international law and MNC power.16 For 
it to be a bridge in the gap, a paradigm shift is essential.17 Clapham 
states that: 
“trying to squeeze international actors into the state-like entities box is, 
at best, like trying to force a round peg into a square hole, and at worst, 
means overlooking powerful actors on the international stage.”18  
Within the last 40 years, the global community has not been reasonably 
effective in trying to tackle the issues raised by MNCs. Multinational 






16 Dinah Shelton, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World’ (2002)  25 Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 314.   
17 Nowrot (n3) 33.  




particularly in relation to human rights. 
Andrew Clapham19
 
rightly states that:  
“The emergence of new fragmented centres of power, such as 
associations, pressure groups, political parties, trade unions, 
corporations, multinationals, universities, churches, interest groups, 
and quasi-official bodies has meant that the individual now perceives 
authority, repression, and alienation in a variety of new bodies, whereas 
once it was only the apparatus of the state which was perceived in the 
doctrine to exhibit these characteristics. This societal development has 
meant that the definition of the public sphere has had to be adapted to 
include these new bodies and activities.”20 
The spread of non-state actors and the encounters they stance so as to 
protect human rights has redirected attention to the state-centric 
approach of international law.  
The lack of national laws in order to hold MNCs accountable, as well as 
the absence of accountability in the international legal structure, have 
the tendency to be a refuge to those MNCs who do not respect human 
rights.21 Deva is of the opinion that, if a corporation wanted to respect 
and uphold human rights standards, there are no existing universal 
international standards to adhere to.22
 
 
While states remain the principal actor in international law, it is 
becoming more evident that the presence of non-state actors has effects 
 
19 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford: Clarendon Press/New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993) 137; Philip Alston, ‘The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human 
Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?’ in Philip Alston (eds), Non-State Actors and Human 
Rights (Oxford 2005) 23 
20 Ibid. 
21 Mnyongani (n8) 54 
22 Surya Deva, ‘Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and International Law: Where 
from Here’ (2003) Connecticut Journal of International Law 19. 
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for the state-centric system, to protect human rights.23 
Since Nigeria is rich in natural resources and amongst one of the global 
actors in oil and gas, it has become an investment destination for many 
multinational corporations all over the world. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that large corporations have their presence in Nigeria, while 
they engage with subsidiaries of their parent companies abroad. They 
have expanded their business operations into segments of production 
and marketing activities, including joint ventures with states or other 
local business entities and foreign direct investments in manufacturing 
or exploration of mineral resources. 24  In addition, they engage in 
consultancy and market their products through a complex multi-network 
process in order to reach world markets.25  
Exploration of natural resources should bring about an economic 
development in that area, as well as a better life for the people in that 
territory.26 There seems to be little or no benefit accruing to Nigeria 
compared with its vast natural and mineral resources in terms of 
development.27 Kofi Annan28 argues that natural resources, which are in 
 
23 Mnyongani (n8) 54.; see also L.C. Backer, ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United 
Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in International Law’ (2006) 37 Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 294.  
24 See Sumantra Ghoshal and Christopher A. Bartlett, ‘The Multinational Corporation as an 
Interorganizational Network’ (1990), 15 Academy of Management Review 603 at 604 < 
http://gul.gu.se/public/pp/public_courses/course40530/published/1298469899850/resourceId/15964758/con
tent/Goshal%20%20Bartlett%201990%20-%20Theme%201.pdf >accessed 19 May 2020. 
25 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Supply Chains and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, OECD Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility (2002) 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/2089098.pdf >accessed 15 May 2020. 
26African Development Bank (ADB) and African Union (AU) ‘Oil and Gas in Africa’ (2009) 92 < 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Oil%20and%20Gas%20in%20Africa
.pdf > accessed on 20 July 2020. 
27 Claude Kabemba, ‘Myths and Mining: The Reality of Resource Governance in Africa’ (2014)  OSISA< 
http://www.osisa.org/open-debate/economic-justice/regional/myths-and-mining-reality-resource-
governance-africa > accessed 14 May 2020. 
28 Kofi Annan, ‘Momentum Rises to Lift Africa’s Resource Curse’ The New York Times (4 September 
2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/opinion/kofi-annan-momentum-rises-to-lift-africas-resource-
curse.html?_r=0 > accessed 12 May 2020. 
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abundance in Africa, could have led to sustainable economic growth, 
including the provision of innovative jobs and investments in health, 
education and infrastructure – unfortunately, that is not the case. On 
the contrary, the consequences of resource goldmines, according to him, 
are conflict, strengthening inequality, corruption and environmental 
disasters.29 He concludes that the situation in Africa confirms the truth 
of the cliché that unusual oil is not just a blessing but a curse.30 
Nigeria, with a population of over 140 million people, is currently the 
world’s sixth largest oil producer and the eighth largest country to 
export crude oil. Nigeria’s oil and gas sector provides 40% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP), with 95% of the country’s entire exports and 
about 80% of budgetary revenues that all tiers of government greatly 
depend on. 31  Regardless of the billions of dollars made from oil 
exploration, the Niger Delta – which is the oil and gas-rich wetland in 
southern Nigeria and which to a large degree gained Nigeria recognition 
as a major world producer of oil – has largely faced the negative effects 
of this oil exploitation.32 With more than 50 years of oil exploitation, 
massive bits of the region have poor water quality; pollution, disruption 
and degradation of farmlands and fishing ports, destruction of wildlife 
and biodiversity, and loss of fertile soil continue to be problems.33 
Furthermore, there has been no provision of a satisfactory planned 
justification policy for the areas affected.34 The response from people in 
this region, in the form of protest and campaigns against the activities 




31 Niger Delta Human Development Report (2006) <http://www.ng.undp.org/publications/nigeria-delta-
hdr.pdf > accessed 11 May 2020. 





of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the form of 
extra-judicial executions, arbitrary detentions and unlawful restrictions 
on their rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly.35 
Should home states withdraw in the quest for corporate accountability 
against home of origin of corporations who set up business and do 
business abroad, the outcome may be unfortunate for human rights in 
Nigeria’s oil sector. Then again, in the event that they don’t, we are not 
sure of the way that all corporate human rights issues in Nigeria will be 
settled through home state endeavours. The solution additionally lies in 
Africa itself, which will offer ascent to the issue regionally. This is what 
this thesis addresses. 
Although home state efforts should not be totally set aside, however, 
complete dependence on home state jurisdiction for corporate 
accountability can be likened to attempting to discover something that 
does not exist. 
Thus, this thesis will examine the idea of a regional approach to 
corporate accountability for human rights violations, through the African 
Union instrument.  
The thesis will contend that implementing an accountability framework 
in the African Union (AU) is one of the alternatives that can be utilized 
in ameliorating the institutional ills entrenched in the present situation 
in the oil and gas industry. It contends that the accountability paradigm 
has been weak in Nigeria and advocates for a new accountability 
paradigm, although this does not imply that the AU alone can solve the 
problems of corporate human rights violations.  
 
35 Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission Report (Oputa Panel Report) vol. 3 
<http://www.nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/oputa/ > accessed 10 May 2020. 
8 
 
Since the issue of corporate abuse continues in Nigeria, Africa must 
make rigorous, realistic and complementary efforts to address the 
problem as well. 
 
1.2 Background 
As a result of the issue in the Niger Delta, Nigeria attracted the eyes of 
the world, because of the part that corporations played in the overt 
violation of human rights in Ogoniland, where mineral resources were 
being explored.36
 
The general population of the Niger Delta in Nigeria 
appears to have endured the most at the hands of multinational 
corporations in Africa. 
The unfair treatment meted out to them by the extractive industries 
include the severe abuse of mineral resources, the formation of 
environmental debacles in the Niger Delta, intrigue and complicity with 
the administration in power to carry out violations against the host 
community and individuals of Nigeria, and support of militants to 
commit criminal acts within the region.37
 
A report highlighting the consistent environmental degradation due to 
exploration of oil over a period of more than 50 years was published in 
August 2011 by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP); the 
report stated that the degradation in the Niger Delta is profoundly 
established, and as such it would take 25 to 30 years to tidy up the 
 
36 Jena Martin Amerson, ‘What’s in a Name? Transnational Corporations as Bystanders to the Rule of Law 
in a Globalized Society’ (2011) 85 SJLR 1, 3–4, describing the role of Shell in Nigeria as that of a 
bystander; Larisa Wick, ‘Human Rights Violations in Nigeria: Corporate Malpractice and State 
Acquiescence in the Oil Producing Deltas of Nigeria’ (2003), 12 MSJIL 63,  67–74; Human Rights Watch, 
‘The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing 




contamination and actuate a feasible recuperation38 – a lot more oil 
spills, with crushing impacts, have happened since that time.39 Neither 
the Federal Government of Nigeria nor the MNCs have made any solid 
endeavour to actualize the UNEP report, regardless of the new spills.  
There is no closure to the issue of corporate human rights violations in 
the Niger Delta, as a result of the lethargy present. The MNCs are not 
prepared to pursue the way of human rights commitments over the span 
of their extraction business in the Niger Delta. What other proof is 
needed to demonstrate that the government may not withdraw from the 
way of complicity with MNCs to the aggregate disregard of its kin? 
Without a doubt, on 14 December 2012, the Community Court of Justice 
(CCJ) of the Economic Community of West African States worried in its 
judgement that the issue of corporate human rights infringement in the 
Niger Delta of Nigeria is a consistent problem.40 
The realization internationally that MNCs can violate corporate human 
rights is conceived by essential worldwide debates on the activities of 
corporate power, particularly its relationship with claims of human rights 
violations, either single-handedly or in complicity with states. The 
means by which to urge corporations to obey human rights 
commitments and to make them accountable for the infringement of 
human rights would prove to be quite a task.  
Attempts were made in the past, at the international level, towards the 
creation of a multilateral regulatory regime for corporations; however 
there was no success.41 Respecting the legal and regulatory framework 
 
38 UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoni Land ( UNEP Report, 2011) 
<http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA.pdf > accessed 16 June 2020. 
39 <http://platformlondon.org/2012/01/04/shells-bonga-oil-spill-hits-nigerian-communities/>accessed 7 
May 2020. 
40 SERAP v. The Federal Government of Nigeria (2009) ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12 
41 Carolin F. Hillemanns, ‘UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
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concerning their exploration activities is what corporate accountability 
entails. There are plenty of laws and regulations relating to the 
environment in Nigeria.42 They have not been extremely compelling for 
various reasons, as they are obsolete laws, include legitimate escape 
clauses and are lagging behind on enforcement. For example, NESREA 
(National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement 
Agency) does not accommodate corporate restorative measures in 
instances of natural contamination. Under these laws people don’t have 
the right to sue organizations for harm. The person who has endured 
the harm does not file for liability; rather NESREA does.43  
There is no evidence to prove that NESREA – or its predecessor 
association, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) – has 
filed for civil liability in instances where the depositing of dangerous 
waste was involved.44 The chief purpose behind the confinements to 
corporate responsibility is the staggering reliance of the administration 
on oil incomes and its complicity with multinational oil corporations. The 
association between the government of Nigeria and the oil corporations 
makes it hard to assign accountability regarding issues. The government 
 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (2003) 10 GLJ 1065–1080, 1066. 
42 Oil Pipeline Act 1956 (amended in 1965); Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968; Oil Terminal Dues Act 
1969; Petroleum Act 1969; Associated Gas Reinjection Act of 1979; Harmful Wastes Act (HWA) of 1988; 
Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act 1988; Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992; 
National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act  2007; 
Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) 1991; Gas 
Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill of 2009 and section 20 of the Constitution. Public regulatory 
bodies on environmental issues include: Federal Ministry of Environment, Housing and Urban 
Development (also known as Federal Ministry of Environment); National Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA); National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA); and Department of Petroleum Resources. 
43 National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act 2007. 
44 It is only the National Environmental (Pollution Abatement in Mining and Processing of Coals, Ore and 
Industrial Minerals) Regulations of 2009 that provide for the right to sue in order to prevent, stop or control 
a breach of its provisions. 
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and MNCs point fingers at one another so as to extenuate themselves 
of their obligations.45  
In Nigeria, in addition to the government, the MNCs’ most remarkable 
partner remains its investors. In this way, while corporations may be 
compelled by global standards to embrace a specific forepart, their 
advantaged association with the Nigerian government alleviates them 
from the related duties in Nigeria. 
The use of regulations and rules is jeopardized, as it would influence oil 
corporations as well as the government. This circumstance isn’t made 
easy by the way that national civil society has transcendentally kept on 
clamouring for self-determination and control of resources as opposed 
to corporate accountability. It clarifies the reason why sanctions have 
not been upheld or have been intended to have negligible effect. The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice 
featured the complicity between government and oil corporations.46  
In relation to the aforesaid, unfortunate victims rather prosecute 
corporations who violate human rights in courts in developing areas, 
where there are relaxed regulations and they have higher chances of 
getting favourable results. In the wake of attempting unsuccessfully for 
more than quite a while to get a reasonable remuneration from Shell for 
oil pollution in Nigeria, the Bodo people group took its case to the High 
Court in London in 2012.47 In 2012, with the assistance of two NGOs, 
Environmental Rights Action and Friends of the Earth, four farmers 
 
45 For example, Shell declares its readiness to reduce emissions but insists that the Nigerian government, its 
partner, does not support such measures because they would reduce production levels.  
46 ECOWAS is a regional grouping of 16 countries to which Nigeria belongs. 
47 Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta (London: Amnesty 
International, 2009). See also John Vidal, ‘Shell Nigeria Oil Spill 60 Times Bigger than It Claimed’, The 
Guardian (23 April 2012) < https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/apr/23/shell-nigeria-oil-spill-
bigger >accessed 12 May 2020. 
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documented a claim against Shell in the Netherlands for the loss of jobs 
following the natural harm caused by the activities of Shell somewhere 
in the range of 2005 to 2008. 48  Additionally, the utilization of 
extraterritoriality is being endangered by the hesitance of nations to 
straightforwardly encroach on different nations’ national power.49  
In Nigeria, wilful self-determination by oil corporations has not positively 
affected their conduct in the areas of human rights and the environment. 
For example, regardless of its interest in the VPSHR (voluntary principles 
of security and human rights), human rights violations in the Niger Delta 
have been associated with corporations such as Shell and Chervon. Shell 
was associated with 27 clashes which occurred due to its activities in 
Nembe50 between 2000 and 2006; and between 2007 and 2009, Shell 
spent no less than 383 million US dollars on security in Nigeria: 33% of 
the cash was spent on government security powers and equipping 
militants with ammunitions which they used to create unrest and human 
rights infringement in the Niger Delta,51 as they threatened indigenes 
who protested against the mistreatment.  
Shell was ensnared in an assault on the indigenes of Odioma in Bayelsa 
state in 2005: about 17 individuals were slaughtered by members of the 
joint task force, and over 100 indigenes were made homeless after the 
community was burnt down.52  
Shell was associated with five human rights violations which occurred in 
indigenous communities between 2009 and 2010; likewise, in 2005 and 
 
48 ‘Shell on Trial in Netherlands over Pollution in Nigeria’, Vanguard (12 October 2012) 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/10/shell-on-trial-in-netherlands-over-pollution-in-nigeria/> 
49 Ibid. 
50 Felix Tuodolo, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Between Civil Society and the Oil Industry in the 
Developing World’ (2009) ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 8(3): 530.  
51 Platform, Dirty Work: Shell’s Security Spending in Nigeria and Beyond (London: Platform, 2012) 
52 Kenneth Omeje, ‘High Stakes and Stakeholders: Oil Conflict and Security in Nigeria’ (2006) Hampshire 
and Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
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2008 Chevron asked a team of armed men to manage challenges with 
local communities protesting against them.53 Shell recorded in excess 
of 3,000 episodes of oil spills, and day-by-day gas flaring of around 604 
million standard cubic feet of gas was emitted between 1995 and 
2006.54 
Two leading recent works, one by Clapham and another by Alston, 
address the issue of accountability of non-state actors. Clapham’s work 
examines the use of human rights by non-state actors in its entirety; it 
sees a human rights methodology which rises above state-driven human 
rights and proceeds to lay out the human rights duties of non-state 
actors.55 It proceeds to suggest manners by which the non-state actors 
could be considered accountable. 
Fundamentally, Clapham asserts that human rights accountability 
should rest on states, individuals, as well as non-state actors (NSAs). 
Alston further expresses that international law ought to be modified to 
accommodate the activities of MNCs.56 
The past decade has seen a growing literature on MNCs and human 
rights which has averred that states should be accountable for MNCs’ 
activities, while another school asserts corporate accountability through 
human rights instruments and codes of conduct. Schutter has said that 
states are the primary responsible actors for the human rights activities 
of MNCs and that codes of conduct should not be seen as an alternative 
way to state responsibility, but as harmonious.57 However, there is still 
 
53 Earthrights International, The Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development, 2013. 
54 Tuodolo (n50) 537. 
55 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006).  
56 Peter Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
57 O De. Schutter, ‘Towards a new treaty on business and human rights’ (2016) Business and Human Rights 
Journal, 1(1): 77 
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limited research on a regional approach to holding MNCs accountable. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze: 
i. How to improve corporate human rights accountability in Nigeria 
through the African Union, therefore strengthening states’ human 
rights duties to hold multinational corporations accountable.  
This is crucial because the fight to shift responsibility for protection of 
human rights to multilateral or international institutions, or to enact a 
global regulatory regime that will solve the problems of corporate 
human rights violations despite the incapacity of weak states like Nigeria 
to meet their obligations, has been a long time coming.  
In that situation, the solution to the problem, some scholars argue 
correctly, may lie at the regional level.58 However, as argued above, 
some scholars have expressed their dissatisfaction with the performance 
of the AU in monitoring corporate accountability in Africa. They argue 
that although Africa is a continent where abuses of corporate human 
rights are numerous, the AU has done nothing significant to solve these 
problems.59 Unfortunately, there is a lack of research in this area. While 
research on corporate governance and accountability is high, specific 
focus on implementing the guiding principles through a regional 
instrument and national institutions in Nigeria is rare and inadequate.60 
 
58 Alice D. Jonge, Transnational Corporations and International Law Accountability in the Global Business 
Environment (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) 149; also Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises 
and the Law (2nd edition, The Oxford International Law Library, 2007) 118. 
59 Ibid.; Daniel Aguirre, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2005) 5 
AHRLJ 239, 265; see also Emeka Duruigbo, ‘Multinational Corporations and Compliance with 
International Regulations Relating to the Petroleum Industry’ (2001), 7 ASICL 101, 126. 
60 Aguirre (n59) 255. 
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Most researchers in this area concentrate on the study of home-state 
jurisdiction without a sufficient nexus to the study of host-state 
jurisdiction and in particular the regional legal jurisprudence. Thus, this 
thesis is important as it aims to fill the gap by engaging in that study. 
It is also significant because it is triggered by a response to the call of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for more 
research in the area of corporate accountability in order to facilitate 
implementation of the framework in this part of the globe.61 Ruggie lays 
the premise by arguing that there is bound to be future debate on the 
UN Guiding Principles (UNGP), but at least we now know what the 
foundations are and how to frame the future debate.62 This thesis will 
engage in an inquiry as part of this future debate on how the AU 
conventions and mechanisms can be improved to hold MNCs 
accountable, and also to ascertain if we can use the foundational 
principles of the guiding principles to confront corporate human rights 
violations regionally, using Nigeria as a case study. 
Aside from the major objective of the thesis, other aims and objectives 
have emerged within the central objective that must be addressed. 
Nigeria is a weak state and could not perform its obligations under the 
guiding principles. In such a situation, how can it implement the guiding 
principles? This thesis also aims, therefore, to explore the reasons why 
Nigeria is unable to stand up to its responsibilities in this regard and 
suggests possible ways of remedying this situation. 
Of course, the whole discourse still centres on the major objective. A 
critical look at the voluntary codes, national laws and regional 
 
61 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for 




instruments reveals that they attempt to solve this problem of weakness 
of states by suggesting complementary efforts from other states and 
host states alike, in accordance with the principle of international law.63 
Among other things, it prescribes that where states are unable to protect 
human rights adequately, 64  because MNCs are involved, the home 
states have roles to play in ensuring that businesses are not involved in 
human rights violations.65 It also calls for combined efforts from civil 
society and co-operation among states to resolve the issue of human 
rights responsibility and accountability by corporations. In fact, the use 
of extra-territorial jurisdiction is also supported for the attainment of 
that purpose.66 In that regard, the AU as a regional organization has a 
vital role to play in this matter, to use its institutional structure and 
mechanism to evolve a legal regime of corporate accountability in the 
continent. The inquiry of how the AU can fit into this challenge is the 
main engagement of this thesis. 
Another objective is to examine how corporations can be liable, together 
with states, for their complicity for human rights violations under the 
African human rights system. In order to do this, it is important to 
examine the state of the current level of the regulatory, normative and 
corporate accountability framework for corporations doing business in 
Nigeria. In doing this, it is important to note that Western notions and 
concepts of international law dictate the AU’s legal jurisprudence,67 with 
few modifications to reflect an African perspective. Therefore, even 
 
63 Note that the UNGP also call for complementary efforts from corporations.  
64 United Nations Human Rights, ‘Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework’ (2011) New York and Geneva 3. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Rachel Murray, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2000) 50; Nsongurua J. Udombana, ‘Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting States’ 
Obligations under the African Human Rights Charter’ (2004) 40 SJIL 105,121. 
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though most of the AU treaties can be violated by states with the 
complicity of corporations, or vice versa, the existing legal structure of 
the AU does not hold corporations directly accountable for violations of 
human rights. 
This is due to the fact that only states are parties to the African human 
rights treaty regime. It thus means that the African human rights 
system follows the state-centric view of international law that seeks to 
protect human rights through the instrumentality of the states alone, on 
the premise that only states are the primary bearers of human rights 
obligations.68 As a result, the state, and not corporations, has four 
important duties to give effect to the provisions of regional and 
international human rights treaties. 
The first is the duty to respect human rights, and the purpose is to 
prevent the government itself from trampling on the rights of the people. 
The second is the duty to protect human rights; this places obligation 
on the state to protect its citizens from human rights violations by third 
parties. The third is the duty to promote human rights, which is a unique 
duty in the African treaty regime69
 
because it places a further obligation 
on the state to showcase its human rights record. The last is the duty 
to fulfil human rights, which is a mandatory injunction to states to 
implement and realize the purports and intents of human rights. 
As a result of these obligations, a state can be held liable for failure to 
discharge its obligations under the African human rights regime, as it is 
clear that the state is the mechanism of enforcement of the human 
 
68 Martin Dixon, International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 174. 
69 This is the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), an African treaty 
adopted in Nairobi, Kenya, by the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government on 27 June 1981, OAU doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982) which 
entered into force on 21 October 1986 and was ratified by all member states of the African Union including 
Eritrea, which acceded to the Charter in January 1999. See Article 1 of the African Charter. 
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rights regime in Africa. Unfortunately, most states are complicit in 
corporate human rights violations in Africa, as this study has shown 
earlier. 
The deficiency of the AU’s legal structure with regard to corporate 
accountability was seen in the case of SERAC and CESR v Government 
of Nigeria70
 
where the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR, or the African Commission) rendered a decision holding 
the Nigerian government liable for complicity in the violation of human 
rights perpetuated by corporations on the grounds of state responsibility 
without attributing any blame to the corporations involved. The African 
Commission found Nigeria to have breached its four-fold obligations 
guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Charter), and was therefore found to have violated the right to enjoy 
Charter-guaranteed rights and freedoms without discrimination,71 the 
right to life,72 the right to property,73 the right to health74
 
(Article 16), 
the right to housing,75 the right to food,76 the right of peoples to freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources,77 and the right of peoples 
to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.78 
The implication of that case is that if the state fails to perform its four-
fold obligations to protect, respect, promote and fulfil human rights, 
 
70 Communication 155/96; Decision handed down at the 30th Ordinary Session of the Commission held in 
The Gambia. For text, see Bernard H. Oxman, ‘International Decisions’ (2002), 96 AJIL 677–684. The case 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
71 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1982) 21 l.L.M 58, Article 2. 
72 Ibid., Article 4. 
73 Ibid., Article 14. 
74 Ibid., Article 16. 
75 Ibid., Article 18(1). 
76 Ibid., implicit in Articles 4, 16 and 22. 
77 Ibid., Article 21. 
78 Ibid., Article 24. 
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there can be no remedy under the present African legal jurisprudence 
to hold corporations accountable. 
According to Joe Oloka-Onyango, the main focus of condemnation by 
the African Commission was the government of Nigeria; little attention 
was given to the obligations and responsibilities (in human rights terms) 
of the companies that were intimately involved in many of the human 
rights violations that occurred there.79 At the end, the decision of the 
African Commission was biased, making the Nigerian government 
responsible for all the atrocities that happened. 
In truth, the position of the African Commission is understandable. The 
Commission could not have focused on the corporation involved (Shell 
Petroleum Development Company, SDPC) when the African human 
rights system, like all other regional human rights systems, is in fact 
state-based. The problem lies with the state-based structure, and it 
would be unfair to expect the African Commission to condemn the 
structure that ensures its legitimacy. As such the responsibility to 
change the structure lies with the AU, not with the African Commission. 
However, this study is of the view that the African Commission’s decision 
could have been better if it had considered corporate law and human 
rights theory together with international law. According to Steven 
Ratner80  human rights theory does not accept efforts to limit duty 
holders to states or to those administering state policy. He further 
argues correctly that corporate law provides direction to international 
law on the need to see corporations, and not just those working for them, 
 
79 Joe Oloka-Onyango, ‘Who’s Watching “Big Brother”? Globalisation and the Protection of Cultural 
Rights in Present-day Africa’ (2005) 5 AHRLJ 1–26,25. 




as duty holders.81 Consequently, this study interrogates the question of 
corporate liability for their complicity for human rights violations under 
the African human rights system. It rests on the conceptual 
underpinning that international law is not static; it is shifting and 
adjusting itself to meet the challenges of human rights protection by 
moving from the era of strict construction of states as duty bearers to 
include individuals and now to non-state actors.82 
The reasons behind the inclusion of non-state actors are the inadequacy 
of state responsibility and individual responsibility to meet the 
challenges of corporations. 83  This study therefore proves that 
corporations are duty bearers who should be saddled with obligations to 
protect human rights. Thus, human rights responsibility refers to 
obligations of corporations to respect human rights. However, 
accountability helps in questioning the crack of that obligation by the 
corporation. The whole idea of accountability is to prevent and remedy 
the arbitrary use of power.84 In the Corfu-Channel case, the conception 
of accountability as a check in the use of power by questioning the 
conduct of people, states or institutions was adopted.85 Consequentially, 
the court observed rightly that a state on whose territory an act contrary 
to international law has occurred may be called upon to give an 
explanation.86
 
The concept of corporate accountability as used in this 




83 Oloka-Onyango (n79) 25. 
84 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1981). 
85 Nils Rosemann, ‘New Perspectives of Accountability: The Merging Concept of Corporate 
Responsibilities with Regard to Human Rights’ (2004) paper delivered at the Florence Founding 
Conference of the ESIL1–14 at 8 < http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Rosemann_0.PDF >accessed 
17 May 2020. 
86 Corfu-Channel case, ICJ Reports (1949), para. 8. 
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imposition of penalties in cases of non-compliance and the right of 
victims to seek redress.87 
Indeed, this enquiry has come at the most appropriate time. A regional 
institution like the EU has been taking proactive steps to ensure that its 
home-based corporations do not violate human rights abroad. 88 
Certainly, the AU must learn from the EU but it is difficult to compare 
the two regional institutions because they have different historical 
backgrounds, focus and levels of growth. Nonetheless, the recent move 
by the AU to extend the jurisdiction of the proposed African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to cover corporate liability 89
 
indicates its preparedness to take the issue of corporate accountability 
seriously. Article 46C of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights (Protocol) seeks to invest the ACJHR with 
power to try legal persons for criminal corporate liability. 90 
Notwithstanding the criticism of some scholars that the motive behind 
the ACJHR91 is a ploy to settle a score with the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) by providing an escape route for the trial of African leaders 
by the ICC, 92  the establishment of the ACJHR with jurisdiction on 
 
87 Peter Utting, ‘The Struggle for Corporate Accountability in Development and Change’ (2008), 39 DAC 
959– 997,965–966. 
88 Joshua M. Chanin, ‘The Regulatory Grass Is Greener: A Comparative Analysis of the Alien Tort Claims 
Act and the European Union’s Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2005) 12I JGLS 745,778. 
Note that the EU Framework too is not perfect but it ‘is a sound initial step towards a very worthwhile end’. 
89 Franny Rabkin , ‘African Human Rights Court Could Cover Criminal Offences’ Business Day (29 
January 2014) <http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/law/2014/01/29/african-human-rights-court-could-cover-
criminal-offences >accessed 18 May 2020. 
90 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights’ adopted by AU Heads of State and Governments on 27 June 2014< 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-file-
protocol_statute_african_court_justice_and_human_rights.pdf>accessed 20 May 2020. 
91 Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court, 
Assembly/ AU/Dec.366 (XVII), adopted at the 17th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, 30 June to 1 
July 2011 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (para. 8). 
92 Stephen Arthur Lamony, ‘African Court Not Ready for International Crimes’, African Arguments< 
http://africanarguments.org/2012/12/10/african-court-not-ready-for-international-crimes-–-by-steven-
lamony/ > accessed 11 June 2020; Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, ‘Concerning the Criminal Jurisdiction of the 
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corporate liability will go a long way to address the issue of corporate 
human rights accountability. In fact, Vincent Nmehielle argues that it is 
easy for any commentator or observer to view the move as indeed 
reactionary due to a perceived “Africa backlash” on the ICC.93 
In addition, the capability of the ACJHR as it is presently constituted by 
the Draft Protocol to handle a wide array of cases which include genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, terrorism, corruption, illicit 
exploration of natural resources, and criminal corporate liability, among 
others, is doubtful. With respect to corporate criminal impunity, the idea 
to extend the jurisdiction is commendable. Currently, on the issue of 
corporate human rights responsibility, the component of reform in any 
nation or region of the world should be the best practices. As such this 
thesis asserts that a regional institution intending to make 
complementary efforts that will adequately address the issue of 
corporate accountability must start from a critical examination of the 
regional mechanisms and then begin research on how to implement it 
to the AU. The issue of access of individuals to the ACJHR is not even 
guaranteed. Yet, the hope of attaining a society free from corporate 
abuse in Africa is not lost. 
The question for consideration is whether focusing on regional 
mechanisms is an adequate compliance and if that can ensure corporate 
accountability? The answer may be negative, but it is the beginning of 
the process of corporate accountability in Africa. Consequently, this 
thesis seizes this opportunity to fill the missing link. It interrogates how 
 
African Court – A Response to Stephen Lamony’, African Arguments < 
http://africanarguments.org/2012/12/19/concerning-the-criminal-jurisdiction-of-the-african-court-–-a-
response-to-stephen-lamony-by-chidi-anselm-odinkalu/>accessed 13 May 2020. 
93 Vincent Nmehielle, ‘Taking Credible Ownership of Justice for Atrocity Crimes in Africa: The 
African Union and the Complementarity Principle of the Rome Statute’, in Vincent Nmehielle (eds), 
Africa and the future of International Criminal Law (EIP 2012) 240. 
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the present potential in the AU can be projected to live up to the 
demands of the widely acclaimed internationally recognized principles 
of corporate accountability recognized by the UNGP and how the hydra-
headed problems of corporate human rights violations can be resolved. 
This is a crucial issue for two reasons. One, the failure of the states to 
protect always leads to violations of human rights treaties of the AU 
itself; and two, research in this area is rare, as noted earlier.94 Thus, 
this thesis is important as it aims to fill the gap by engaging in that 
enquiry. 
In addition, this study, if completed and published, will facilitate 
effective and efficient regulatory mechanism on corporate accountability 
in African states; it will also motivate the AU to evolve a complementary 
regulatory and normative framework that will help the states to meet 
their expectation in the UN framework and serve as an instrument of 
advocacy at the hands of law firms, NGOs and international 
organizations interested in corporate human rights accountability. 
Ultimately, the study will also be useful to various stakeholders such as 
students, legal practitioners, policy-makers, states, regional institutions 
in Africa, international institutions, corporations, academics, 
researchers and a host of others who have a stake or interest in 
corporate human rights obligations and accountability in Africa. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
As noted earlier, the guiding principles have provided us with a template 
to address the issue of human rights and accountability. According to 
Ruggie, the framework is not a toolkit because it does not provide a 
 




ready-made solution to the problems at hand. It calls for a thorough 
research before implementation. In fact, the truth is that if a thorough 
research is done as contemplated by Ruggie, a new framework will 
emerge. The beauty of that new framework is not that it will be in 
conflict with the general principles enunciated but that it will take care 
of the peculiar history, experience and unique environmental differences 
of each nation, state or continent. This study will consider one main 
question and other sub-questions. The main research question is: 
i. How to improve the human rights accountability of multinational 
corporations in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria? 
Subsidiary questions that are addressed are: 
ii. What are the reasons in favour of human rights accountability by 
multinational corporations in Nigeria? 
iii. What is the nature, extent and history of human rights violations 
by corporations in Nigeria?  
iv. What is the current level of regulatory, normative and corporate 
accountability framework for corporations doing business in 
Nigeria? 
v. Is the current level satisfactory? 
vi. Are soft laws enough to hold MNCs accountable?  
vii. How do and can AU mechanisms hold corporations accountable?  
 
1.5 Research methodology and Approach 
It is essential to note that methods used for data collection and analysis 
be precise.95  Chynoweth posits that there would not be any significance 
 
95 Jan Jonker and Bartjan Pennick, The Essence of Research Methodology: A Course Guide for Master and 
PhD Students in Management Science (Springer –Verlag, 2010). 
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in inserting a methodology section in a doctrinal research writing as it 
does not entail data collection but analysis.96 While this statement may 
be true for published research journals, it may not necessarily apply to 
a PhD thesis. This is so because if the nature of the method and 
methodology used are unknown, evaluating and synthesising this thesis 
with other related studies will be difficult.97  
This section of work describes the various reasons for the selection of 
the methodology taken. A research methodology is "a technique for 
collecting data which could involve specific instruments such as self-
completion questionnaires, structured interviews or participant 
observation".98 Also, it can simply be “a strategy or plan of action that 
leads methods to actions”.99 In order words, a research methodology is 
a justification for using a particular research method.100 
 
1.5.1 Legal Research methods 
Legal research is ideally through either doctrinal legal method or non-doctrinal 
legal method.101 
1.5.1.1 Non- doctrinal legal research 
Non-doctrinal research, also known as social-legal research, involves 
methods taken from other disciplines to generate empirical data that 
answers research questions.102 It can be a policy, problem, or a reform 
 
96 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods 
in the Built Environment (Wiley- Blackwell, 2008) 37. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Alan Bryman and Emma Bell, Business Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 32. 
99 John Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches, 2nd edition 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 5. 
100 C.R. Kothari, Research Methodology and Techniques (2nd edn, New Age Publishers 2004) 26. 
101Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2012). 
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of the existing law.103 A legal non-doctrinal finding can be qualitative or 
quantitative, and a dogmatic non-doctrinal result can be part of a large-
scale project.104 The non-doctrinal approach lets the researcher conduct 
research that analyses the law from some other science disciplines and 
employ those disciplines in drafting the law.105 Simply put, non-doctrinal 
helps in understanding how other disciplines influence law and legal 
research.106 
 
1.5.1.2 Doctrinal legal research 
Doctrinal or library-based research is a common methodology employed 
by those researching law. Doctrinal research seeks to find, what is the 
law in a particular case.107 It is interested in the analysis of the legal 
doctrine and how it developed and applied.108 This is mainly theoretical 
research,109 that involves simple research to find a specific statement of 
the law or legal analysis with more complex logic and depth.110 Simply 
put, it is library-based research that seeks to find the "one right answer" 
to specific legal issues or questions. Thus, this type of methodology aims 
to make particular inquiries to identify particular pieces of information.111 
All inquiries will have specific answers to particular questions that can 





106  Susan Mcvie, 'challenges in socio-legal empirical research' < 
https://www.create.ac.uk/methods/methodological-challenges/socio-legal-empirical-research/ > accesses 18 
April 2021. 
107 Salim Ali, Zuryati Yusoff and Zainal Ayus, ‘Legal Research of Doctrinal and Non-Doctrinal ( n102). 
108 Ibid. 
109 Geoffrey Wilson, 'Comparative Legal Scholarship' in Mike McMconville and Wing Hong Chui, Research 
Methods for Law (Edinburgh university press, 2012) 164. 




library-based research.112 These steps include analysis of legal issues to 
determine the need for further research, which is qualitative in nature 
and doesn't necessarily employ statistical analysis of data. 113  The 
qualitative characteristics indicate that this research is not a field or 
laboratory research that will involve any primary collection procedure 
such as mass observation, telephone survey, or small group study 
behaviour.114 This stage often involves a great amount of reading on a 
subject using sources such as dictionaries, primary textbooks, treatises, 
and journals accompanied by footnotes. Definitions of Terms are 
provided in these sources, that help the researcher understand and 
summarise the legal principles involved in law understudy.115  
 
This study will primarily entail library-based research. It will involve a 
critical analysis of human rights instruments and literature on MNCs 
accountability and the relevant norms, ethics, and codes dealing with 
MNCs accountability at both regional and international levels. 
This thesis utilises a library-based research method. The research 
method adopted was heavily influenced by the research 
questions/objectives explored in the thesis. 
This thesis adopted the library-based research method due to the 
difficulties encountered in adopting other research strategies. For 
example, this thesis jettisoned reliance on interviews with stakeholders 
due to the problems encountered during the research. For example, this 
research encountered difficulties in conducting interviews, especially 
 
112 Ibid. 
113 Paul Chynoweth (n 96). 
114 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (n 101). 
115 Salim Ali, Zuryati Yusoff and Zainal Ayus, ‘Legal Research of Doctrinal and Non-Doctrinal ( n102). 
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amongst high-ranking officials of MNCs and NGOs operating in Nigeria 
who declined an interview. Notwithstanding the potential challenges of 
the strategy adopted in this thesis, its findings are ultimately reliable, 
as this thesis reviewed all relevant data found in various literature on 
the internet. 
Consequently, the thesis will rely significantly on primary and secondary 
sources relevant to the study. The primary sources to be used include 
international and regional human rights instruments, the domestic laws 
of Nigeria regulating the activities of MNCs, and the judgements of 
international, regional and domestic courts. This thesis will also examine 
the Nigerian Constitution to see its impact on the proposed legal 
framework for human rights and accountability. Furthermore, this thesis 
will also investigate UNGP and AU treaties, documents and declarations 
relevant to the study. The secondary sources to be relied on include 
journal articles, law textbooks, and records and reports collected by 
government agencies, human rights bodies/commissions and other 
electronic sources relevant to the study. 
 
1.5.2 Rights-based approach 
The research adopts the rights-based approach. It is based on a legal 
premise of universal entitlement. Also, a rights-based approach provides 
a basis for holding relevant actors accountable and can generate law 
and policy reform.116 The acknowledgement of the fundamental basis of 
procedural rights is the importance of a rights-based approach 
concerning the oil-producing communities of Nigeria to give the people 
 
116 Olubayo Oluduro, ‘Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing 




a starting point for obtaining information concerning environmental 
matters that affect them.117 Rather than confining them to the role of 
passive onlookers to environmental matters that affect them, it also 
facilitates their participation in the decision-making process as a matter 
of right.118 If within this framework, the government fails, it can legally 
be held accountable by the people. As noted by UNICEF, a rights-based 
approach seeks to raise levels of accountability in the development 
process by identifying the rights holders and corresponding duty-
bearers and enhancing the capacities of these duty-bearers to meet 
their obligations.119 A rights-based approach requires the development 
of laws, administrative procedures, and practices and mechanisms to 
ensure the fulfilment of entitlements, as well as opportunities to address 
denials and violations.120 
A human rights-based approach grounded in the international human 
rights framework.121 It is a value-based approach, which works for the 
ethical inclusion of all people, without discrimination, building a fair, just 
and non-discriminatory society. 122  Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand the full context of people's lives: their geographical, social, 
political, cultural, and economic circumstances. 123  With this 
understanding, a rights-based approach works to increase people’s 







121 Rights as defined by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and after that in covenants and 
treaties known as the international framework for human rights. 
122 'Impact of Rights-Based Approaches to Development’< at 









1.6 Scope of Study 
The focus of this research is an inquiry into the possibility of putting 
corporations in Africa under a normative framework that will ensure 
their accountability in the conduct of their business in Africa, using 
Nigeria as a case study. Examples will also be provided from other 
developed and developing countries, in order to learn from other 
experiences. The research is interested in analyzing business-related 
aspects of human rights that are suitable for transnational business in 
Africa in order to propose uniform corporate human rights obligations. 
Consequently, only relevant literature suitable for a discourse on 
corporate human rights responsibility and accountability will be 
considered. 
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This study is divided into seven chapters, as well as an introductory 
chapter and a concluding chapter. Chapter 1 is the introduction, which 
provides a general introduction, explaining the link between corporation 
and business, using Nigeria as a case study, and the ensuing governance 
gap resulting in corporate human rights violations. It also explains the 
background on which the discussion of the remaining chapters is based. 
Chapter Two looks at the history of oil and gas in Nigeria, as well as the 
history of oil pollution in Nigeria. Chapter Three defines concepts 
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relating to this research, and provides an overview of multinational 
corporations and the concept of human rights. 
Chapter Four analyzes the national legal standards dealing with the 
protection of the right to environment. It also looks at several cases 
which have been filed in Nigerian courts and the manner in which the 
Nigerian judiciary has interpreted the laws governing the oil industry 
and decided on the legality or otherwise of the actions of the oil 
companies and the Nigerian government; the concept of accountability 
and human rights is discussed as well. Chapter Five looks at current 
existing international regulatory frameworks for holding multinational 
corporations accountable for human rights violations land also looks at 
voluntary instruments that have attempted to hold MNCs accountable.  
Chapter Six looks at the guiding principles. It examines the tripartite 
framework for corporate accountability, widely known as the United 
Nations Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, the concept of “due-diligence” and extra-territorial 
jurisdiction within its framework. It discusses the nature and extent of 
the human rights obligations protected and articulates the usefulness of 
the guiding principles and their implications for the AU. 
Chapter Seven examines the role of the AU and others in ensuring 
corporate accountability for human rights in Nigeria. The chapter 
therefore examines the African Charter and its institutional and 
regulatory mechanism for the protection of human rights regionally. 
Chapter Eight examines how the AU mechanisms can help hold MNCs 
accountable. The chapter discusses the emergence of corporations as 
new duty bearers, the role that law and institutions can play in 
addressing the issue of corporate human rights responsibility and 
accountability in Africa, and the reasons behind the quest for legal and 
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institutional frameworks for accountability in Nigeria. It identifies 
frameworks for the AU that address corporate human rights violations 
and accountability from an African perspective, with a further study on 
the guiding principles. The proposed framework deals with how the 
widely acclaimed internationally recognized principles of corporate 
accountability, as recognised by the guiding principles, can be used by 
the AU to help a state like Nigeria not only effectively perform its 
international obligations but also solve the problems of corporate human 
rights violations. Therefore, it examines how some legal and policy-
making institutions in the AU can be rejuvenated. It considers possible 
problems that can be encountered in implementing the framework, and 






History of the oil industry in Nigeria 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the subject of the research and 
provided a background of the study. This chapter discusses the history, 
nature and extent of corporate human rights violations in Nigeria. Oil in 
Nigeria generates about 40% of the Gross Domestic Product and 70% 
of government revenues and up to 90% of all what the government 
receives.1 MNCs in the form of colonial companies have been present in 
Nigeria for over a hundred years.2 The earliest MNCs entered Nigeria 
during the colonial regime under the British 3  and some of these 
companies were established in the 19th century after the slave trade was 
abolished. The companies were expected to deal in legitimate trade such 
as palm oil trade.4 
Nigeria is currently the largest producer of oil in Africa, and it holds the 
largest natural gas reserves in the African continent.5
 
In June 2020, 
British Petroleum (BP) released a full energy report with statistical data, 




1 Somina Varrella, Oil Industry in Nigeria –Statistics & Facts, December 1, 2020. < 
https://www.statista.com/topics/6914/oil-industry-in-nigeria/ > accessed 12 April 2021. 
2 Ojo, G.U. ‘Towards a Non-Oil Economy: Resolving the Resource Curse Crisis in Nigeria’ in Ojo, G.U (ed) 
Envisioning a Post-Petroleum Nigeria: Leave the Oil in the Soil Benin City: (ERA/FoEN 2010). 
3 Olufemi Amao, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Multinationals and the Law in Nigeria: Controlling 
Multinationals in Home State” (2008) 52 (1) Journal of African Law 89-113. 
4 Ako Rhuks  & Okonmah Patrick ‘Minority Rights Issues in Nigeria: A theoretical Analysis of Historical 
and Contemporary Conflicts in the Oil-Rich Niger Delta Region’ (2009) 16 (1) International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights 53-65. 
5 U.S energy information administration, on Nigeria, December 2013< 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Nigeria/nigeria.pdf > accessed June 10 2020. 
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proven oil reserve in the world, which totals approximately 37.0 billion 
barrels.6
 
The same 2020 BP report on world oil production shows that 
Nigeria is the 11th largest oil producer in the world, with a production 
rate of 2.2 million barrels per day (bpd),7
 
and the sixth-largest exporter 
of oil, with a 2015 exportation rate of 2.2 million bpd.8 Nigeria has the 
largest natural gas reserves in Africa, 9
 
with estimated proven gas 
reserves of 180.5 trillion cubic feet, 10
 
making it the ninth-largest 
concentration in the world.11  
As of 2015, Nigeria moved up to become the eighth largest oil-exporting 
country to the United States of America, 12
 
and is responsible for 
approximately 30% of the total oil produced in Africa. In October 2014, 
Nigeria became the first country to completely stop selling oil to the 
United States of America, for the first time since 1973, due to the impact 
of the shale revolution.13 
Nigeria’s Finance Minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, announced in 
November 2014 that a 6% drop in its oil revenue would pressurise the 
government into cutting non-essential spending, raise more revenue 
and spend half of its $4.1 billion sovereign wealth fund, down from $11.5 
billion at the start of 2013, to cover budgetary shortfalls. Daniel Yergin, 
an energy researcher with IHS Cera and author of The Quest, a history 
of oil and geopolitics, said that two of Nigerian’ biggest issues are, firstly, 
 
6 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2020 69th edn. < 
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-







13 <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/as-us-shuts-its-door-on-nigeria-s-oil-exports/190455/> accessed 
April 10 2020. 
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the loss of its biggest market in the U.S, and secondly, the price decline 
which had really hit them.14 
John Campbell, who was a previous U.S ambassador to Nigeria, was of 
the view that the country could incline into disarray if the price of oil 
falls beyond its current $78-per-barrel price because its finances have 
already been pushed to breaking point by oil bunkering or theft by 
Nigerian officials, which he estimates represents around 10% of 
Nigerian production.15 
Revenue derived from oil provides 95% of foreign exchange earnings 
for Nigeria, and the Nigerian government gets over 80% of its revenue 
from oil exports. Nigeria earned $196 billion from oil and gas exports in 
the four years from 2007 to 2010.16
 
Between 1960 and 2000, oil worth 
more than $300 billion was extracted from the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria.17
 
In light of this fact, it is clear to see that oil is invaluable to 
the Nigerian economy and to the people of the country. 
Despite the natural resources that the country benefits from, Nigeria 
flares almost 75% of the gas that it produces and re-injects only 12% 
to enhance oil recovery. 18  It is estimated that about 800 million 
standard cubic feet of gas are flared daily in Nigeria.19 – the highest 
 
14 Robert Windrem, ‘Needle on Zero: Nigerians’ Economy Tanking as U.S. Oil Exports Dry Up’ (Nbc 
News, November 29 2014)<  https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/needle-zero-nigeria-s-
economy-tanking-u-s-oil-exports-n256236 >accessed April 11 2021. 
15 Ibid. 
16 John Donovan, ‘Nigeria Oil Revenue Rose 46% to $59bn in 2010 on Improved Security’ (2011) < 
http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2011/04/18/nigeria-oil-revenue-rose-46-to-59bn-in-2010-on-improved-
security/ > accessed 12 April 2020. 
17 Daniel Agbiboa, ‘Corruption in the Underdevelopment in the Nigeria Delta in Nigeria’ (2012) Journal of 
Pan African Studies 5,8< http://www.jpanafrican.com/docs/vol5no8/5.8Corruption.pdf > accessed April 12 
2020. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ishaya Amaza, ‘Nigeria: The Nigerian Gas Flare Commercialization Programme: A Win-Win Situation? 
‘(Aelex, 5 April 2018) < http://www.aelex.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/THE-NIGERIAN-GAS-
FLARE-COMMERCIALIZATION-PROGRAMME.pdf > accessed 12 April 2021. 
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amount of gas flared by any member of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – and from a high standard, gas 
flaring has sky-rocketed in Nigeria since 1996.20 Despite this, Nigeria 
remains the second-largest flaring country in the world and emits about 
$1.8 billion worth of gas annually.21 But what is more shocking than the 
economic loss is the fact that so much gas is wasted, despite the 
country’s rampant energy poverty, because gas flared could have been 
converted into energy. Until 2002, Nigeria accounted for approximately 
25% of all gas flared worldwide.22 This figure has dropped, however, 
and currently, Nigeria accounts for about 20% of the total amount of 
gas flared globally.23 The amount of gas flared by Nigeria would provide 
about 40% of Africa’s gas consumption.24 and perhaps meet the needs 
of the West African sub-region.25 
 
2.2 History of Oil in Nigeria 
Currently, oil is said to account for 53% of the world energy supply.26  
Just before oil was discovered in commercial quantities, agriculture was 
a major source of the Nigerian economy, contributing more than 70% 
of GDP and the majority of Nigeria’s exports.27  
MNCs in Nigeria has been around for more than a hundred years as 
colonial companies. During the colonial era under the British, the first 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 E. Zoheir and F. Jorg, ‘Gas Flaring: The Burning Issue’ (2013)< 
http://www.resilience.org/stories/2013-09-03/gas-flaring-the-burning-issue/ > accessed May 14 2020. 




26 Shell World Energy Supply Projections (1995-2050). Cited in Nlerum, F.E. 'Reflections on Participation 




MNC was already in Nigeria.28 and in the 19th century, after the abolition 
of the slave trade, some of the companies were already established. 
These companies were expected to deal in trade such as palm oil trade.29 
The British colonial companies were the recipient of the beneficial 
colonial laws. For example, in 1900, all mineral resource rights were 
nationalised and vested in the British crown and in 1907, all landholding 
rights were vested in the British crown. 30  In Nigeria, prior to the 
discovery of oil, the most important natural resource exploited by the 
colonial companies was tin.31 
There is no majority opinion amongst academics on the exact year oil 
exploration started in Nigeria.32 However, some authors have stated 
that oil exploration began in Nigeria in 1906.33 According to the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) website, the Nigerian Bitumen 
Co. & British Colonial Petroleum commenced operations around 
Okitipupa in the present-day Ondo State of Nigeria in 1908,34 When the 
Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, owned by a German element, initiated a 
business in the Araromi zone in the western part of Nigeria.35  
 
28 Olufemi Amao,‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Multinationals and the Law in Nigeria: Controlling 
Multinationals in Home State’ (2008) 52 (1) Journal of African Law 89-113. 
29 Ako Rhuks  & Okonmah Patrick, ‘Minority Rights Issues in Nigeria: A theoretical Analysis of Historical 
and Contemporary Conflicts in the Oil-Rich Niger Delta Region’ (2009) 16 (1) International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights 53-65. 
30 Phia Steyn, ‘Oil politics in Ecuador and Nigeria: a perspective from environmental history on the struggles 
between ethnics minority and national governments’ (PhD thesis University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, 
South Africa 2003, 148). 
31 Amao (n27). 
32 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘A Legislative Proposal for Public Participation in Oil and Gas Decision-Making in 
Nigeria’ (2010) 52 (2) Journal of African Law 184 -211. 
33 Phia Steyn, ‘Oil politics in Ecuador and Nigeria: a perspective from environmental history on the struggles 
between ethnics minority and national governments’ (PhD thesis University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, 
South Africa 2003,148). 
34 NNPC  History of Nigerian Petroleum Industry 
<http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/IndustryHistory.aspx  
>accessed June 20 2020. 
35 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation< 
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/DevelopmentoftheIndus
try.aspx > accessed 11 May 2020. 
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However, with the beginning of the First World War in 1914, its 
spearheading endeavours came to an end unexpectedly.36 However, in 
order to prevent non-British companies and others from exploring for oil 
in colonial Nigeria, the British Colonial administration enacted the 
Mineral Ordinance of 1914.37 This law expressly prohibited non-British 
nationals or companies from obtaining mineral rights in colonial 
Nigeria.38 
 
A business agreement was sealed between the Nigerian Bitumen 
Corporation and the Southern Protectorate of Nigeria and prevailing with 
regards to acquiring prospecting rights, soon after convincing the 
administration as well as the Colonial Office that, in view of their insight 
into the district's geography, oil existed in southern Nigeria and that 
their organisation (the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation) was capable of 
discovering it. 39  Consequently, in 1908, the Nigerian Bitumen 
Corporation made its investigation for oil in the Araromi zone between 
Ijebu Ode in the present Ogun State and Okitipupa in the present Ondo 
State.40 All investigation exercises stopped in 1914 as a result of the 
First World War, as there were no remarkable discoveries made, in spite 
of the fact that investigation proceeded for around six years.41 
 
36 Ajomo, M, ‘Law and Changing Policy in Nigeria’s Oil Industry’ in Omotola, J. & Adeogun, A.A. (eds.)  
Law and Development Lagos: (University of Lagos Press 1987) 
37 Mineral Oil Ordinance No. 17 of 1914 (amended in 1925, 1950 and 1958) cited in Ajomo (n35) 
38 NAI, Mineral Ordinance 1907/c80 1290 
39 N.K. Obosi, ‘The Structure of the Nigerian Government’ (2002) < 
http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/adv.asp?Blurb=493 > accessed May 12 2020. 
40 Ayodele-Akaakar F.O, ‘Appraising the Oil and Gas Laws: The Search for Enduring Legislation for the 
Niger Delta Region’ (2001) <http://montrose.ckan.io/dataset/dd5a3107-5788-42eb-8efd-
1345bb4906c9/resource/e11a3fd1-286e-423e-a3fa-9112c716239c/download/data-item-39.-appraising-the-
oil-and-gas-laws---a-search-for-enduring-legislation-for-the-niger-.pdf > 
accessed May 16 2020. 
41 The Times, October 16 1911, 19e., December 11 1912, 9; June 24 1913, 17c; Confidential letter from the 
Petroleum Department, November 12 1936, BP 44063, BPA; Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 193-
6. See also NNPC (n 33). 
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After Shell D’Arcy was granted solitary concession rights over Nigeria in 
1938, around 20 years after the end of the First World War, fresh 
extraction tasks were carried out.42 However, it was not until 1947 that 
Shell D’Arcy’s activities completely continued.43 The license granted to 
Shell to explore oil encompassed mainland Nigeria, and the area was 
357,000 square miles.44 
Extractive activities were extended to different indigenous areas of 
Nigeria throughout the years. In spite of the fact that Shell D’Arcy had 
found its first oil in 1953 in a well in Akata, it still did not manifest any 
profit. 45
 
After Mobil Exploration, Nigeria was granted concessionary 
rights over the entire of northern Nigeria in 1955,46 it was incorporated 
to do business and soon after began extraction activities in Nigeria.47 In 
January 1956, a short while after Mobil’s activities began, an oil rig 
drilled by Shell D’Arcy inside the Agbada territory at Oloibiri, situated in 
the Niger Delta area of Nigeria, brought about the primary disclosure of 
oil, which led to the oil business in Nigeria.48  Two years after the 
disclosure, oil continued to be drilled from the rig, which later resulted 
in Nigeria’s first oil exportation in 1958.49 As noted by Jide Osuntokun, 
Shell D’ Arcy operated: 
 
42 The Times, October 16 1911, 19e., December 11 1912, 9; June 24 1913, 17c; Confidential letter from the 
Petroleum Department, November 12 1936, BP 44063, BPA; Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 
193-6 
43 Ibid. 
44 Manby Browen, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil 
Producing Communities, Human Rights Watch: (1999) New York. Cited in Amao (n33). 
45 Ayodele-Akaakar (n39). 
46 NNPC (n33). 
47 Ayodele-Akaakar (n39). 
48 Legislative Council, March 1956: Question no 52 by the Hon. the Member for Egba Division regarding 
owners of mining land at Agbada and Oloibiri areas and the export of minerals extracted there from, CSE 
1/85/8834 – EP 18247/3, NNAE. 
49 Ibid. Also Ayodele-Akaakar (n39). 
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“….under Mineral Oil Ordinance No.17 of 1914 and its amendment of 
1925 and 1950, which allowed companies registered in Britain or any of 
its protectorates the right to explore for oil in Nigeria, and equally 
provided that the principal officers of those companies must be British 
subjects…”50 
The reincorporation of Shell BP in Nigeria, after Nigeria’s independence 
in 1960, was to conform with Nigerian domestic legislation.51  
The Nigerian government thereafter chose to survey the concession 
rights which had been granted over the whole of Nigeria and finalised 
that different corporations should have exploration rights.52 Following 
that decision, somewhere around 1961/1962, the Nigerian government 
further expanded oil exploration in Nigeria by approving licences to 
explore oil to Agip, Mobil Exploration Nigeria Incorporated, Saftrap 
(currently known as Elf), Amoseas (currently known as Chevron), 
Tenneco (currently known as Texaco) and Nigerian Gulf Oil.53 Offshore 
and onshore exploration was within the provisions of the licences. 
Additionally, in 1961, the Nigerian government authorised the only oil 
refinery. 54  Subsequently, Nigeria proceeded to become the 11th 
member nation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in July 1971, when it joined the institution.55 
 
50 Jide Osuntokun, Oil and Nigeria Development, Development Outlook 1, No. 3,40(1986). 
51 Petroleum Act 1969, Sections 2 and 3, provide that only companies incorporated in Nigeria will participate 
in the industry.  
52 Ibid. 
53 NNPC (n33). 
54 Ibid.  
55 Organization of the Oil Exporting countries < http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm > 
accessed 17 May 2020; see also< http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/new-
era/case_studies/Nigerian_National_Petroleum_Company.pdf >accessed 17 May 2020. 
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By virtue of Decree No. 18 of 1971, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation 
(NNOC) was established on April 1 of the same year.56 The right to 
manage all parts of the Nigerian oil industry, from exploration rights 
through to oil marketing, was given to the NNOC.57 Just before the end 
of 1971, income generated from oil exportation resulted in 
approximately 55% of the profit generated from remote trade.  
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD)
 
was promulgated in 
1972.58 The purpose of the NEPD (which is additionally referred to as 
the Indigenization Decree) was to enhance the power of Nigerians in the 
Nigerian economy so as to reduce cooperation and a decline in 
investment by foreigners.59 This strengthened the Nigerian economy 
because there was an expansion of public-sector dominance. Enterprises 
were classified into two categories under the decree. The first category 
was kept only for Nigerians, while under the second category, foreigners 
were entitled to participate (depending on a few conditions being met).60 
Enterprises were later divided into three categories as a result of the 
NEPD extending the categories in 1977. The first category was reserved 
primarily for Nigerians with some participation from foreigners, while 
the second and third categories were confined to a limit of 40% and 
60%, respectively.61 The Nigerian government procured 35% of the 
value of the oil corporations operating in Nigeria following the passing 
 
56 Center for Energy Economics < http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/new-
era/case_studies/Nigerian_National_Petroleum_Company.pdf > accessed 13 May 2020. 
57 Ibid. 
58 NEPD 1972, Decree No. 4, Federal Military Government, Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary 
No. 10, Vol. 59, February 28 1972, Part A. This was followed by the NEPD 1977, Decree No. 3, Federal 
Military Government, Supplement to Official Gazette No.2, Vol. 69, January 13 1977, Part A.See also, D.O. 
Adeyomo and A. Salami, 'A Review of Privatisation and Public Enterprises Reform in Nigeria' (2008), 






into law of the NEPD.62 The primary participation agreement was drawn 
up between the Nigerian government and the oil companies.63 Under 
the agreement, the government acquired 35% of the joint venture.64 
About 21 years after the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 
Olobiri, the Nigerian government, in April 1977, by virtue of Decree No. 
33, formed the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) through 
a merger of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation and the Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources.65 
Two years after the enactment of the 1977 NEPD, in 1979 the NNPC 
decided to expand the shareholding of its organisation working in Nigeria 
to 60%, thereby ensuring that there was a third investment agreement 
between the Nigerian government, which was well represented by the 
NNPC, and the oil industries, and this immensely expanded the value of 
Nigeria.66 Later in 1979, during the nationalisation period in Nigeria, the 
Nigerian government made a notable impact by nationalising the 
resources of British Petroleum (BP).67 The NNPC, therefore, acquired all 
BP’s assets after the nationalisation, leading to an increment of up to 
80%.68 
As the situation started to become threatening for foreign companies 
who were investing, it led to Nigeria witnessing a great number of 





65 Center for Energy Economics (n56).  
66 Ibid. 
67 Ann Genova, ‘Nigeria’s Naturalization of British Petroleum’ (2010) The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 3,1. 
68 NNPC, History of Nigerian Petroleum Industry 
<http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/IndustryHistory.aspx  
>  accessed 11 November 2020. 
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indigenisation.69 As a result of the hesitance of foreign companies to put 
resources into Nigeria, the Nigerian government endeavoured to make 
a progressively ideal investment place, which led to it deciding, in 1986, 
to give increasingly appealing financial terms for investment in the 
private sectors of the oil and gas industry.70 Nigeria made an edge of 
two dollars per barrel on all oil production in return for expansion of 
investment and extraction and improved recuperation responsibilities by 
involved organisations, which was guaranteed by a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) executed by the administration.71 
 
2.2.1 History of Pollution in the Nigerian Oil Industry 
As stated in the previous section, exploration of oil for business purposes 
in Nigeria began in 1956. Which is to say that as of the 1950s, before 
oil production commenced, there was basically a pollution-free 
environment in Nigeria. 
As the Nigerian oil industry commenced its operations for business, oil 
pollution was inevitable.72  A 2006 scoping report conducted by the 
Nigerian Federal Ministry of Environment, the Nigeria Conservation 
Foundation, the World Wildlife Fund UK73
 
and the International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) 74 
concluded that: 
 
69 Genova (n67). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 ‘Gas Flaring in Nigeria’ <http://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/gas_flaring_nigeria.pdf > 
accessed 19 October 2020. 
73 Niger Delta Natural Resources Damage Assessment and Restoration Project, Phase 1 – Scoping Report. 
Federal Ministry of Environment, Abuja; Nigeria Conservation Foundation, Lagos; WWF, UK; CEESP-
IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, 31 May 2006. 
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World Conservation Union. 
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“Oil and gas activities have caused damage in several forms to the Delta. 
In exploration, seismic lines have cleared significant forest areas, and 
seismic crews have generated thousands of tons of waste, all disposed 
untreated directly into the ecosystem. In production, there is a 
considerable amount of dredging and filling of the water ways, siltation, 
sulfidic dredge spoils leading to acidification of water bodies, erosion, 
spills (well blowouts and facility failures), pollution from gas and 
associated oil flaring, discharge of huge amounts of production water 
containing significant quantities of hydrocarbons, and drilling mud 
discharges. In transportation, laying of several thousand miles of oil and 
gas pipelines across Delta habitats has resulted in significant habitat 
damage and loss, pipeline and tanker spills, and storage tank spills. And 
in refining, toxic sludge discharges and process spills pollute waterways, 
flaring and stack emissions pollute the atmosphere, and refined 
products (particularly petrochemicals) further enter the ecosystem.”75  
It was reported that there were legitimate records which uncovered the 
fact that the gas flaring which occurred within the oil industry while 
Nigeria was still a province of Great Britain was at that time known to 
the British government. While it recognized the fact that the practice 
was unsatisfactory, it was reluctant to bring to an end the unfaltering 
misuse of a portion of Nigeria’s significant oil resources. 76  It was, 
however, transcendentally ascribed to the remarkable benefits made by 
the oil corporations.77 The issue of gas flaring was officially addressed 
just before Nigeria got its independence in 1960, and the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Lord Home, was requested to address the issue 
of wastage of energy and resources, so that, at some point, the British, 
 
75 Scoping Report (n71). 




who were offering counsel to the Nigerians, might be rebuked.78 The 
Secretary of State for the Colonies reacted by stating that until there 
was an advantageous commercial arena and facilities, particularly 
British Petroleum pipelines and storage tanks, were in place to utilize 
the gas, then flaring off the by-products from the oil refineries was seen 
as typical practice.79 
In 1963, J.S. Sandler, the British Trade Commissioner in Lagos for the 
UK Foreign Office, composed a private note stating that Shell and BP 
had to proceed, possibly inconclusively, to flare off a huge extent of the 
related gas created, and were aware that it would probably cause 
problems with Nigerian government officials who, as a result of their 
greed, failed to realize the dangers of exploiting the nation’s natural 
resources, but blamed Shell/BP for misusing Nigeria’s riches, rather than 
acknowledging the fact that the widespread uncontrolled flaring of gas 
should be addressed.80 Sandler, likewise, criticized the using of funds 
on uneconomic strategies for utilizing gas, and expressed that it was 
fascinating to see the degree to which the oil organizations perceived it 
to be important.81 
The note from Sandler went further to state that:  
“in the long run, Shell/BP was going to have to consider very carefully 
how it would explain publicly the large outflow of capital that is likely to 
take place towards the end of the decade ... it will no doubt come as 
something of a shock to Nigerians when they find that the company is 
remitting large sums of money to Europe. The company will have to 
 
78 See Memorandum of 21st June 1960, given to the Secretary of State, Mr Edmund de Rothschild, of the 
banking family: ‘Natural Gas in Nigeria’, file DO 35/10500, UK National Archives. 
79 Nigerian Oil and Natural Gas Industry, file DO 177/33, UK National Archives.  




counter the criticisms which will very probably be made to the effect 
that the company is exploiting Nigeria by stressing the very large 
contribution it is making to Nigeria’s export earning.”82 
By only flaring gas, Nigeria was uniquely responsible for the emission of 
more ozone-depleting substances into the environment than every other 
source in sub-Saharan Africa put together, as per the World Bank report 
of 2002.83 As expressed by the United States Department of Energy, gas 
flaring in Nigeria led to a total of 300 million metric tonnes of 
atmospheric carbon being released into the environment between 1963 
and 2001.84 It was determined that in 2001 alone, 12 million metric 
tonnes of atmospheric carbon was discharged into the atmosphere in 
Nigeria.85 
An examination supported by the World Bank characterized the flaring 
of gas as the inefficient outflow of ozone-harmful substances which leads 
to global warming.86 In light of appraisals made in 2000, the yearly 
overall volume of gas which is being flared sums up to around 110 billion 
cubic metres.87 This is sufficient to bolster the yearly utilization of South 
and Central America.88  
 
82 J.S. Sandler, ‘Gas and Flaring in Nigeria: a human right, an environmental and economic monstrosity’ 
<https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/gasnigeria.pdf > 
accessed 20 May 2020. 
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trade.org/images/stories/publications/IP6/Nig_GasFlaring_Petroleum%20Training%20Journal%20(PTJ)%2
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86 Defining the Environmental Development Strategy for Niger Delta’ (1995), 14266, 2 
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 >accessed 12 April 2021. 
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Around 1,000 standard cubic feet of associated gas is created for every 
barrel of oil produced in Nigeria, which promotes a day-to-day 
generation of roughly 2.8 billion standard cubic feet of gas.89 This makes 
up about 10% of the entire amount of gas flared globally, as indicated 
by some sources.90
 
As per the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Environment, 
the Nigeria Conservation Foundation, the World Wildlife Fund UK and 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN), the Niger Delta is among the 10 most important 
wetlands and eco-frameworks on the planet and is one of the five most 
extremely polluted biological communities being harmed by oil 
exploration in the world,91 with spilled oil which could be approximated 
to nine to 13 million barrels and a region where gas flaring has been 
continuously allowed.92 
Records demonstrate that as regards the flaring of gas on the United 
Kingdom’s Continental Shelf in the North Sea, a vastly improved 
methodology was undertaken during the 1970s, contrary to the frame 
of mind shown by the British in regard to gas flaring in Nigeria.93 
Notwithstanding gas flaring in Nigeria, several great mishaps bringing 
about the release of oil into the environment had occurred. These 
mishaps have included the emission of a large number of gallons of oil 
in a few spill occurrences.94 There have been records gathered for the 
years from 1976 to 1988 for spillage of oil which has been accounted 
 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-
1303327122200/279gerner.pdf > accessed 21 May 2020. 








for by the oil companies;95 spills involving the release of about 2.1 
million barrels (or 88.2 million gallons)96 of petroleum oil in the Niger 
Delta area of Nigeria were accounted by the companies in about 2,696 
spill incidents over this period,97 having recorded the most astounding 
amount of oil spills in the 1978 to 1980 yearly record.98 
As demonstrated by several reports between 1970 and 1982, more than 
1,500 episodes of oil spills were recorded in Nigeria.99 However, it would 
be safe to presume that the amount of oil that was spilled over this 
period was a lot higher, in light of the incorrect information usually 
provided and the rareness with which it was provided.100 
Additionally, in oil spills which involved just a single oil company over 
the 10-year time frame between 1982 and 1992, 27 separate 
occurrences brought about the emission of about 1.6 million gallons of 
oil into the environment, but under 30% of the oil spilt was retrieved.101 
According to records 40% of the total number of spills recorded by Shell, 
which operated in more than 100 nations, were in Nigeria.102 
The generous measure of oil that is being discharged onshore in local 
communities is in no doubt the fault of oil companies exploring the 
region. They have continuously asserted that numerous inland spills are 
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99 Emmanuel Nnadozie, ‘The Curse of Oil in Ogoniland’ < http://www.umich.edu/~snre492/cases_03-
04/Ogoni/Ogoni_case_study.htm >accessed 21 May 2020. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Leighton, Roht-Arriaza and Zarsky (n96). 




the result of the treachery of oil pipelines, and sometimes as a result of 
militants vandalizing oil pipelines. Regardless, it became obvious that oil 
companies were unable and even reluctant to fix the loopholes 
throughout the years.103 
The circumstances in the Nigerian oil industry have turned out to be a 
worldwide scandal, so much so that Diane Abbott – the first black, 
female Member of Parliament (MP) in Britain, representing the Hackney 
North and Stoke Newington constituency – stated on 9 April 2006, in 
The Jamaica Observer newspaper, that the finding of oil has been an 
ecological catastrophe for the Niger Delta, where the oil is extracted.104 
The continuous contamination of water by petroleum has made the 
water undrinkable for the indigenes, even as Shell and other Western 
oil corporations have conspired with successive military tyrannies to 
assault the local area. 
The lands that indigenes cultivate have all been destroyed by the 
continuous flaring of gas in the Niger Delta region, which is known to be 
the greatest source of ozone-depleting petroleum substances in Africa. 
The petroleum by-product is simply scorched in mammoth flares which 
cause limitless ecological harm, and this is symbolic of the mercilessly 
exploitative nature of the oil extractive industry in Nigeria.105 
Throughout the years, the attitude of the framework of the oil industry 
in Nigeria has not improved and the pollution being emitted has not 
diminished. Information concerning episodes of spillage of oil have been 
incorrect, and conformity with established laws has been exceptionally 
 
103 Ibid. 
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negligible, with corporations doing what they need without having 
regard for the soul and intent of various acts/regulations, and depending 
on inadequacy in the law to avoid responsibility regarding the 
displeasing practices they choose to adopt – and obviously the 
debasement of the Nigerian government throughout the years has not 
improved the situation.106 
The report by members of a US delegation trip – which was non-
governmental and took place from 6 to 20 September 1999 – expressed 
the view that there has been a long and horrible record of environmental 
degradation and violations of human rights in the areas in Nigeria where 
petroleum is being produced, with a gross dimension of environmental 
degradation caused by oil exploration and extraction in the Niger Delta 
which had gone unsupervised for 30 years.107 It further stated that 
evidence demonstrated that the oil corporations have acted in complicity 
with the military, by the oil corporations neglecting their duties towards 
the environment, but rather conspiring with the military to intimidate 
Nigerian citizens.108 It proceeded to state that it has cost numerous lives, 
and the steadiness of the oil-producing community keeps on been 
compromised due to the conspiracy between multinational oil 
corporations in Nigeria only to make profits.109  
The extractive industries in operation in the Niger Delta have 
demonstrated double standards by not utilizing either the leading 
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for environmental degradation can be reduced by upgrading to new 
technological advancements.110 
 
2.3 Oil Spills 
a) The Ebubu Ochani Spill – In the early 1980s, a spill of petroleum 
covering around 10 hectares of land was found in a thick, occasionally 
swamped forest in Ebubu land near the Ejamah village. Petroleum was 
some metres down and was said to have begun amid the Nigerian civil 
war which was fought between 1967 and 1970.111 For several days there 
was a fire which was ignited on the site with the oil spill. Due to the war, 
Shell had closed down production and pulled back from the area, which 
led to no move being made; however, Shell claimed that it owned the 
broken-down equipment which caused the oil spill.112 
Thirteen years after the civil war ended and long after Shell had restored 
its image in the Niger Delta, there was no action taken with regard to 
the oil spill; neither was the devastation that it had caused to the 
environment cleaned up, and because of this, in 1983 the ruler of 
Ejamah-Ebubu filed a claim against Shell seeking compensation. Shell 
did not initiate a clean-up until 1990 – by then it was 20 years after the 
end of the war and perhaps 20 years after the spill first occurred – even 
though it had promised to clean up the oil spill earlier. Unfortunately 
when Shell pulled out of Ogoniland, the clean-up was deserted. 
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Government Area of Rivers State, Nigeria (2011) J.Appl.Sci.Envionmental Management 15, 4. Also < 
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/51861/1/ja11090.pdf >accessed 14 April 2021.. 
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b) The Texaco Oil Well Burst – A faulty piece of machinery in the oil 
field in Funiwa was the reason for the Funiwa village oil well burst, which 
affected around 5,000 kilometres off the Niger Delta coast on 17 January 
1980. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the Chevron Oil 
Company and the Texaco Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum Company were 
all joint ventureres of the field at that time. The incident lasted for close 
to 13 days, which led to a fire outbreak that caused grievous harm as 
the fire didn’t cease for two days. 400,000 barrels of crude oil was 
released into the environment as a result of the incident, which had an 
adverse effect on land and water. Due to the obliteration of more than 
800 acres of mangrove forest and the contamination of rivers and creeks, 
close to five towns were affected indirectly,113 and as a result of the 
contaminated water, seafood in the water was either killed or 
adulterated by oil spillage.114 Indigenes of the local communities were 
deprived of basic rights to clean water because of the contamination; 
their means of survival was basically taken away from them because 
most of the locals were fishermen.115 After assessing the extent of the 
damage caused by the spill, foreign experts suggested that the victims 
be compensated with the sum of roughly US$60,000,000. The operator 
of the Funiwa field, Texaco, agreed to pay US$6,000,000 to the affected 
communities, however, which was one tenth of the proposed 
compensation. This was not taken well by the communities, and so 
caused a stand-off between the communities and the oil company, which 
moved the Nigerian government to intercede. After an inquiry tribunal 
requested further recommendations, Texaco was advised to pay 
 
113 S.O. Aghalino and B. Eyinla, ‘Oil Exploitation and Marine Pollution: Evidence from the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria’ (2009)  J.Hum Ecol 28,3. Also < http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JHE/JHE-28-0-000-
09-Web/JHE-28-3-000-09-Abst-PDF/JHE-28-03-177-09-1964-Aghalino-S-O/JHE-28-03-177-09-1964-
Aghalino-S-O-Tt.pdf > accessed 23 December 2020. 




compensation to the communities to the total of US$12,000,000. The 
Nigerian government ordered that Texaco pay the compensation 
granted to the Rivers State government, rather than directly to the 
affected communities, and as expected the funds were diverted by the 
corrupt Rivers State government, instead of being handed out to the 
victims who were impacted.116 
A legal action was eventually brought against Texaco for refusal to pay 
compensation for damages due to victims of the spill; this led to 
disappointed victims deciding to withdraw a considerable number of 
their cases as they were disappointed at the way the entire issue was 
overseen.117 
(c) The Idoho Spillage – A ruptured pipeline, running between the 
Idoho production platform and the Qua Iboe terminal, in Akwa Ibom 
State in Nigeria, led to the environment being polluted by 40,000 barrels 
of crude oil. On 12 January 1998, Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited 
claimed that the faulty pipeline, which was installed in 1971, had been 
certified on 1 May 1991 until 2011, which was a period of 20 years.118 
On 21 January 1998, Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited, after having 
started an oil-spill clean-up, claimed that over 90% of the oil had 
evaporated – which was what brought it to the knowledge of the public 
– while the remaining had naturally disseminated, although some oil had 
been retained due to the clean-up; however, there were no solid figures 
given with regards to the measure. In Nigeria on 2 February 1998, five 
states119 reported that their water was contaminated due to the oil 
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wind and wave actions. Communities made claims for compensation and 
individuals claimed that they had lost their means of survival, alongside 
the pollution of their water and destruction of equipment, as Mobil 
depicted the oil spill as a major disaster. 
(d) Other More Recent Spills 
(i) In October 2004 several thousand barrels of oil were released into 
the environment, due to a pipeline which was owned by Shell and 
located near the Goa community in Ogoniland being damaged, causing 
a fire outbreak which was devastating to the people in the community, 
as their canoes and palm trees were destroyed. The local residents were 
denied of their means of livelihood but also of their source of water 
supply, as severe pollution was additionally inflicted on the surrounding 
mangroves and lakes, which supplied drinking water to the community 
and was a fish habitat. 
(ii) Facilities belonging to Shell in the Ogbia territory of Bayelsa State 
experienced an oil spillage in June 2005. This spill led to a leakage of oil 
into the rivers in the region. Shell sent a team to investigate the matter, 
but did not take any action for some time thereafter. 
(iii) On 14 August 2006, an oil well120 owned by Shell leaked oil which 
polluted the environment, leading to a subsequent fire incident. Shell 
did not succeed in putting out the fire until after three months of trying, 
and tried to exonerate itself from responsibility for the outbreak by 
claiming that the oil well was vandalized by angry indigenes.  
(iv) The first oil ever exported from Nigeria was from Bodo, in 1958. 
One of the supervisors on Bodo’s maritime facility claimed that in August 
2008 significant changes were made to the lives of 69,000 people who 
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live in the region when a greasy sheen was discovered in Bodo swamp, 
five miles away from the houses in Bodo.121 As much as 3,000 barrels a 
day was said to have been spilled into the water, and the spill was not 
stopped until 7 November 2008, although Shell first questioned the 
validity of the dispute. Just a month after the November spill, in 
December 2008, the pipeline in Bodo swamp was damaged again. On 
this occasion Shell did not take responsibility by investigating or trying 
to fix the damage immediately, but waited until 19 February 2009. An 
excess of 280,000 barrels may have been spilled, as indicated by oil spill 
assessment experts who analyzed both physical evidence and videos of 
the two spills. According to Nenibarini Zabby, Head of Conservation at 
the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development in Port 
Harcourt, this was the most serious oil spill, as Bodo was a major 
meeting point of many other pipelines that collected oil from nearly 100 
wells in the Ogoni district, and a lot of minor spills within the 
communities have been recorded over the years. 
This inflicted grievous hardship on indigenes of the community, as they 
lost their means of survival, so began leaving the community in large 
numbers, looking for a better settlement Almost 80% of the indigenes 
in the Bodo community were fishermen and they had no clean water to 
survive on.122 
Many cases have been filed against Shell with regards to oil spillage 
which has polluted the community; fines have been given to Shell many 
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times; compensation has been made without communities ever 
receiving payments most of the time; and even when compensation is 
eventually given, it will have been after years and years of appeals in 
court in Nigeria. 
On 7 January 2015, a monetary agreement was reached between Shell 
and the Bodo community for a sum of £55 million, which was to be 
disbursed to victims who had been affected by the oil spills in one way 
or the other, and whatever was remaining was to be used to further 
develop the Bodo community123 and clean up the mess made. We can 
only hope that the money will be used for the purpose for which it was 
allotted. 
Industry watchers have concluded that on average, there are at least 
three major oil spills recorded in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria each 
month, as Shell has been accused of having a leaking pipeline from 
which over 800,000 barrels of oil has been leaking out continuously for 
several months in the Niger Delta.124
 
Sometimes these oil spills are not just accidents but deliberate attempts 
by oil companies to dispose of drilling waste, thereby harming the land 
and water. 
In Nigeria, oil companies do not follow proper pollution-reducing 
techniques125 but frequently discard waste from oil drilling directly into 
fresh-water bodies. US environmental regulations, for instance, totally 
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January 2015) < https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2015/shells-nigerian-subsidiary-
settlement-with-bodo-community.html > 
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forbid the dumping of produced water or drilling mud from onshore 
facilities into surface-water bodies; produced water has to be re-infused 
for recovery or infused into disposal wells, while drilling muds are to be 
landfilled. The Nigerian government has been under overwhelming 
criticism for permitting oil companies to dump waste in a way that would 
be unlawful in the United States.  
Multinational corporations in the oil industry in Nigeria give an 
unmistakable, well-recorded record of the environmental degradation 
caused by oil multinationals and the impact of that degradation in the 
community.126 The examples mentioned above show the need to adapt 
a legal avenue through which multinational corporations can be held 
accountable for violating the environment.  
It is important to broaden the scope of national, regional and 
international law so as to ensure that human rights and the environment 
are protected, as environmental degradation done by multinational oil 
corporations and its impact on health have not been addressed, and the 
victims have had no alternative legal recourse through which to pursue 
their claims.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the history and development of the oil industry 
and pollution in Nigeria, as well as the current environmental problems 
associated with oil exploration and production activities in Nigeria. We 
have been able to understand the history and development of the oil 
industry in Nigeria, as well as the current environmental problems 
associated with oil exploration and production activities in Nigeria, in the 
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form of oil spills and gas flaring. We can see the reliance placed on oil 
by the Nigerian government, as the revenue derived from this industry 
forms the bedrock of the Nigerian economy. Despite the economic 
benefits resulting from the discovery of oil in Nigeria, the subsequent 
exploitation of the oil has had a negative effect on the people who live 
within the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and on the environment in 









In the previous chapter, we looked at the history and development of 
the oil industry in Nigeria, as well as the current environmental problems 
associated with oil exploration and production activities in Nigeria.  
This chapter focuses on concepts or terms which are relevant to the 
analysis in the thesis. It identified human rights as a cause of action, 
while stating the connection between human rights and environmental 
rights, because when the air is polluted with toxins from oil industries, 
it adversely affects members of the communities. It is almost impossible 
to talk about one without talking about the other. Thus, the chapter 
attempts a conceptual analysis of some terms or concepts including 
accountability, human rights and MNCs, amongst others. It focuses on 
MNCs, highlighting the MNCs regulatory framework, accountability, the 
importance of improving human rights in the activities of MNCs will be 
highlighted.  Here, the definition of MNCs will be in focus as well as 
focuses on human rights as a concept.  
 
3.2 Defining Corporation 
The legal status of corporations is often identified as a threshold for 
settling responsibility issues. 1  We are referring to multinational 
corporations, a term which usually refers to a legal person that owns or 
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controls production, distribution or service facilities outside the country 
in which it is based.2 A corporation is qualified as an MNC if it has a 
certain minimum size, if it controls production or service plants outside 
its home state and if it incorporates these plants into a unified 
corporation strategy.3 Operating in different countries puts corporations 
outside the effective control of domestic and international law, which 
can amount to a lack of legal accountability for human rights violations 
by MNCs. 
MNCs have the freedom to have many operations in different states at 
the same time.4 The structure of an MNC creates a corporate veil, which 
depicts that the corporate structure hides a variety of relationships, 
especially between legal and natural persons. Establishing direct 
responsibility on corporations is an important element of corporate veil.5  
The doctrine of international legal personality is a crucial component for 
corporations to known their rights and duties that under international 
law. The definition used and the elements by which the definition is 
considered conclusive would determine if an entity is eligible to have 
legal personality. Even though it is asserted that, while examining the 
status of corporations with regard to the traditional concept of legal 
personality, the conclusion that corporations are not subject to 
international law is no longer valid, it could be inferred that no essential 
 
2 Ibid. The term ‘transnational corporations’ is mostly preferred by the United Nations, which is linked to 
the 1970s movement for a new international economic order (NIEO). 
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conceptual reason exists why corporations should not be weighed down 
with international human rights obligations.6  
 
3.3 Multinational Corporations 
MNCs are strong entities in developing and developed countries. 
UNCTAD’s 2009 World Investment Report estimates that there are about 
82,000 transnational firms around the world, about 810,000 foreign 
associates and millions of suppliers.7 As indicated by Anderson and 
Cavanagh, out of the biggest 100 economies in the world presently, 51 
are MNCs and the other 49 are states.8 They also stated that the top 
200 corporations’ total sales are larger than the combined economies of 
considerable numbers of countries, excluding the biggest 10. Large 
MNCs have outcomes bigger than many states, sufficient to set up their 
guidelines and evade state regulations,9 so they are said not to be 
accountable to anyone but are a law unto themselves.10 As a result of 
the widespread characteristics of their activities and procedures for 
decision-making, a regulatory challenge for national governments was 
created by them.11  
 
6 Nicola Jagers, Corporate Human Rights Obligation: In search of Accountability ( Oxford: Intersentia 
2002) 246; see also< https://www.abo.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2002-Engstrom-Who-is-
responsible.pdf >accessed 27 November 2020. 
7 UNCTAD Investment Report 2009, cited in A. Jonge, ‘Transnational Corporations and International Law: 
Bringing TNCs out of the Accountability Vacuum’(2011) Critical Perspectives on International Business 
7(1) 66–89, 66. 
8 Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh ‘Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global Power’ (Institute for Policy 
Studies 2000)< 




11 Emeseh, Engobo, Ako, Rhuks Temitope, Okonmah Patrick and Obokoh Lawrence Ogechukwu, 
‘Corporations, CSR and Self-Regulation: What Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis?’ (2009) 11 German 
Law Journal 2, 234. 
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Different countries have subsidiaries of MNCs; every subsidiary, as a 
general principle, is regulated by the state’s national laws where the 
subsidiary company is domiciled, with every subsidiary independent of 
the other. Nonetheless, it has been contended that, despite the size of 
activities undertaken globally by MNCs, they function as a piece of the 
corporate body and are determined based on the commitments made to 
the body.12 As such, corporate bodies are single monetary units in light 
of the fact that the subsidiary acts in the best interests of the body. 
Commitments and liabilities are distributed amongst the subsidiaries to 
lessen the dangers and for tax assessment purposes. As a solitary 
financial unit body, the debts or liabilities of the subsidiary accrue to the 
holding company, the holding company usually would reimburse the 
subsidiaries in such circumstances. Despite the fact that subsidiaries are 
situated and registered in various jurisdictions, they are liable to the 
holding company in the host state, which is outside the host state where 
they are registered,13 meaning the subsidiaries are said to be subject to 
the control of the holding company.14 
Seemingly, MNCs depend on their incorporated form to avoid liability 
under municipal law. Thus, MNCs could depend on “the fact of their 
municipal registration and regulation to avoid liability under other 
regimes such as when a suit is brought against them in their home 
countries”.15 This is particularly important in human rights violation 
cases brought in the USA under the Alien Torts Claim Act 1789 (ATCA). 
Under an ATCA suit, most MNCs insist that the municipal law of the host 
state is the applicable law in light of the fact that the subsidiaries are 
 
12 Christopher Tugendghat, The Multinationals (The Book Service Ltd 1971) 65. 
13 Stephen Tully, ‘Corporations and International Law Making’ (PhD Thesis, London School of Economics 
and Political Science 2004). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Emeseh (n11).  
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independent of the holding companies in the home country. Potentially, 
there are gaps whereby MNCs can avoid liability for their activities in 
developing countries. Hence, the home jurisdictions in defenceless 
territories are weak with regards to the control of multinational 
corporations.16  
 
3.4 Accountability and Human Rights 
Accountability is a vague concept and so it might be difficult to have a 
precise definition. Although accountability is widely believed to be a 
good thing, the concept is exceedingly unique and is often used in a very 
rife way. 17  Shearer views accountability as an intersubjective 
relationship whereby one is committed to exhibit the sensibility of one’s 
activities to those to whom one is accountable.18 Accountability implies 
numerous things to numerous individuals, for instance, administrative 
accountability, professional accountability, financial accountability, 
social accountability, political accountability and legal accountability.19 
The focus of this thesis will be on legal accountability, which requires 
adherence to formal regulations and willingness to justify one’s activities. 
Accountability is a particular, mind-boggling and focal component of 
human rights. With regards to human rights, accountability is concerned 
with the need of the state to completely conform with its commitments 
under the international and regional human rights treaties to which it is 
 
16 Olufemi Amao, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Multinationals and the Law in Nigeria: Controlling 
Multinationals in Home State’ (2008), Journal of African Law, 52(1), 89–113. 
17 David Hulme and Nimal Sanderatne, The Toothless and the Muzzled: Public Accountability, Public 
Expenditure Management and Governance in Sri Lanka (Manchester: University of Manchester, 2008) 76.  
18 Teri Shearer, ‘Ethics and Accountability: From the For-itself to the For-the-other’ (2002) Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 27(6), 541–573.  
19 Helen Potts, Accountability and the Highest Attainable Standard of Health  (Colchester, UK: University 
of Essex/O Society Institute, 2008), 5; also< http://repository.essex.ac.uk/9717/1/accountability-right-
highest-attainable-standard-health.pdf > accessed 12 April 2021. 
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a party. Solid instances of people and groups seeking accountability by 
the government demonstrate that the genuine test is converting the 
lawful commitment of implementation of certain measures.20 
The thought of accountability is an indistinct concept that is hard to 
characterize in exact terms,21 although, comprehensively, there is said 
to be accountability when there is a relationship between an individual 
or body, and the execution of tasks or capacities by the individual or 
body are subject to another’s mistake, course or request that they 
provide data or justification for their actions.  
Accountability is a foundation of the human rights framework. Human 
rights are basically an arrangement of norms and practices that govern 
the connection between the individual and the state or those in 
authority.22 Human rights models set out the rights and opportunities to 
which all are entitled by virtue of being human, and the corresponding 
duties of those who exercise authority or power. 
Acknowledging accountability as it is comprehended in a human rights 
framework entails both monitoring and error by both government 
authorities and individuals impacted; such accountability requires 
access to data and transparency, and an active popular participation. It 
is not sufficient to have access to dependable data and indicators; 
genuine accountability requires forms that enable and activate typical 




Governance.pdf > accessed 10 July 2020. 
22 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner ‘Who Will Be Accountable?’ (Human 
Rights and the Post 2015 Development Agenda) < 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/WhoWillBeAccountable_summary_en.pdf 
accessed 21 March 2021. 




Globalization means that it is increasingly hard for only the state to hold 
corporations accountable.24 
Accountability from a human rights point of view alludes to the 
relationship of government legislators and other duty bearers to the 
right holders impacted by their decisions and activities.25 Accountability 
has a remedial capacity; hence it is conceivable to address individual or 
aggregate complaints, and place penalties on bad behaviour by the 
people as well as the institutions responsible.  
Albeit integral to human rights practices, there has been major concern 
in governance, politics, law and business when it comes to accountability. 
Several disciplines have different meanings and functions of 
accountability; in the context of most public policy, accountability refers 
to those in power taking responsibility for their actions, responding in 
due order regarding their actions, disclosing and justifying them to those 
impacted, and being liable to some form of enforceable sanction if their 
lead is flawed.26 
Attempts to increase accountability can be accomplished by illustration 
on human rights norms and mechanisms to reinforce the three 
components of accountability known as responsibility, answerability and 
enforceability.27  
 
24 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Global Governance and Democratic Accountability’ (Duke University, 2002) 19. < 
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.610.6432&rep=rep1&type=pdf > 
accessed 11 May 2020. 
25 Ibid.pg.20. 
26 John M. Ackermann, ‘Social Accountability in the Public Sector: A Conceptual Discussion’, Social 
Development Working Paper, No. 82 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005). 
27 Peter Newell and Shaula Bellour, ‘Mapping Accountability: Origins, Contexts and Implications for 
Development’, IDS Working Papers, No.168 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2002); Andreas 
Schedler, ‘Conceptualizing Accountability’, in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner 
(eds), The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999). 
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Under international human rights law, states are primarily accountable 
for respecting and protecting the rights of those within their jurisdiction. 
Weakness in accountability of state actors stems from a wide range of 
factors, including corruption, weak governance, lack of political will, 
etc.28 The ability of states to respect, protect and satisfactorily carry out 
their human rights obligations is formed and constrained by a global 
political economy whereby many of non-state actors have taken up 
dominant roles, of which the actors include multinational corporations. 
While these actors have made progress in developing policies and 
systems of accountability, their voluntary and self-regulatory nature 
means that significant gaps in accountability remain unaddressed.29 
Accountability in a human rights mechanism also needs an effective and 
available mechanism for redress if violations occur.  
According to Grant and Keohane, accountability infers that some actors 
have the right to hold other actors to certain standards, to be able to 
determine if they have carried out their responsibilities in light of these 
standards, and to see that sanctions are imposed if it is determined that 
these obligations have not been met. 30  Accountability implies a 
relationship between those in authority and those holding them 
accountable, where they generally acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
standard for accountability and the authority of the parties to the 
relationship, i.e. one party to exercise specific powers and the other to 
hold them accountable.31 It is therefore inferred that the concept of 
accountability means that actors being held accountable have a duty to 
 
28 Ibid. 
29 UNCTAD Investment Report 2009. 
30 Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’ (2005) 
American Political Science Review 99, 1. < 




act in ways that conform with recognized standards of behaviour, and if 
they fail to adhere, they will be sanctioned.32 
 
3.4.1 Who Should Be Accountable? 
It would not make sense and it is rather ineffective to lay total emphasis 
on government accountability for something they cannot control. To 
institute accountability, we have to determine what states are reluctant 
to do, incapable of doing, and just do not know how to do, and most 
importantly in developing countries like Nigeria. Most times, states’ 
policies can be lifted to promote economic, social and cultural (ESC) 
rights, and also health; states must find their ability to fulfil their ESC 
rights obligations, including their health obligations, to also include 
multinational corporations, who are often the ones calling the shots in 
the scope of a global political economy.33 How to hold multinational 
corporations accountable for human rights violations they commit has 
been a continuous debate, which does not seem to have an end. 
Deciding on which framework should be used to hold multinational 
corporations accountable has been one of the main focuses of the 
debate: should it be international mechanisms? Regional mechanisms? 
Should the home states or host states be held accountable? Or through 
soft laws? Or through strengthening existing national mechanisms? 
Multinational corporations are intricate entities and a single approach 
may be insufficient to hold multinational corporations accountable. 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Alicia Ely Yamin, ‘Beyond Compassion: The Central Role of Accountability in Applying a Human 
Rights Framework to Health’(2013) Health and Human Rights Journal, 10(2) 4.< 
https://cdn2.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2013/07/2-Yamin3.pdf> accessed 12 July 2020. 
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Since international human rights law rules do not directly address 
holding corporations accountable, this study will argue that there is a 
need for a paradigm shift so as to hold multinational corporations 
accountable. The lack of direct binding obligations for MNCs under 
international human rights law has been a significantly criticized subject. 
A protection gap has been one of the main causes of concern,34 if the 
protection of human rights is left entirely for the states to handle: firstly, 
because the status of recognition of human rights instruments in the 
various jurisdictions is uneven; secondly, because of their contrasting 
enforcement, which is similar to the strength of the domestic legal 
system and the reliance on foreign investment of the different states.35 
Another notable ground for criticism is the governance gap,36 which 
results from the disparity which exists between the power of MNCs to 
significantly harm human rights and domestic legislators’ inadequacy to 
take efficient measures in this regard. The unfair nature of international 
human rights law which grants MNCs purposeful rights and benefits, 
without holding them liable for abuses, has been criticized by some 
scholars.37  
Legal ways to hold MNCs liable and to compensate victims for 
environmental damage, which are known to exist, are significantly 
important. As a fact, though, at the moment those alternatives exist at 
 
34 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie’ (2008), UN Doc A/HRC/8/5  
para. 84. 
35 John Ruggie, ‘Prepared Remarks at Clifford Chance’ (2007) Harvard University United Nations 4.< 
https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-remarks-
Clifford-Chance-19-Feb-2007.pdf >accessed 13 April 2021. 
36 UNHRC (n34) para. 3. 
37 Anna Grear, ‘Challenging Corporate “Humanity’: Legal Disembodiment, Embodiment and Human 
Rights’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 511, 514; Jan Wouters and Anna-Luise Chane, ‘Multinational 
Corporations in International Law’ (2013) Working Paper 129/2005. < 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/80807979.pdf > 
 accessed 2 April 2021. 
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the international and national level, but with no similarity in the level of 
rigidness and enforcement. The structure does not seem to be 
preferable at the national stage. In developing host states, even with 
the fact that most of them have established a legal environmental 
framework, the success at holding MNCs liable is vastly limited due to a 
lack of efficient enforcement and the pressure placed on the host states 
by MNCs. Contrarily, developed home states do not account for a greater 
or lesser extent of the environmental damage resulting from the 
activities of their companies, which has its consequences at some point. 
In other words, they are not keen to adopt regulations to reduce 
environmental impact by having control over extra-territorial industrial 
activities.  
Also, the claims made for environmental damage which are held in 
domestic courts are a continuous issue with hasn’t been solved. 
Compensation should be given to victims for environmental damage and 
environmental corporate behaviour could be amended in such a way as 
to avoid harm to the environment in the future.38 
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) is seen as a 
mechanism to promote accountability and transparency.39 All MNCs in 
the Nigerian oil industry signed up to this initiative which requires them 
to publicly disclose their payments to the government. It is directed 
primarily at promoting the accountability of the government towards its 
 
38 Daniel Iglesias Márquez, ‘Legal Avenues for Holding Multinational Corporations Liable for 
Environmental Damages in a Globalized World’, ARACÊ – Direitos Humanos em Revista | Ano 2 | 
Número 3 |Setembro 2015. 
39 Caitlin Corrigan, ‘Breaking the Resource Curse: Transparency in the Natural Resource Sector and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’ (2014) Resources Policy, 40, 17–30; Shirley Smith, Derek  
Shepherd and Peter Dorward, ‘Perspectives on Community Representation within the Extractive Industries 




citizens, irrespective of profits or revenues brought in by corporations.40 
EITI could be seen not as a direct mechanism; to this end, accountability 
should also be demanded by stakeholders from their government. 
Where there is good governance in existence and commitment to 
institutional reform, EITI can become efficient at holding governments 
accountable.41  
For EITI to promote accountability and transparency, the corruption in 
government and institutional mechanisms has to be addressed as it 
incapacitates the ability for EITI to perform efficiently. 
Idemudia argues that EITI, which is a Western concept, requires 
refinement suitable for local utility.42 Mainly, it is recommended that 
accountability in the Nigerian public sector and corporate institutions is 
controlled by the impact of stakeholders that are significantly 
important.43  
The EITI is an efficient mechanism, just like other soft laws. There is no 
reason why international mechanisms should not hold corporations 
accountable for human rights violations, considering the fact that 
corporations benefit immensely from international law. 
The right to justice and the right to effect remedy and reparation are 
the basis upon which accountability is established. 
 
 
40 Gavin Hilson and Roy Maconachie, ‘Good Governance” and the Extractive Industries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (2008) Mineral Processing and Extractive Metallurgy Review, 30(1), 52–100. 
41 Ibid. 
42 U. Idemudia, ‘The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Nigeria: Sifting Rhetoric from Reality 
Resource Governance’ in A.K. Nord, J. Luckscheiter and A. Harneit-Sievers (eds), The Challenges of 
Change: Improving Resource Governance in Africa (Cape Town, South Africa: Heinrich Bo ̈ll Foundation – 




3.4.2 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
accountability 
A rapid increase in civil society groups in environmental and human 
rights NGOs in Nigeria, who are concerned about the violations by 
multinational oil corporations. Civil society organisations (CSO) have 
been defined as the: 
“vast array of public-oriented associations, not known as formal parts of 
the governing institutions of the State: everything from community 
associations to religious institutions, trade unions, and non-
governmental organisations, operating to promote the interests and 
perspective of a particular sector of society, but not all issues for all 
sectors.”  
Today global public policies are the product of negotiations between 
states, business and civil society or NGOs, and as such, NGOs have 
become an accepted form of civic expression. NGOs have become a de 
facto partner in establishing global norms and standards, negotiating, 
influencing, and proposing policy solutions to public social problems, 
especially with regards to the environment and human rights violations. 
Part of the changing governance reality is that civil society has replaced 
some functions carried out by the state. In this and other ways, the 
NGOs have grown to a size and scale to rival the very government or 
intergovernmental agencies with which they interact with. In Nigeria, 
NGOs have been able to expose some degradations as a result of oil 
activities.  
NGOs do not often have established governance mechanisms whereby 
their members and supporters can hold them accountable for their 
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activities." 44  It is highly ironic that NGOs who are the forerunners 
ensuring companies and government are held accountable for their 
violations, as they do not have governance mechanisms or good 
democratic. Hence, a vital limitation of many NGOs in the absence of 
democratic ideology in their governance mechanism. An important issue 
is: who are NGOs accountable to? Incorporate boards or democratic 
countries leaders are accountable to voters, and corporate leaders are 
accountable to boards of directors or stakeholders.45 Jarvik argues that 
"NGOs are by definition unrepresentative and undemocratic since the 
population of the countries where they operate, do not elect them nor 
pay them."46 
In addition, it can be contended that NGOs are not exactly independent. 
The drive behind the argument is that the independence of such NGOs 
decreases, and as such, they cannot criticise the governments or MNCs 
when they are in the wrong with regards to various issues. Thus, if 
governments, through their foundations or agencies, make a 
considerable available amount of funds to the NGO, a member or 
supporter of that particular NGO will exert little or influence.47 Therefore, 
such an NGO will be accountable to the states or organisation rather 
than its ordinary members. Several criticisms on NGOs involve lack of 
transparency, abandonment of original goals, lack of legitimacy, 
inefficiency, misconduct in the NGO sector and inadequate state 
regulatory control of NGOs, amongst others.48  
 
44 Weidenbaum Murray, ‘Who will Guard the Guardians? The Social Responsibility of NGOs’ (2009) 87 
Journal of Business Ethics 147-155 
45 Ibid. 
46 Jarvik Lanrence, ‘NGOs: A ‘‘New Class’’ in International Relations’ (2007) Orbis 51(2) 217-238, 220. 
47 Weidenbaum(n44). 
48  Argandona Anthonio, 'Ethical Management Systems for Not-For-Profit Organisations' (2007) IESE 
Business School Working Paper 693/2008. <http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0693-E.pdf >(assessed 
20 December 2020) 
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Notwithstanding the above weaknesses of NGO participation in 
international public regulation, major roles in holding MNCs accountable 
for their activities have been played by NGOs, especially in developing 
countries, and as well as their activities which have led to improved 
transparency in the international governance model.  
Furthermore, NGOs are seen as being representatives of the interests 
of stakeholders they identified with and been accepted by those 
communities confer legitimacy on the activities of NGOs.49 Mujih argues 
that "democratic elections are not the only way of giving legitimacy to 
persons or entities advocating for others. Indeed, they are not suitable 
in many cases outside the political sphere." 50  Nevertheless, the 
communities represented by NGOs have the power to hold back their 
mandate or legitimacy if a reason to believe that the NGOs have not 
been adequate in achieving their (constituencies) aspirations. 
 
 
3.5 The Concept of Human Rights 
The preamble enshrines that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) states that human rights are fundamental to human beings, so 
consequently they cannot be granted and no authority can take it away 
from them. Until human rights became involved in the international 
concern of states, it was seen as a matter of domestic law. Thus, 
through diverse international human rights instruments, enforceability 
and legitimacy, human rights have been acknowledged legally.  
 
49 Mujih Edwin, Regulating Multinationals in Developing Countries: A Case-study of the Chad-Cameroon 
Oil and Pipeline Project Farnham (Gower Publishing 2012) 165. 
50 Ibid. Pg. 161. 
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Amid other things, the first initiative on international human rights law 
was established in 1946 with a directive which was made available to 
the United Nation Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to formulate 
a Universal Declaration, moved by the desire to establish a well 
understood system in order to promote and protect human rights, as 
well as for a generally improved acceptable meaning.51 Within two years 
the international community came to an agreement on the basics of 
human rights, and came up with the UDHR.52 
The UDHR is made up of a basic list of fundamental rights and freedoms, 
and is an authoritative understanding of the term ‘human rights’ in the 
UN Charter.53 The UDHR as a declaration is a non-binding instrument, 
even if several provisions of the UDHR have achieved the status of 
customary international law and so all states are bound by them.
 
Human rights as a term in this research refers to a legal concept 
applying to civil, political, economic, social, cultural and collective rights 
laid down in international human rights instruments.54  
Over the past 50 years, human rights, globally known to be the only 
system of contemporary standards, have developed progressively and 
been defined by all states in a comprehensive international legal 
framework.55  
The international human rights system is linked to development, 
international peace and security, and leads to a pluralist democracy, 
which is a global movement, good governance and the rule of law.  
 








After the end of the Cold War, international humanitarian and criminal 
law, which were seen as specific aspects of international human rights 
law, became progressively complex and harder to control.56 
The focus of this research on human rights is not based on opinion, but 
a notable characteristic of human rights which is justified, and leads to 
an enjoyable human right which is free to all human beings, and this 
includes the communities in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. 
 
3.5.1 The Basic Characteristics of Human Rights 
Even if the international community has reached an agreement on the 
basics of human rights within two decades, it took 40 years to recognize 
the characteristics. 57  At the 1993 Vienna World Conference human 
rights were declared as universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated.58 Based on these basic characteristics, human rights are 
deducted and serve as additional distinguishing factors, because of their 
fundamental and inalienable natures.59 Although these characteristics 
are been criticized, they are still relevant.60 They are: 
 
3.5.1.1 The Universality of Human Rights 
This simply means that human rights are equally owned by all human 
beings as provided for in the UDHR, that people are entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms written in this declaration, without discrepancy of 




58 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993, Article 5. 




opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 61 
Alternatively, the universality principle is a reflection of the universal 
normative values recognized by roughly 200 countries of the world 
which participated at the Vienna World Conference.62 
 
3.5.1.2 The Indivisibility, Interrelatedness and Interdependency 
of Human Rights 
This simply means that human rights are so linked in nature, and 
abandoning one category of those rights is disadvantageous to the 
others. Consequently, attention is needed for a fair and equal handling 
of all human rights, without bias, and with the same importance.63 
The Fundamental Nature of Human Rights  
Human rights are fundamental because they are a basic need – which 
is contrary to ordinary wants – which no institution or person can deny.64 
They establish only minimum standards, which makes them 
fundamental and should be met by all.65 
 
3.5.1.3 The Inalienable Nature of Human Rights 
Independent of a codification by a specific state, human rights exist, 
and this characteristic sets them apart from positive laws, which are 
subject to the wills of the legislator to exist.66
 
In addition, the inalienable 
 
61 UDHR, 1948, Article 2. Currently the universality of human rights is challenged by the theory of 
‘cultural relativism’, according to which human rights should be culture-specific rather than universal. 
62 Nowak (n51). 
63 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993, Article 5. 






nature of human rights has two practical consequences so that no 
authority can take away these rights from their bearers, and as such no 
bearer of such rights can legally give them away by consent.67 
This set of basic characteristics sets human rights apart from other 
values and justifies their instituting power. In general, human rights are 
vital claims that every human being can fairly claim from other people, 
social institutions or governments as a matter of justice. 
 
3.6 Human Rights and the Environment 
All human beings depend on the environment in which they exist or live. 
A safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment is essential to fully 
enjoy a wide range of human rights, including the rights to life, health, 
food, water and sanitation.68 We are unable to fulfil our aspirations or 
even live at a level commensurate with minimum standards of human 
dignity without a healthy environment. 69  Protecting human rights 
connects to protecting the environment. When people are able to learn 
about, and participate in, the decisions that affect them, they can help 
to ensure that those decisions respect their need for a sustainable 
environment.70 
In recent years, recognition of the links between human rights and the 
environment has greatly increased. 71  The number and scope of 
international and domestic laws, judicial decisions and academic studies 
 
67 Ibid. 
68 < https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/SRenvironmentIndex.aspx > 




government-halt-deforestation >accessed 21 July 2020. 
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on the relationship between human rights and the environment have 
developed fast.72 
Some states now incorporate a right to a healthy environment in their 
constitutions. Many questions about the relationship of human rights 
and the environment remain unanswered, and require further 
examination.73 
Attempts to maintain a linkage between human rights and the 
environment have been made on several occasions in various 
international fora. 74  These attempts have resulted in numerous 
attempts to put forward a right to a healthy or clean environment, 
thereby leading to a healthy academic debate about whether a right to 
a clean or healthy environment exists under international law.75 So far 
there are only a few conventions that endorse a right to a clean and 
healthy environment.76 
Africa has not been left out in the attempt to promote a linkage between 
human rights and the environment. This region – where the state of 
underdevelopment makes environmental protection, in real terms, less 
significant than in developed states – has in its regional treaty, the 
 
72 Ibid. 
73 Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment (2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/IEEnvironment/Pages/IEenvironmentIndex.aspx, accessed 
17 April 2020. 
74 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm (Stockholm Declaration), 5–16 
June, 1972; United Nations Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro (Rio 
Declaration), 3–14 June, 1992; Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg 
Declaration), 26 August – 4 September 2002. 
75 E. Egede, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Is There a Legally Enforceable Right to a Clean and 
Healthy Environment for “Peoples” of the Niger Delta under the Framework of the 1999 Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria?’ (2007) Sri Lanka JIL, 19(1) 51. 




African Charter, declared the right of people to a general satisfactory 
environment advantageous to their development.77 
The treaty recognizes that the right to a clean or healthy environment 
is a necessary prerequisite for the healthy development of the peoples 
within a society. The Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, in Article 18(1), also provides that women will have 
the right to live in a healthy and sustainable environment. In addition, 
by the 1999 Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action, the 
defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU)78 Ministerial Conference on 
Human Rights affirmed that the right to a generally satisfactory healthy 
environment is a universal and inalienable right and forms an integral 
part of fundamental human rights.79 This declaration went on to state, 
in paragraph 8(n), that violations of human rights in Africa are caused 
by environmental degradation, and other issues as well.80 
The African Charter, along with the Protocol on the Rights of Women 
and the Grand Bay Declaration, emphasized the need for African states 
to put forward the vital and required linkage between human rights and 
the environment. African states ought to take steps towards domestic 
implementation of a right to a clean and healthy environment by 
incorporating the right into their municipal law and the constitution, 
which is fundamental. Quite a number of African states – especially 
those which adopted their constitutions in the 1990s when awareness 
of the need to protect the environment started to grow – specifically 
 
77 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, article 24. 
78 The O.A.U. has, since 2001, been replaced by the African Union (AU), established by the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union, which was adopted 2 July 2000 and came into force on 26 May 2001. 
79 Paragraph 2 of Declaration and Plan of Action of the First OAU Ministerial Conference on Human 




included a legally enforceable human right to a clean and healthy 
environment in their constitutions.
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3.6.1 Human Rights, the Environment and Nigeria 
1. Relevant Municipal Laws 
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
The awareness of the importance of the protection of the environment 
is suggested in the fundamental objectives and directive principle of 
state policy of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.82 
Section 20 of the constitution states that: “The State shall protect and 
improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest 
and wildlife of Nigeria.” 
Also, Section 17(2)(d) of the constitution states that exploitation of 
human or natural resources in any form, other than for the good of the 
community, shall be avoided. However, although this is embedded in an 
obligatory manner, the constitution makes it clear that this provision is 
not enforceable in court.83  
Is there therefore a legally enforceable right to a clean and healthy 
environment under the 1999 Constitution? Chapter IV of the Nigerian 
Constitution provides for fundamental human rights, which are 
 
81 Article 24 of the 1992 Angolan Constitution (a right to a ‘healthy and unpolluted environment’); Article 
24(a) of the 1996 South African Constitution (a right to ‘an environment which is not detrimental to a 
person’s health or well-being’); Article 46 of the 1992 Congo Constitution (a right to ‘a healthy, 
satisfactory and enduring environment’); Article 44(1) of the Ethiopian Constitution (a right to ‘a clean and 
healthy environment’); Article 39 of the 1992 Madagascar Constitution (imposing a duty for ‘everyone to 
respect the environment’); Article 39 of the 1995 Ugandan Constitution (a right to ‘a clean and healthy 
environment’). 
82 Chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution. 
83 Section 6(6)(c) of the 1999 Constitution. 
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enforceable in the courts.84 The rights, which are the traditional civil and 
political rights, are the right to life,85 to dignity of human person,86 to 
personal liberty, 87  to fair hearing, 88  to privacy and family life,89  to 
freedom of thought, 90  to conscience and religion, 91  to freedom of 
expression and the press,92 to peaceful assembly and association,93 to 
freedom of movement, 94  to freedom from discrimination 95  and to 
freedom from compulsory acquisition except in a manner prescribed by 
law.96 
Nnaemeka–Agu JSC, of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, clarified the 
incorporation of fundamental human rights in the Nigerian Constitution 
in the following words: 
“Human Rights mark a standard of behavior which we share with all 
civilized countries of the world since the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, though it still left for various 
member nations to determine which rights from the plethora of rights 
then declared they would wish to incorporate into their domestic laws.”97 
While the recent Nigerian Constitution was adopted on 29 May 1999, it 
does not explicitly incorporate the right to a clean environment under 
Chapter IV, because the Constitution, though adopted in 1999, is simply 
 
84 Section 6 (6)(b). 
85 Section 33. 
86 Section 34. 
87 Section 35. 
88 Section 36. 
89 Section 37. 
90 Section 38. 
91 Section 39. 
92 Section 40. 
93 Section 41. 
94 Section 42. 
95 Section 43. 
96 Section 44. 
97 V. Kim v The State [1992] 4 NWLR. Part 233, 17, 37.  
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a repeat of the traditional civil and political rights provisions of the 
previous Nigerian Constitutions, to the omission of social and economic 
rights, as well as solidarity rights.98 African constitutions, such as the 
1996 South African Constitution, have included the right to a clean 
environment. Section 24(a) of the South African Constitution says that 
people shall have the right to an environment which is not detrimental 
to his or her health or well-being. Also, the 1992 Angolan Constitution, 
in Article 24, provides for the right to a clean environment, as it 
expressed that all citizens shall have the right to live in a healthy and 
unpolluted environment. 
However, although the right to a clean and healthy environment is not 
expressly stated in the Nigerian Constitution, it can be concluded from 
definite fundamental rights stated in Chapter IV. For example, it can be 
inferred from the right to life.99 
Judge Christopher Weeramantry, rightly in this writer’s view, noted that:  
“The protection of the environment is likewise a vital part of 
contemporary human rights doctrine. For it is a sine qua non for 
numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life 
itself.”100 
The degradation of the environment, as a result of great pollution of the 
land, water and air in the Niger Delta, led to the continuous death of 
people in that region. There is nothing stopping the people of the Niger 
Delta from claiming on violation of their right to a clean environment, 
which has a tremendous impact on their health and life, which denies 
them their right to life. Recently, in the case of Jonah Gbemre v. Shell 
 
98 The 1999 Constitution is a reproduction of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. 
99 Section 33 of the 1999 Constitution. 
100 The Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), I.C.J. Rep. 1997, 7 at 97. 
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Petroleum Development Corporation & 2 Ors,101 the Federal High Court 
of Nigeria examined the issue of a right to a clean and healthy 
environment against the traditional civil and political rights contained in 
the constitution. In this case the applicant, on behalf of himself and as 
a representative of the Iwherekan community in Delta State, Nigeria, 
tendered an application in court to enforce his fundamental human 
rights in respect of the gas-flaring activities of the Shell Petroleum 
Development Corporation. The court made an affirmation that the 
applicant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to life and dignity of human 
person included the right to a clean, poison-free, pollution-free and 
healthy environment.102 In this case the court founded its decision on 
the constitutional basis of rights to life and human dignity, as well as 
the provisions of the African Charter, including the solidarity right to a 
clean environment under Article 24 of the African Charter.103 The court 
held that the provisions of legislation that permitted continued gas 
flaring were not in accordance with the applicant’s rights to life and/or 
dignity of a person as enshrined in Sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and Articles 4, 16 
and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification 
and Enforcement) Act, and are therefore unconstitutional, null and 
void.104  This decision appears to be a rather isolated decision of a 
Nigerian court on this issue. Furthermore, it is the decision of the 
appellate courts; the courts would adopt a liberal interpretation of the 
 
101  Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Corporation & 2 Ors [2005] AHRLR Suit No. 
FHC/B/CS/153/05. 
102 Ibid., para. 3. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., para. 6; the relevant legislation referred to by the judge as being null and void are the Associated 
Gas Re-injection Act, A25, Vol. 1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 and the Associated Gas Re- 
injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations, Section 1.43 of 1984, which permitted gas flaring during 




various civil and political rights in Chapter IV of the constitution and 
infer a right to a clean and healthy environment. The Supreme Court of 
Nigeria has encouraged such a liberal approach to the interpretation of 
the Nigerian Constitution, to suit the recent needs of citizens. Udoma 
JSC, at the Supreme Court, stated at the court of first instance, that: 
“it is the duty of this court to bear constantly in mind the fact that the 
present Constitution has been proclaimed the Supreme Law of the Land: 
that it is a written, organic instrument meant to serve not only the 
present generation but also several generations yet unborn, it is my 
view that the approach of this court to the construction of the 
Constitution should be, and so has been one of liberalism ...”105 
Courts in some other jurisdictions where no explicit inclusions of the 
right to a clean environment in their Bill of Rights exist are of the opinion 
that such a right could be deduced from certain traditional civil and 
political rights, provided for in such a Bill of Rights, and are justiciable. 
For example, although in India there is no specific provision in the 
fundamental human rights chapter of the constitution conferring a right 
to a clean environment, this right has been inferred as a result of judicial 
activism.106 The Supreme Court of India, in the case of Subhash Kumar 
v. Bihar,107 ruled that the right to life contained in Article 21 included 
the right to enjoyment of pollution-free water and air. 
Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights, in certain recent 
cases, has gone ahead in interpreting other traditional civil and political 
 
105 Nafiu Rabiu v. the State [1980] NSCC 291 at 300–301.  
106 Michael Anderson, ‘Individual Rights to Environmental Protection in India’, in A. Boyle and M. 
Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996)  
107 Subhash Kumar v. Bihar [1991] AIR 1 SC 420, 424. 
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rights, such as the right to a private and family life, as being affected 
when there is environmental degradation.108  
In Lopez Ostra v. Spain,109 a waste treatment plant was built next to 
the applicant’s house. During its operation, the plant emitted fumes and 
smell, causing health problems to the local residents, including Mrs 
Lopez Ostra and her family. The European Court of Human Rights, upon 
an application by Mrs Ostra against the Spanish government, held that 
the severe environmental pollution from the plant was a breach of the 
applicant’s right to private and family life, under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Also, in the case of 
Hatton & Ors v. United Kingdom,110  the applicants, who lived near 
Heathrow Airport, complained, amongst other things, that with the 
introduction of a new scheme in 1993 by the United Kingdom 
government, night-time noise got worse, especially in the early morning, 
and this violated their right under Article 8 of ECHR. The Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights held that the increased night-time 
noise, especially in the early morning, was a violation of the applicants’ 
right under Article 8. While this decision has been put aside by the Grand 
Chambers on the peculiar facts of the case, the Grand Chamber agreed 
in principle that a claim against noise pollution could be brought under 
Article 8, in appropriate cases, as an intrusion of the right to private and 
family life.111 
The environmental pollution in the Niger Delta, with its related health 
implications, could thus be said to be a violation of the right to life of 
 
108 Article 8(1) of the Convention provides that ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence’. See S.377 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, which gives the right to privacy and family. 
109 Lopez Ostra v. Spain [1995] 20 EHRR. 277. 




the individuals living there under Section 33 of the Constitution. In 
addition, the gas flaring emitting unhealthy gases into the atmosphere, 
and again its severe unfavorable health implications for the residents of 
the area, could be inferred to be a violation of the residents’ right to 
privacy and family life under Section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution. 
The right to privacy and family life could also be said to be violated by 
the recurrent use of explosives and vibrator trucks causing sound 
pollution and cracks and damage to homes. 
There is no reason, in the light of the practice in other jurisdictions, why 
more Nigerian court decisions would not deduce a right to a clean and 
healthy environment from the provisions of Chapter IV of the 
constitution and therefore hold multinational corporations accountable 
when there is a breach. 
 
3.7. MNCs Human Rights Violations and States 
The struggle behind MNCs human rights violations in developing 
countries, mostly in African states, is that it often carries with it the 
complicity of states. The violation of human rights by corporations works 
in a way that makes states associates in the crime.112 As noted earlier, 
states have a responsibility under international law to protect their 
citizens from violation of human rights by non-state actors such as 
MNCs.113 
 
112 On complicity, see Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (UNGP): Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011). In commentary to Principle 17, it provides that ‘the relevant standard for 
aiding and abetting is knowingly providing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial 
effect on the commission of a crime’. 
113 See Chapter One. 
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The same state which is responsible for safeguarding people in its 
territory from violation of human rights has become the means by which 
those rights are violated. The violation of human rights by states takes 
different shapes; sometimes, human rights are violated individually by 
the states in direct form, and at other times, they are violated with 
combined efforts of corporations. 
The International Law Commission (ILC) has contributed tremendously 
to international law in this respect. It has separated the principle of state 
responsibility into two: the primary rules, which deal with duties and 
obligations of states; and the secondary rules, which set boundaries to 
determine when states breach those duties.114  The secondary rules 
developed by the ICC (International Criminal Court) are moored by the 
attribution doctrine, which tries to make states liable for failure to 
perform their duty and to make them accountable for the unlawful 
conduct of their agents.115 
Once the conduct of the private parties that is comparable to a breach 
of international law can be attributed to a state, then the state is 
deemed to have breached its obligation under international law.116 
The case of SERAC and CESR v. Government of Nigeria is the most cited 
example of state complicity in corporate human rights violations. The 
argument of this thesis is that the complicity of states in corporate 
human rights violations in Nigeria, and the failure of regional and 
international legal jurisprudence to address it positively, will lead to a 
 
114 Report of the International Law Commission [1991] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2 at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1991/Add.1 (1991 Draft Articles); Report of the International Law Commission [1980] 2 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2, at 30–34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/ Add.1 (1980 Draft Articles). On 
definition of secondary rules, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
115 Steven Ratner, International Law: The Trails of Global Norms (Arts & Jervis publishers 1998) 443. 
116 Under ICC, it is difficult to prove that the conduct of private parties is that of the states unless it can be 
proved that they are acting under the instruction and control of states. See Article 11(1), 5 and 8 of the ICC. 
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state of unending breach of international obligations, that is, gross 
violations of human rights without remedies contrary to the universally 
acceptable maxim of law: ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, 
there is a remedy). 
To justify this argument, let us consider a similar case with respect to 
the Ogoni people decided by ECOWAS in 2012. In SERAP v. The Federal 
Government of Nigeria 117  the plaintiff claimed that the federal 
democratic government of Nigeria was liable for the violation of the 
rights to health, adequate standard of living and economic and social 
development of the people of the Niger Delta by a consortium of 
corporations118 because of its failure to enforce laws and regulations to 
protect the environment and stop pollution.119 
The court held that the government of Nigeria violated Articles 1 and 24 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and was therefore 
liable for human rights violations by the corporations in the Niger Delta. 
So, a thorough examination of this case, along with the history of the 
Ogoni people’s travails at the hands of corporations in Nigeria, will show 
either the inability or reluctance of the government of Nigeria to address 
corporate human rights violations within its territory and the failure of 
regional judicial frameworks with respect to the issue of corporate 
human rights responsibility and accountability in Africa. 
It should be noted that Nigeria is not the only country to be guilty in 
terms of complicity in corporate human rights violations. Several states 
 
117 ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12. 
118 Ibid. The corporations are the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company, ELF Petroleum Nigeria Ltd, AGIP Nigeria PLC, Chevron Oil Nigeria PLC, Total Nigeria PLC 
and Exxon Mobil. They were sued together with the federal government of Nigeria, but in a preliminary 
objection by the corporations, their names were struck out as the court held that it has no jurisdiction over 
them. 
119 n 117 
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in Africa are guilty of this crime, which is due to poor human rights 
standards in the continent.120 Though their participation varies, however, 
if the same, it is not of the same magnitude. Instead of protecting their 
citizens against corporate human rights violations, some rather stand 
by and fail to act, some are actively violating the human rights of their 
people with the complicity of corporations, while some go beyond their 
territories to become entangled in human rights violations in other 
developing countries. 
The vigorous support by the government for the policy of the oil 
companies in Ogoniland – which polluted land, destroyed houses, food 
crops and other means of livelihood and ultimately lost people their 
homes – was condemned by the African Commission. The African 
Commission notes that the government gave the go-ahead to private 
actors, and the oil companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the 
well-being of Ogonis121 and therefore called upon the government to 
take steps to resolve the problems created by them. Sadly, in 2012, 
after about 11 years, the ECOWAS court echoed the same statement to 
the government of Nigeria when it noted that: 
“In the instant case, what is in dispute is not a failure of the Defendants 
to allocate resources to improve the quality of life of the people of Niger 
Delta, but rather a failure to use the State authority, in compliance with 
international obligations, to prevent the oil extraction industry from 
doing harm to the environment, livelihood and quality of life to the 
people of that region.”122 
 
120  Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2008 – The State of the World’s Human Rights 
(2008), 3, noting ‘human rights promised in the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] are far from 
being a reality for all the people of Africa’. 






This chapter identified human rights as a cause of action, while stating 
the connection between human rights and environmental rights, 
because when the air is polluted with toxins from oil industries, it 
adversely affects members of the communities. It is almost impossible 
to talk about one without talking about the other, for the protection of 
the environment is likewise a vital part of contemporary human rights 
doctrine. It also linked NGOs and accountability. 
This chapter has so far revealed that states not only have the potential 
to violate human rights, but they actually do, either singlehandedly or 
in concerted efforts with MNCs. As a result of this complicity, most, if 
not all, human rights have been breached. Such human rights include 
the right to economic, social and cultural development,123 the right to a 
clean and healthy environment,124 the right to redress and justice,125 
the right to human dignity,126 and the right to life.127  
In view of the unreliability of states to guarantee human rights, due to 
their frequent complicity in human rights violations, the question that 
calls for interrogation is how do we hold MNCs accountable for human 
rights in such states?  
The next chapter will look at legal and institutional framework for oil 
operation in Nigeria and their inadequacy. 
 
 
123 African Charter (n77) Article 22. 
124 Ibid., Articles 16 and 24. 
125 Ibid., Article 7. 
126 Ibid., Article 5. 




Institutional Frameworks Regulating MNCs in Nigeria  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on concepts which were relevant to the 
analysis in this thesis. Thus, it attempted a conceptual analysis of some 
terms or concepts including accountability, human rights and MNCs, 
amongst others. 
The continuous increase in environmental devastation and human rights 
violations forces human rights law to be extended to include 
environmental protections as a way to improve the lives of the people 
through protection of the environment. So, to accentuate human rights 
and environmental protection, national legislations were also enacted. 
While there exists a growing link between human rights law and 
environmental law, it will strengthen both fields by increasing national 
and international focus on accountability for environmental destructions 
resulting in human rights violations, most especially by multinational oil 
corporations (MOCs), as well as strengthen environmental standards 
and human rights laws. Ironically, in Nigeria, although laws have been 
enacted, they are not implemented or adequate enough. The Niger Delta 
region records large casualties from oil spillage and fire; individuals and 
communities are not spared from the damage caused by its natural 
resources.1 Hence, this chapter will analyze the national legal standards 
dealing with the protection of the environment, and will also look at 
several cases which have been filed in Nigerian courts and the manner 
in which the Nigerian judiciary has interpreted the laws governing the 
 
1 Steve Azaiki, Oil, Gas and Life in Nigeria (Ibadan: Y-Books, 2007), 150–151. 
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oil industry and decided on the legitimacy or otherwise of the actions of 
the oil companies and the Nigerian government.  
 
4.2 Framework of Nigerian in the Oil Industry 
Guaranteeing an equilibrium between economic development and the 
right of the people of Nigeria to a healthy and clean environment became 
crucial as it raised grave concern. 2  This sub-section addresses the 
adequacy or otherwise of the existing laws and the effectiveness of the 
enforcement mechanism in preventing human rights violations by 
multinational corporations. 
Compared to operations in developed countries which maintain and 
apply higher standards, in Nigeria the case is the opposite, which has 
been a great concern in the Niger Delta region. The oil companies, 
however, state that their operations are legal as they follow local laws 
which established the minutest legal standards that regulate their 
activities. 
The Petroleum Act,3 sets the framework for oil operations in Nigeria and 
is the main framework that regulates Nigeria’s oil industry. It provides 
that oil companies’ operations have to conform in a manner that is in 
accordance with good oil field practices. Other significant legislation 
includes the Oil in Navigable Waters Act,4 the Oil Pipelines Act,5 the 
Associated Gas (Reinjection) Act 6  and the Petroleum (Drilling and 
 
2 Dinah Shelton, ‘Problems in Environmental Protection and Human Rights: A Human Right to the 
Environment’ (2011), GW Law Faculty Publication and Other Works, paper 1048, available at 
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2050&context=faculty_publications, accessed 
24 June 2020. 
3 Petroleum Act P.10 L.F.N 2004 
4 Cap 06 L.F.N 2004 
5 Cap 07 L.F.N 2004 
6 Cap 25  L.F.N 2004 
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Production) Regulations of 1969, made under the Petroleum Act.7 From 
1988, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act (Decree no. 58 
of 1988) was bestowed with the authority to issue standards for water, 
air and land quality in a Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), 
and regulations made by FEPA under the decree administered 
environmental standards in the oil industries. 8  The Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) had also issued established environmental 
guidelines and standards for the petroleum industry in Nigeria (1991), 
which were sometimes similar to or different from those issued by FEPA. 
These standards are similar to those in force in Europe and the US.9 
According to Nigerian law the federal government owns all the country’s 
natural resources.10 Thus, under the Petroleum Act a licence has to be 
acquired from the Ministry of Petroleum Resources before any oil 
operation, exploration, drilling, production, storage, refining or 
transporting is allowed to commence.11 Nigerian citizens or companies 
incorporated in Nigeria are the only ones permitted to apply for a 
licence. 12  All practicable precautions ought to be adopted by oil 
companies, as well as the provision of updated equipment to avert 
pollution, and they must take prompt steps to control and, if possible, 
end any pollution that may happen. 13  They must maintain all 
 
7 Human Rights Watch, The Price of Oil, Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violation in 
Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities’(1 January 1999).< 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a82e0.html  >accessed 13 April 2021. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Article 40(3) of the 1999 Constitution; Article 42(3) of the 1999 Constitution. The Petroleum Act also 
provides in section 1 that the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands to 
which this applies ( i.e., land in Nigeria, under the territorial waters of Nigeria or forming part of the 
continental shelf) shall be vested in the state. 
11 Petroleum Act 2004. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Amendment Regulations 2019, Regulation 25.. 
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installations in good condition in order to prevent the release waste of 
petroleum and to cause the minimum possible damage.14  
Oil companies are also expected to conform to all local planning laws, 
such as not going into areas that are sacred to the community or 
destroying any object of worship by the indigenes, and they must allow 
local inhabitants access to roads constructed in their operating area.15 
Specific rules on how to go about claiming compensation when there is 
violation of their land are provided. 
The Environmental Impact Assessment Act (Decree no. 86 of 1992) 
requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) to be carried out 
where the scope, nature or location of a proposed project or activity are 
likely to affect the environment significantly.16 The EIA is essential in 
certain cases, including oil and gas field development, and construction 
of oil refineries, some pipelines, and processing and storage facilities.17 
Undergoing an EIA is a policy of the Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency and the state Environmental Protection Agencies. Like the other 
regulatory framework to protect the environment in Nigeria, there is, in 
practice, little enforcement of the requirements to carry out EIAs, either 
by FEPA or by the DPR’s regulatory arm, the petroleum inspectorate, 
and essentially no quality control over the assessment is carried out.18 
 
4.2.1 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
The constitutional provisions of Nigeria do not impose human rights 
obligations directly on companies. They protect their citizens from 
 
14 Ibid., Regulation 36. 
15 Ibid., Regulations 17, 19 and 22. 
16 Environmental Impact Assessment Act 2004, Cap E12 LFN. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Petroleum Act (n3). 
95 
 
human rights violations through the enactment of general provisions in 
the Nigerian Constitution for human rights protection.19  
Law and other methods of environmental protection that recognize the 
social, economic and political aspects of environmental control are still 
advancing in Nigeria.20 Section 20 of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999 acknowledges the importance of the 
environment and it provides that: “The State shall protect and improve 
the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wild 
life of Nigeria.”21 
The Niger Delta people, by being denied these rights enshrined in the 
constitution, fail to meet up to the citizens of the Federal Republic which 
holds a 60% share of the joint venture interest with the translational oil 
companies.22 In Nigeria, all oil, gas and minerals are settled in the 
Federal Government of Nigeria. Section 44 sub-section 3 of the 
constitution states: 
“Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire 
property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, 
under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial 
waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the 
 
19 Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution, headed ‘Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy’, contains ESR rights, while Chapter IV, from sections 33 to 45, contains protection of rights such as 
right to life (33), right to dignity of human persons (34), right to personal liberty (35), right to fair hearing 
(36), right to private and family life (37), right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (38), right to 
freedom of expression and the press (39), right to peaceful assembly and association (40), right to freedom 
of movement (41), right to freedom from discrimination (42) and right to acquire and own immovable 
property (43). 
20 Mosope Fagbongbe, ‘Criminal Penalties for Environmental Protection in Nigeria: A Review of Recent 
Regulation Introduced by Nigeria’ (2012), NIALS Journal of Environmental Law, 2, 151. 
21 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), Section 20, Cap. C23 LFN, 2004. 
22 Centre for Petroleum Information< http://www.petroinfonigeria.com/fag.html> accessed 20 April 2020. 
96 
 
Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as 
may be prescribed by the National Assembly.”23 
Although the application and enforcement of environmental regulations 
by Nigeria would have been in the best interest of its citizens, especially 
those in the oil-producing communities, however, in practice this is not 
always the case because the provision of Section 20, under Chapter II, 
dealing with Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy, is not justiciable subject to section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution of 
Nigeria, 1999.24 The Nigerian government has devised and promulgated 
a comprehensive system of laws on environmental regulation and 
protection.25 However, these regulations and policies are rarely enforced; 
in most cases, they are deliberately disregarded due to fears that tough 
environmental regulations to control the activities of the oil companies 
would cause reduction in profit and these companies to leave Nigeria.26 
Critically, it’s apparent that environmental pollution continues to occur 
in Nigeria and this is contrary to the human rights principle of reasonable 
living conditions and the development of human personality, as 
advocated in many human rights instruments, along with the fact that 
the interruption of the fundamental ecological balance is harmful to 
physical and moral health.27 However, it should be noted that there is a 
 
23 Section 44(3) of the Constitution, note 21. 
24 Section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution states that: ‘the judicial powers vested in accordance with the 
foregoing provision of this section shall not, except as otherwise provided by this constitution, extend to 
any issue or question as to whether any act or omission by any authority or person or as to whether any law 
or any judicial decision is in conformity with the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state 
policy set out in chapter II of this constitution’. For debates on the justiciability of the Fundamental 
Objectives Provision, see B.O. Nwabueze, Ideas in Constitution Making (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 
1993). 
25 Joshua P. Eaton, ‘The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and 






central connection concerning the right to a healthy environment and 
other human rights. The continuous degradation of the environment 
affects the right to life, health, work, dignity of human person, privacy 
of the home, education and other human rights.28 
Several avenues by which Nigeria adopted the concept of corporate 
accountability are through specific legislation on the environment29 and 
other sectors of the economy.30  
 
4.2.2 The Petroleum Act  
This Act provides for the exploration of petroleum from the earthly 
waters and the continental projection of Nigeria and to vest the 
ownership of the natural resources, as well as all on-shore and off-shore 
revenues from petroleum resources derivable from the federal 
government and for all matters related. 31  General Yakubu Gowon’s 
regime promulgated the Petroleum Decree No. 51 in 1969; (now Cap 10 
L.F.N 2004) this decree placed ownership and control of all petroleum 
resources in Nigeria under the control of the federal government, 
meaning that lands containing natural resources which were owned by 
 
28 Brown E. Umukoro, ‘Gas Flaring, Environmental Corporate Responsibility and the Right to a Health 
Environment: The Case of Niger Delta’, in Festus Emiri and Gowon Deinduomo (eds), Law and Petroleum 
Industry in Nigeria: Current Challenges, Essays in Honour of Justice Kate Abiri (Lagos: Malthouse Press 
Limited, 2009), 67. 
29 Section 7 of the Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act, Cap H1 LFN 2004; Section 6 of the 
Oil in Navigable Waters Act, Cap 06 LFN 2004; Section 3(1) and 4 of the Associated Gas Re-injection 
Act, Cap 08 LFN 2004; Section 27(2) of the National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act 2007; Section 62 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, 
Cap E 12 LFN 2004. 
30 For other sectors in Nigeria, see, for example, trafficking in human persons, Section 28(2) of the 
Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act of 2003, Sections 65–67 of 
the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 2004, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. 
31 Petroleum Act, L.N 69 of 27 November 1969, Cap. P10 LFN, 2004. 
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individuals, communities, local governments and even states were 
denied their rights to the natural resources.32 
Under the Act, the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations33 
made provisions for sanctions against environmental pollution by MOCs, 
and in Section 25 it provides that:  
“the licensee or lessee shall adopt all practicable precautions, including 
the provision of up-to-date equipment approved by the Director of 
Petroleum Resources, to prevent the pollution of inland waters, rivers, 
watercourses, the territorial waters of Nigeria or the high seas by oil, 
mud or other fluids or substances which might contaminate the water 
banks or shoreline or which might cause harm or destruction to fresh 
water or marine life and where any such pollution occurs or has occurred, 
shall take steps to control and, if possible, end it.”34  
Unfortunately, measures are not only taken to control pollution when it 
occurs, as there exist no other obligations on the oil company, or any 
criminal penalty against the oil company in affected communities. It has 
been established that MOCs in the Niger Delta do not comply with best 
practices in the oil industry as some of the equipment used during the 
process of extraction is outdated. Best practices require that the 
equipment should usually have a lifespan of 15 years, but in Nigeria, the 
records showed that MOCs’ equipment could last as long as 25 years 
and their operational failures and faulty equipment lead to oil spillage in 
the neighbouring communities, which diminishes the rights of the people 
to a safe and healthy environment. 
 
32 United Nations Development Programme, Niger Delta Human Development Report (Abuja: UNDP, 
2006), Chapter 1, 2. 
33 Petroleum Act, P 10 L.F.N 2004. 
34 Section 25 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Amendment Regulations 2019. 
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It is important to emphasize that Paragraphs 35(a) and 36 of the first 
Schedule of the Petroleum Act, which were enacted pursuant to Section 
2(3) of the Act, provide for necessary acquisition subject to payment of 
fair and adequate compensation for the infringement of apparent or 
other rights to any person who owns or is in lawful occupation of the 
licensed or leased land. By these provisions MOCs are liable to pay 
adequate compensation in the event of oil and gas pollution, although 
in practice these MOCs hardly pay sufficient compensation as provided 
by the law.35 There is no provision under the Act for penalty for the 
license holder for any environmental damage, or for compulsory clean-
up and restitution of the environment in case of acts resulting in hostile 
impact on the environment such as oil and gas pollution.36 Possibly, this 
would make MOCs committed to environmental protection, as for now 
they pay little or no damage for crops, economic trees and other 
property; they leave the environment contaminated and useless after 
exploration, such as in Ogoniland.37 The Petroleum Act has failed to 
provide the necessary environmental guidelines for the control of these 
MOCs that operate in joint ventures with governments, owning 60% of 
the investment.38 The provisions of this Act are obsolete and therefore 
need to be amended to give land owners control of their resources, and 




35 Simon Warikiyei Amaduobogha, ‘The Legal Regime for Petroleum activities in Nigeria’ in Tina Hunter 
(eds), Regulation of the Upstream Petroleum Sector: A Comparative Study of Licensing and Concession 







4.2.3 Minerals and Mining Act  
The Minerals and Mining Act of 1992 was enacted to amend and 
strengthen all existing legislation relating to mines and minerals, 
conferring ownership of mineral resources on the federal 
government.40This Act relates to oil mining activities and general growth 
in the oil industry.41 Section 99 pertains to the prevention of pollution 
of the environment and it provides that:  
“the holder of a mining title shall, in exercise of its right under the license 
or lease, have regard to the effect of the mining operations on the 
environment and take steps as may be necessary to prevent pollution 
of the environment resulting from the mining operation of the oil 
company.”42 
This provision tends to strengthen similar provisions in the Petroleum 
Act discussed above as it places obvious legal obligation on the oil 
company to protect the environment from the effects of oil mining. The 
Act took a step further by providing offences against pollution by the oil 
companies engaged in oil mining activities and provides in Section 115 
that: “a person who pollutes the environment or uses water contrary to 
sections 65, 69, 71 and 99 of this Act, commits an offence under this 
Act.” Section 65, dealing with prohibition on pollution of watercourse, 
provides that: “no person shall, in the course of mining or prospecting 
for minerals, pollute or cause to be polluted any water or watercourse 
in the area within the mining lease or beyond that area.”43 Where both 
pieces of legislation would have further halted the degradation of the 
environment is by making provision for the protection of “Protected and 
 
40 The Minerals Oil Ordinance No. 17 of 1914 and No. 1 of 1924. 
41 Minerals and Mining Act 1992, Cap. M12 LFN 2004. 
42 Ibid., s99.  
43 Petroleum Act, L.N 69 of 27 November 1969, Cap. P10 LFN, 2004. See s 155 and 65. 
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Productive Trees” under Section 21 of the Petroleum Act and “Saving of 
Sacred Trees Trees and Other Objects of Veneration” under Section 8 of 
the Minerals and Mining Act, respectively. The law also made provision 
for the payment of adequate compensation but did not make provision 
for the enforcement of such payment; again, these provisions fall short 
of an enforceable law because they only state the offence without any 
corresponding penalty, which would have served as the basis for diligent 
prosecution. So, these provisions are voidable as you cannot place 
something on nothing. 
 
4.2.4 Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Act  
The Act establishes the Commission44 which among its functions is to 
confront ecological and environmental problems derived from the 
exploration of oil and minerals in the Niger Delta area, to have a dialogue 
with the federal government and member states on the prevention and 
control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution,45and to 
interact with the various oil, mineral and gas prospecting and producing 
companies on all matters of pollution prevention and control.46 
The provision of the NDDC Act is not a very impressive legal framework, 
and the government’s lack of will to enforce environmental regulations 
against erring oil companies, coupled with the restricted access to 
justice for those who may be adversely affected by the activities of the 
MOCs, make effective control of these MOCs at the national level near 
illusion.47 
 
44 Niger Delta Development Commission (Establishment Act No. 6) was passed into law by the National 
Assembly on 12 July 2000. NDDC Act, Cap. N86, LFN 2004. 
45 Ibid., s 7(1)(h) NDDC Act, Cap. N86 LFN 2004. 
46 Ibid., s7(1)(i). 




4.2.5 Associated Gas Reinjection Act  
The Associated Gas Reinjection Act48 was enacted to basically make oil 
companies submit preliminary programmes for gas re-injection and a 
thorough plan for the implementation of gas re-injection.49 It became 
effective on 28 September 1979. By the provision of Section 2, 
companies were bound to submit comprehensive plans for gas re-
injection by 1 October 1980, while gas flaring was to cease by 1 January 
1984; thus, flaring was declared illegal except with the written 
permission of the Minister for Petroleum. Any flaring without the 
requisite certificate from the minister is illegal and the company shall 
forfeit the concession granted in the particular field.50 
Further, the Associated Gas Re-injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) 
Regulations were enacted with a commencement date of 1 January 1985. 
The regulations are to the effect, inter alia, that a certificate for 
continued gas flaring will be issued only where more than 75% of the 
produced gas is effectively utilized or converted. According to the 
regulations, the minister has the power to review, mend, alter, add or 
delete any of the provisions of the regulations.51 Despite the obvious 
provisions of the law since 1985, MOCs in the oil sector in Nigeria have 
continued to be free to flare gas without sanctions. Nigeria is one of the 
greatest gas-flaring countries in the world and it is estimated that over 
70% of its associated gas is being flared. 31 December 2012 was one 
out of several extended dates set by the Federal Government of Nigeria, 
but this set date has not been met by the government as MOCs continue 
 
48 Associated Gas Reinjection Act 2004, Cap. A25, LFN. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., s3 and 4. 
51 See s1 and 2 of the regulations. 
103 
 
to claim that it is not possible to end the flaring of associated gas in 
Nigeria. This means that MOCs will continue to impair the environment 
in the Niger Delta through gas flaring since the government is not 
committed to ending the iniquitous actions of the MOCs in the region. 
 
4.2.6 National Environmental Standards and Regulation 
Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act  
This agency is specifically charged with responsibility for the protection 
and development of the environment, biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable development of Nigeria’s natural resources in general and 
environmental technology, which includes co-ordination and liaison with 
relevant stakeholders within and outside Nigeria on matters of 
enforcement of environmental standards, regulations, rules, laws, 
policies and guidelines. 52  The function of the agency includes the 
enforcement of compliance with policies, standards, regulations and 
guidelines on water quality, environmental health and sanitation, 
including pollution abatement; the agency has the responsibility under 
its mandate to enforce compliance with the guidelines and legislation on 
sustainable management of the ecosystem, biodiversity conservation 
and the development of Nigeria’s natural resources.53 
Also, the agency is empowered to enforce compliance with regulations 
on the importation, exportation, production, distribution, storage, sales, 
use, handling and disposal of hazardous chemicals and waste. But it is 
sad to observe that the Act excludes such enforcement in the oil and 
 
52 Note that Section 36 of the NESREA Act repealed the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act, 
Cap. F10 LFN 2004. See s (1)(1) of the NESREA Act 2007. 
53 See Section 7 of the NESREA Act 2007 dealing with the functions of the agency. 
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gas sector.54 The reason is not far-fetched, because the oil and gas 
sector accounts for the greatest source of environmental degradation in 
the Niger Delta region,55 and any law that affects the production of oil 
and gas will definitely affect the government and economy of Nigeria 
because over 90% of foreign revenue to the government comes from 
tax and royalties levied on oil production by the MOCs.56 
 
4.2.7 National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) 
Act 2006 
The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency Act was 
established in 2006 and the responsibility of the agency is to prepare, 
detect and respond to all oil spillages in Nigeria.57 It also manages and 
implements the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan for Nigeria.58 The 
agency’s responsibility is to survey and ensure compliance with all 
existing environmental legislation and the detection of oil spills in the 
petroleum sector, as well as receive reports of oil spillage and co-
ordinate oil spill response activities throughout Nigeria.59 The agency is 
 
54 See Section 7(g) (h) (j) and (k) of the NESREA Act 2007. 
55 S.G. Ogbodo and O.J. Ogbodo, ‘Environmental Democracy, Public Participation and the Niger Delta 
Crisis: A Critique of the Nigerian Experience’ (2012), NIALS Journal of Environmental Law, 2, 312–316. 
56 The NESREA Act, with its regulations, is the most recent law imposing criminal sanctions for 
environmental protection. Sections 20–27 create offences for the violation of the regulations made on air 
quality, ozone layer protection, noise, water quality, effluent limitations, environmental sanitation, land 
resources and water quality. Generally, penalties for individual violators of offences under the Act vary 
from fines not exceeding N50,000 to N200,000 and an additional fine of N5,000 to N200,000 for every day 
that an offence subsists, for a maximum term of imprisonment of two years, or both a fine and 
imprisonment, with the exception of Section 27. In cases of an offence committed by a body corporate, 
penalties range from a minimum fine of N500,000 and a maximum of N2,000,000 and an additional fine of 
N10,000 to N200,000 for every day that the offence subsists. Section 27(1) of the Act criminalizes the 
discharge of hazardous substances thus: the discharge in such harmful quatities of any hazardous substance 
into the air or upon the land and the waters of Nigeria or at the adjoining shoreline is prohibited, except 
where such discharge is permitted or authorised under any law into force in Nigeria. 





also burdened with the task of undertaking surveillance, reporting, 
alerting and other activities as they relate to oil spillages.60 The mandate 
of the agency is entirely administrative and does not specify the rights 
of victims of oil pollution and the extent of compensation which would 
be given to oil pollution victims.61 
 
4.2.8 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
 
NNPC is the state-owned oil corporation. At the start of the oil industry 
in Nigeria, there was slight regulation by the Government of the 
activities of the oil MNCs. 62  During this period, oil MNCs operated 
concessions and paid taxes and their supervision was granted on a one-
man unit at the Mines Division of the Ministry of Lagos Affairs, later part 
of the Ministry of Mines and Power.63 The NNPC was established in 1977 
by the NNPC Decree (now Act).64  NNPC was formed as result of the 
merger between the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation (NNOC) which was first established in 1971. 
The repeal of the NNOC was to engage in the prospecting, mining and 
marketing of oil and all other activities with the petroleum industry.65 
Due to the various problems encountered by the NNOC during the 
 
60 NOSDRA Act 2001, s 5, 6(a) and (b) and 7. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Nwokeji Ugo, ‘The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the Development of the Nigerian Oil 
and Gas Industry: History, Strategies and Current Directions’ (2007) The James A. Baker III Institute for 
Public Policy and Japan Petroleum Energy Centre, Rice University.1-138.< 
http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/page/9b067dc6/noc_nnpc_ugo.pdf   >accessed 20 March 2021. 
63 Gboyega, A. et al “Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria”. (2011) A World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper. < http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5779 >  accessed 20 
December 2020. 
64 Cap.N1O, LFN 2004. 
65 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) Intl. Comm. Law Review 20(1) 30–68. 
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course of its operations, it was terminated. NNPC then combined 
commercial functions of the NNOC with the regulatory functions of the 
Ministry of Mines and Power.66  
 
The functions of the NNPC in the oil and gas sector, is encapsulated in 
Section 5 of the NNPC Act. Some of these functions include exploring 
and prospecting for oil, refining, providing and operating pipelines, 
purchasing and marketing of petroleum, and constructing and equipping 
farms. The NNPC controls or regulates upstream and downstream 
activities in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria.67 The downstream sector 
includes the movement and distribution of petroleum products to the 
final consumers, while the upstream sector of the oil and gas industry 
in Nigeria includes exploration and production activities. The NNPC is a 
very large organization with over 9,000 employees and more than 12 
subsidiaries in various sectors, which includes, research, refineries, oil 
trading companies and petrochemical plants. 68  The most important 
subsidiary of the NNPC is said to be the National Petroleum Investment 
Services (NAPIMS) which acts as the oil and gas industry concessionaire, 
entering into contracts with oil MNCs on behalf of the Federal 
government.69 
 
The operations of the NNPC has been marked by power struggles by 
political elites over what the NNPC controls and who controls it 70 
 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. However, this is no longer the case. The DPR is now the main regulatory agency in the oil and gas 
sector in Nigeria. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid. 
70 Nwokeji (n62). 
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preventing it achieving its primary objectives. Also, the NNPC has been 
known for a widespread of corruption. Nigerian governments have still 
not granted NNPC full organizational autonomy, and as such 
Government officials see the NNPC as a means of enriching themselves.   
The NNPC has been re-organized several times, to attempt to rectify 
decades of inefficiency in the oil and gas industry by the NNPC,.71 For 
example, was the Oil and Gas Sector Reforms Implementation 
Committee (OGIC) in 2000 by the former president Obasanjo to produce 
a National Oil and Gas Policy.72 However, the recommendations made 
by the committees were disregarded. In 2007, the President Yar’adua’s 
administration constituted the OGIC under the chairmanship of Rilwanu 
Lukman with a mandate to transform the provisions of the National Oil 
and Gas Plan (NOGP) into better and more efficient structures to 
improve the oil and gas industry.73 The OGIC report was submitted to 
the Government in August 2008. A landmark highlight of the report is 
to make NNPC independent of governmental control and be run as a 
business enterprise.74 The OGIC report recommended the creation of 
new regulatory agencies in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria. Some of 
these new bodies include, the National Petroleum Assets Management 
Agency (NAPAMA), Nigerian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), National 
Petroleum Oil Company (NPOC Ltd) and the National Petroleum 
Research Centre (NPRC). These new agencies are encapsulated in the 
new Petroleum Industry Bill. 
 
71 Ibid.  
72  Iledare Wumi,‘An Appraisal of Oil and Gas Industry Reform and Institutional Restructuring in 
Nigeria’(2008)IAEEEnergyForum23-26.< https://www.iaee.org/documents/newsletterarticles/408wumi.pdf> 





4.2.9 The Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Act 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act of 199275  is also an 
accountability mechanism that endeavours that sound environmental 
practices are fostered in Nigeria. The EIA acts prevent a likely negative 
impact of a project, either private or public, on the environment. Also, 
the various states in Nigeria have distinct environmental sanitation laws 
regulating environmental practices or sanitation in the states.76 The EIA 
is one of the few statutes in Nigeria that encourages public participation 
in Nigeria's oil and gas industry. The EIA is a landmark in the Nigerian 
environmental protection system because it is the first statute that 
allows public participation in the decision-making processes relevant to 
development. 77   Thus, public members can retrieve information on 
projects and participate in the decision-making process on negative or 
positive) impacts on their immediate environment.78 
 
Under the EIA, oil MNCs and other key project developers shall not take 
part in projects without considering the potential environmental impacts 
at the early stages except permitted by law.79  Under section 2 (2) & (3) 
of the EIA, "where the extent, nature or location of a proposed project 
is likely to affect the environment significantly", oil MNCs are expected 
to undertake an environmental impact assessment of the intended 
project. Under section 4(d) &(e) of the EIA, an environmental impact 
 
75CAP E12, LFN 2004. 
76 Olubayo Oluduro, Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing 
Communities (Cambridge: Intersentia Publishing Ltd, 2014) 399. 
77 Yinka Omorogbe 'The Legal Framework for Public Participation in Decision-making on Mining and 
Energy Development in Nigeria: Giving Voices to the Voiceless,' in Zillman, D.N et al. (eds) (2002) Human 
Rights in Natural Resource Development: Public Participation in Sustainable Development of Mining and 
Energy Resources. Oxford: Oxford University Press 565-77. 
78 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) Intl. Comm. Law Review 20(1) 30–68. 
79 Section 2(1) (4) of the EIA 
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assessment shall include a description of the proposed activities, 
evaluation of the proposed activities, a review of the likely 
environmental impacts and alternatives to mitigate any adverse effects 
project others. In the activities or industries listed in the schedule to the 
EIA as mandatory study activities, environmental impact assessment 
must be by Government. The industries deemed required to study under 
the EIA include mining, petroleum, transmission, and power generation. 
In respect of mandatory study activities, the EIA provides in section 23 
that:  
Where the Agency believes that a program is in the mandatory study 
list, the Agency shall –  
(a) ensure that there is a mandatory study conducted, and a mandatory 
study report is prepared and submitted to the Agency, following the 
provisions of this Decree; or  
(b) refer the project to the Council for a referral to mediate or review 
section 25 of this Decree. 
 
Projects designated as mandatory study activities vetted and approved 
by the Federal Ministry of Environment.80  However, under section 40(1) 
(b) of the EIA, the Federal Ministry of Environment has the powers to 
refuse the approval of a project if it is "likely to cause significant adverse 
environmental effects that cannot be mitigated and cannot be justified 
in the circumstances". 
 
 
80 Eghator (n 78). 
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Section 7 of the EIA allows public participation in environmental impact 
assessment in Nigeria. Section 7 provides: 
Before the Agency decides on an activity to which an environmental 
assessment has produced, the Agency shall give government agencies, 
public members, experts in any relevant discipline, and interested 
groups to comment on the environmental impact assessment of the 
activity.81 
 
Under section 25 of the EIA, in mandatory study activities projects, EIA 
reports shall be published and made available to the public in selected 
places. Any person or individual can file comments on the conclusions 
and recommendations of such statements. Under section 57, a public 
registry should be established by the Federal Ministry of Environment 
containing information and records for enhanced public participation and 
access to justice.82 Furthermore, public participation in environmental 
assessment pronounced in the review panel stage. Under section 17 (1) 
(c), comments filed by private individuals are taken into consideration 
in the review panel. Here, public concerns about the potential 
environmental impacts may prompt the Federal Ministry of Environment 
to refer to a review panel or mediation.83  The Review Panel accentuates 
public participation in environmental impact assessment in Nigeria. 
Under section 37 (b), proceedings in the review panel stage expected to 
be conducted in public "in a way that offers the public an opportunity to 
participate in assessment". 
 
 
81 Eghator (n78). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Sections 22(1) (b) (ii), 26(a) (ii) & 27) b) of the EIA. 
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Under section 8 of the EIA, the adequate period expected to elapse, 
where comments by the public expected to scrutinise before any 
proposed project is approved or authorised. Also, under sections 9(1) 
(2), the decisions reached must be written form and made available to 
interested persons or groups. Under section 9(3), if no interested person 
or group requested the report, the Agency can publish it in any form 
wherein members of the public or interested parties interested in the 
project shall be notified. The provisions above are not strictly adhered 
to in the EIA process, and it is often at the discretion of the project 
developer.84  
For example, Shell Nigeria will also bolster the assertions that some oil 
MNCs deliberately avoid engaging in environmental impact assessment 
of their projects.85 Shell, the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Project 
(NLNG) operator at Bonny, allegedly failed to undertake an EIA of the 
project's potential impacts.  The company's decision not to embark on 
an EIA of the NLNG project was challenged in court by well-known Niger 
Delta environmental activist Mr Oronto Douglas. In Oronto Douglas v. 
Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd86  the court held that the 
plaintiff lacked the standing to sue Shell regarding Shell's failure to 
observe the provisions of the EIA. 
 
An inherent weakness in the EIA is that in some instances, EIA can be 
jettisoned. The Act creates some exceptions. These exceptions can be 
 
84 Rhuks Ako, ‘The Judicial Recognition and Enforcement of Rights to Environment: Differing Perspectives 
from Nigeria and India’ (2010) 3 NUJS Law Review 423–445 
85 Ibid 
86 Suit No. FHC/L/CS/573/96 [Unreported] 
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found in section 15(1). The section states thus an environmental impact 
assessment would not be required when- 
(a) in the opinion of the Agency, projects which the President, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or the Council believes that 
environmental effects of the project are likely to be minimal; 
(b) the project should be carried out during a national emergency for 
which the Government has taken temporary measures; 
(c) the project was done in response to situations that, in the opinion of 
the Agency, the project is in the interest of public health or safety 
 
The above provisions are against the purpose of the EIA. For example, 
despite protest to a proposed project, the President of Nigeria is within 
his powers to avoid the statutory requirements for an EIA in oil and gas 
projects.87  
In the oil sector, where environmental degradation is most prevalent, 
the influence of the oil companies and the paternalistic attitude of judges 
towards them in matters relating to environmental hazards created by 
companies have made the enforcement of environmental laws 







87 Eghator (n 78). 
88 Ako (n 84). 
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4.2.10 The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 
In a bid to control resources, specifically petroleum, oil-rich states have 
created legislatures that help foster effective regulatory and governance 
structures and resolve various energy-related concerns like energy 
security, transparency, local participation, and related social tensions. 
Unfortunately, despite several attempts, the Nigerian government has 
not created effective regulatory and governance reforms, 
notwithstanding numerous attempts despite some of its African 
counterparts. 
The PIB has touted as the panacea to the ills affecting Nigeria's oil and 
gas sector. On 25 May 2017, the Senate of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria passed the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill. The PIB has 
undergone many transformations. The government first presented it to 
the National Assembly in 2009. Still, its passage has been hampered by 
"vested interests, politicization of the legislative process, intense 
political intrigues, and inadequate consultation, compounded by the lack 
of adequate information for active citizens' participation."89 Presently, 
there are different versions of the PIB in circulation due to the inherent 
political intrigues present in the National Assembly. In January 2012, a 
senate committee reviewed the 2009 version of the PIB due to the 
widespread civil disobedience orchestrated by a plethora of civil society 
organizations protesting against the lack of transparency and endemic 
corruption in the country's oil and gas sector.90 The Bill is the first in a 
series of long-awaited petroleum industry laws designed to reform the 
 
89 Victoria Ohaeri, ‘PIB Resource Handbook, An Analysis of the Petroleum Industry Bill’s Provision on 
Community Participation & the Environment’ (Space for Change, April 2013) 7. < 
https://issuu.com/spaces.for.change/docs/spaces_for_change._pib__resource_handbook._final._ > accessed 




Nigerian oil and gas industry. The PIB, an omnibus law, meant to provide 
a new legal and regulatory framework for the oil and gas (petroleum) 
industry in Nigeria, had struggled to see the light of day despite its 
introduction to the National Assembly years ago. Subsequently, the 
National Assembly decided to break down the PIB into several different 
pieces of legislation guiding specific aspects of the industry. Two 
principles which the Bill addresses are; 
 
4.2.10.1 Clarity and Responsibility 
To have effective regulatory governance in the petroleum sector, clarity 
of goals is essential. Lack of clarity can lead to conflicting plans, 
repetition of efforts and weak policies. Clarity ensures that roles and 
responsibilities, adequately allocated, that the boundaries between 
policy and strategy appropriately set, and regulatory functions are well-
defined.91 It further entails that the National Oil Company (NOC) has a 
clear commercial purpose. The relationship between the NOC and the 
state-defined adequately with no conflict of interest.92 
Having well-defined petroleum legislation is likely to relieve adjudication 
of judicial disputes and make stakeholders take responsibility for their 
obligations. This can ensure that investors foresee commercial 
expectations and reduce the possibility of conflict between the host 
communities and the host government. Clarity and responsibility is a 
criterion which the new PIB meets. The objectives of the Bill are set out 
clearly in Section 2 of the Bill.93 Firstly, the Bill creates efficient and 
 
91 Okechukwu C. Ahohu & Wifa, ‘Regulatory Governance: The Petroleum Industry Bill 2020 and Nigerian’s 
Oil Future’ (2020) African Natural Resources and Energy Law Network Research Paper 1/2020.< 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3730659 >accessed 20 January 2021. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Petroleum Industry Bill (2020) s 2 
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effective governance institutions with separate roles for the petroleum 
industry.94 Secondly, it sets out to establish a commercially sustainable 
National Oil Company (NOC) framework. 95  Thirdly, to promote 
transparency, good governance and accountability in the administration 
of petroleum resources. 96  Finally, it seeks to foster a business 
environment suitable for petroleum operations.97 
The Bill creates a two-tier Regulatory system that separates regulatory 
functions upstream, midstream and downstream to assign 
responsivities.98 Two regulatory agencies and a commercial enterprise 
have been created and assign different responsibilities. Section 4 of the 
Bill makes the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Authority (the 
Commission), Section 6 provides for upstream petroleum operations 
with clear objectives and Sections 7,8 and 9, creates technical and 
commercial regulatory functions. Section 29 (1)- (3) makes the Nigerian 
Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (the 
Authority) with similar technical and commercial regulatory functions 
covering midstream and downstream operations in the petroleum 
industry. Finally, the Bill creates the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Company Limited (NNPC Limited) in Section 53 (1) as a limited liability 
company with a clear commercial obligation bereft of government 
finance. There is a concern about limiting the effectiveness of regulators 
in the Bill, notwithstanding the commitment of the PIB. 99  Both 
regulators combine technical and commercial functions in Sections 7, 8 
and 32 (a) and (b). Uniting these functions in one regulator could 
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negatively affect transparency, enforcement and best practice standards 
within the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
 
4.2.10.2 Accountability in Decision Making 
Without accountability, good practices are left unidentified, and harmful 
practices can strive. The new PIB proposes some channels for 
accountability. The Bill creates institutions like the Commission and the 
Authority and establishes apparent Authority, enforcement, delegation, 
and monitoring pathways. Regarding channels of Authority, the Bill 
creates a governing board and the position of Chief Executive for both 
regulatory agencies. In Section 33, both regulatory agencies have the 
powers to issue a regulation. More specifically, in Section 211 (1) -(3), 
the Authority can regulate anti-competitive behaviours. 100  This 
provision has the prospects of addressing market monopolies and 
manipulations. As stated in Section 231 (1) -(6), they also have powers 
to issue administrative penalties where there is a breach. These 
regulatory powers are critical to the performance of their omitted 
responsibilities.101 Concerning the delegation of duties, Section (3) (1) 
(i) assigns the Minister of Petroleum Resources the power to delegate in 
writing to the Chief Executive of the Commission or the Authority any 
power conferred on the Minister. This provides assurances to investors 
and other stakeholders that matters concerning the interest of 
stakeholders for which regulation needed cannot be left unattended. 
About monitoring, the Minister has powers in Section 2 (4) to give 
general policy directives to both regulators on matters concerning 
upstream petroleum operations, midstream petroleum operations and 
 
100 Petroleum Industry Bill 2020, s211 (1)-(3) 
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downstream petroleum operations, which both institutions have to obey. 
While this power can help resolve regulatory frictions and help bring 
local legislation in harmony with international commitments, it also 
offers the possibility for regulatory matters to come under ministerial 
leniency. The latter case may not gain the trust of potential investors. 
 
The PIB is the first of several bills (the Petroleum Industry Fiscal Bill and 
Host Community Bill are currently before the Senate), which the 
National Assembly will debate and pass in due course. The PIB 
encompasses provisions dealing with the legal and regulatory 
framework for the oil and gas sector and establishes rules for the 
operation of MNCs in the industry. It seeks to develop a framework to 
create commercially oriented and profit-driven petroleum operations to 
ensure added value and internationalization of the petroleum industry 
by creating structured and effective governing institutions with well-
defined and separate roles for the petroleum industry.102 The PIB is 
expected to promote and increase transparency, accountability, and 
good corporate governance in Nigeria's oil and gas sector by letting go 
of confidentiality clauses through competitive bid processes for oil 
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4.3 The Case of Gbemre 
Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited & 
Others104  
By order of a Nigerian federal high court on 14
 
November 2005, there 
was an important watershed in the struggle by local communities in the 
Niger Delta of Nigeria to protect their health, environment and 
farmlands, and to bring an end to gas flaring.105 Mr Gbemre acted in a 
representative capacity for himself and for each and every member of 
the Iwehereken community in Delta State, Nigeria against Shell Nigeria, 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Attorney 
General of the Federation. Before the ruling in the suit brought by 
Gbemre in 2005, it had been the view of some industry observers and 
scholars that the only remedies open to individuals and communities 
who suffered damaging environmental effects as a result of the activities 
of oil companies was financial compensation and/or restoration.106 The 
basis for this view was Section 36 of Schedule 1 to the Petroleum Act 
1969 which provides for the payment of fair and adequate 
compensation.107 
The applicants sought the following reliefs from the court: 
“a) A declaration that the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental 
rights to life and dignity of human person provided in sections 33(1) and 
34(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and 
reinforced by Articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and 
 
104 Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company and Others [2005]Suit No.FHC/B/CS/53/05; AHRLR 
151 NgHC 
105 Ibid. 
106 Yinka Omorogbe, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2001) 151. 
107 Regulation 21 of the 1969 Petroleum Regulations uses the term ‘fair compensation’, while Regulation 
23 uses the term ‘adequate compensation’. 
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Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A9, Vol. 1, Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 inevitably includes the right to clean, 
poison-free, pollution-free and healthy environment.”  
“b) A declaration that the actions of the first and second defendants in 
continuing to flare gas in the course of their oil exploration and 
production activities in the plaintiff’s community is a violation of the 
applicant’s fundamental rights to life (including healthy environment) 
and dignity of human person, and therefore deprived them of enjoying 
the best attainable state of physical and mental health as well as right 
to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.” 
“c) A declaration that the failure of the first and second defendants to 
carry out an environmental impact assessment in the plaintiff’s 
community concerning the effects of their gas flaring activities, is a 
violation of Section 2(2) Environmental Impact Assessment Act.”.108 
The court affirmed that the actions of both respondents in continuing to 
flare gas in the course of their oil exploration and production activities 
in the applicant’s community was a violation of their fundamental right 
to life (including healthy environment) and dignity of human persons 
guaranteed by the Constitution and the African Charter. The court 
further declared that both respondents, Shell Nigeria and the NNPC, 
were to be controlled from further flaring of gas in the applicant’s 
community and were to take immediate steps to stop the further flaring 
of gas in the applicant’s community.109 
The court made the following declaratory order: 
 
108 Chapter A9, Vol. I, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
109 Oluwatoyin Adejonwo-Osho, ‘The Evolution of Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection 
in Nigeria’ (Dun Press 2008).  
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“a) That the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights to life and 
dignity of human  persons provided by Sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and reinforced by 
Art. 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter on Human Procedure Rules 
(Procedure and Enforcement) Act Cap A9 Vol.1 Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria, 2004110 inevitably includes the right to clean poison-free, 
pollution-free and healthy environment.”  




Respondent in continuing to flare 
gas in the course of their oil exploration and production activities in the 
Applicant’s community is a violation of their fundamental right to life 
(including healthy environment) and dignity of human persons 
guaranteed by the Constitution and the African Charter.”111  
The provisions of Section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Associated Gas 
Reinjection Act, Cap A25 Vol. 1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 
and Section 1 of the Associated Gas Reinjection (Continued Flaring of 
Gas) Regulations Section 1.43 of 1984 under which the continued flaring 
of gas in Nigeria may be permitted are unpredictable with the applicant’s 
right to life and/or dignity of human person enshrined in the constitution 
and the African Charter and are therefore unconstitutional, null and void 
by virtue of Section 1(3) of the Nigerian Constitution.112  
As no reliefs, as to damages or compensation were sought by the 
plaintiff, the court made no award of damages or any compensation, 
although it had the power to grant ancillary reliefs as it deemed fit. 
The decision of the court was revolutionary on different levels. It was 
the first time that a Nigerian court had applied and extended the 
 





guaranteed fundamental human rights enshrined in the Nigerian 
Constitution to an environmental case.113 It was also the first time that 
a court had held and declared that the gas-flaring actions of oil 
companies amounted to a crime. In addition to the foregoing, no court 
had ever granted a restraining order on an oil company with regards to 
the continuation of exploration and production acts resulting in pollution, 
nor ordered that pollution or flaring by an oil company in any community 
must stop. 
Gbemre v. Shell is a precedent case in Nigeria; it is the first judicial 
authority to declare that gas flaring is illegal, unconstitutional and a 
breach of the fundamental human right to life. Cases relating to 
environmental degradation in Nigeria are not new to the judiciary but 
what makes the Gbemre case special is the fact that the decision was 
the first of its kind, as it was the first case where the court took more 
consideration of the environment rather than potential loss of revenue 
and investment. 
Despite Justice Nwokorie’s laudable decision, Shell displayed a total 
disregard for the Nigerian justice system as it was discovered that no 
detailed phase-out had been submitted. On 30 April 2007, the legal 
representative of the plantiff discovered that Justice Nwokorie had been 
removed from the case by being transferred to another court district in 
the far northern state of Katsina, and also that the court file was not 
available, and that no representatives of Shell, the NNPC or the 
government had turned up.114 The act of Shell and the NNPC was an 
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obvious mockery of the Nigerian justice system as the once famous 
decision by Justice Nwokorie was rendered ineffective. 
However, in Ikechukwu Opara & others v. Shell Petroleum Development 
Company Nig. Ltd. and 5 others,115 where the facts were similar to 
Gbemre’s case, the high court struck out the case due to procedural 
defects. It held that the rights created by the African Charter are beyond 
the definition ascribed to fundamental rights as contemplated by Section 
46 of the Nigerian Constitution and so cannot be enforced by means of 
fundamental rights (enforcement procedure) rules.116  
This case raises questions about the judicial attitude of Nigerian judges 
in matters relating to environmental hazards which affect human rights, 
which are created by multinational oil corporations which are of a 
disadvantage to their host communities.117 With all due respect to the 
court, the applicants’ claims were for the protection of their rights, which 
is the right to life and dignity, as expressly listed under Chapter IV of 
the Nigerian Constitution and therefore enforceable by means of 
fundamental rights (enforcement procedure) rules.118 To strike out the 
case on the ground that the applicants reinforced their claims by citing 
articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter suggests that the court’s 
reasoning was faulty.119 The court should have taken account of the fact 
that Nigeria has incorporated these rights into its domestic law by virtue 
of the ratification and subsequent domestication of the African 
Charter.120 Although the learned trial judge conceded to the applicants’ 
counsel’s argument that issues bordering on whether there is a right to 
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pollute free air or whether the same is right to life requires interpretation 
of the constitutional provisions under Chapter IV of the Nigerian 
Constitution.121 He struck out the case notwithstanding the continued 
negative impacts that the activities could have.122 It is hoped that the 
appeal court will be bold and courageous in this case and uphold the 
existence of environmental rights in Nigeria, as done by trial courts in 
Gbemre’s case. 123  This will enable victims of harm caused by oil 
exploration to ventilate their rights in court against the actors 
accountable. The explicit recognition of the duties of the multinational 
oil corporations towards protecting human rights in the Gbemre case 
shows that there is a prospect of the horizontal application of human 
rights provision to non-state actors in Nigeria.124 
Section 6 of the Nigerian Constitution states that the judicial powers of 
the federation shall be vested in the courts.125 Section 6(6)(b) of the 
constitution states that the judicial powers of the courts shall extend to 
all matters between persons, or between government or authority and 
to any persons in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating 
thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and 
obligations of that person. Thus, courts have exercised these powers in 
administering justice in cases brought before them. 
The cases discussed above have shown the manner in which the courts 
have adjudicated over matters brought before them. However, it is a 
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124 
 
of the delivery of a judgement, but (save for declaratory judgements) 
when that judgement is actually enforced and its fruits recovered by the 
victorious litigant.126 An unenforceable judgement is a bad judgement, 
and in Nigeria judgements and orders made by courts are often ignored, 
not because they are incapable of being enforced, but because the 
courts lack the clout to follow up such orders and judgements,127and 
also because there is no effective mechanism or follow-up process to 
ensure that court orders are obeyed.128 The complexities of the Nigerian 
political environment have made it difficult to ensure the protection of 
rule of law. 
 
4.4 Analysis of Codes of Conduct in the Oil and Gas Industry in 
Nigeria 
A notable weakness of the codes of conduct in the oil and gas sector in  
Nigeria is mainly because their codes of conduct are written in unclear 
terms.129 For example, Oshionebo states that ExxonMobil and Shell are 
two such companies with ambiguous terms in their codes of conduct.130 
ExxonMobil’s Standards of Business Conduct state that: “it is dedicated 
to running safe and environmentally responsible operations”. 131 
Nonetheless, in ExxonMobil’s code, there is no definition of the term 
 
126 Olufemi Amao (n124). 
127 See Human Rights Watch, Everyone’s In On the Game: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the 
Nigeria Police Force (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), 2–3. 
128 Again, this is an issue that deals with the enforcement of judgements and court orders and thus has to do 
with the enforcement arm of governments, i.e., the police and bailiffs. 
129 Evaristus Oshionebo, Regulating Transnational Corporations in Domestic and International Regimes: 
An African Case Study (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).  
130 Ibid.  
131 ExxonMobil, ‘Standards of Business Conduct’ (2011), available at 
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“safe and responsible operations”.132 Therefore, the clause could have a 
lot of interpretations by different shareholders. Shell's clauses are no 
different either, and it states that it will “support fundamental human 
rights”.133 Oshionebo is of the view that Shell was not right to make use 
of unclear expressions, and the proper terminology ought to be “respect 
or observe human rights”.134 The constitutional framework of Nigeria 
states that fundamental human rights are similar to civil and political 
rights which are justiciable and enforceable in Nigerian courts; however, 
socio-economic rights are not justiciable or enforceable in Nigeria.135 
The scope of economic, cultural and social (socio-economic) rights136 is 
provided for in Chapter II of the Nigerian constitution, while civil and 
political rights are enforceable. Nonetheless, MNCs should clearly state 
socio-economic rights in the various codes of conduct.137 
In respect of Addax Petroleum, it seems like an express mention of 
human rights protection in their code of conduct has been omitted.138 
Most times, corporations are affected by their ideological and cultural 
background in the construction of the civil regulatory standard in 
Nigeria. 139  Amaechi and Amao 140  examined the effect of the home 
countries of the oil industries in their localization of codes of conduct in 
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the oil and gas industry in Nigeria.141 They stated that: “corporate codes 
of these MNCs operating in Nigeria, most likely reflects the features of 
their home countries’ model of capitalism, respectively, notwithstanding 
with certain degree of modifications.”142  
However, Total believes that: “to ensure compliance with our code of 
conduct, we ask an independent third party, Good Corporation, to 
conduct ethical assessments of our operations every year.” 143  The 
assessment tackles problems such as labour standards, business 
integrity, the environment and human rights. 144  Assessments were 
made in Angola, Uganda, Tunisia, South Africa and Algeria, amongst 
other countries.145  
 
4.5 Transparency in the Oil and Gas Sector of Nigeria 
(Environmental Impact Assessment Act) 
This law was enacted so that environmental degradation caused by 
exploration and the concerns of members of the oil extractive 
communities in Nigeria could be regulated. 146  The Act is directed 
specifically at the regulation of the industrialization process with regards 
to the environment. 147  The Act seeks to urge the development of 
procedures for information exchange, notification and consultation 
between organs and persons when proposed activities are likely to have 
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a substantial influence on the boundary, on trans-state, or on the 
environment or bordering towns and villages.148 
Apart from the Nigerian Constitution,
 
there are certain other regulations 
in Nigeria that protect human rights in the corporate sector, particularly 
in areas where extraction is carried out in an environment.149 Although, 
irrespective of several weaknesses in some of the regulations,150 the 
ability of the federal executive to enforce the upright segments of the 
existing laws151 has been questioned by scholars 152 and the judiciary.153 
The EITI is a different international mechanism on MNCs’ activities which 
has been localized in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria.154 Many oil MNCs 
are signatories to EITI, they include; BG Group, Shell, Chevron Group, 
Statoil and Total.155 The EITI Board nominated Nigeria as EITI compliant 
on 1 March 2011. 156  The NEITI has a secretariat controlled by an 
executive director and a governing board. The objectives of the NEITI 
Act 2007 were to ensure due process and transparency by extractive 
corporations and the federal government of Nigeria, monitoring and 
ensuring accountability in revenue receipts of the federal government, 
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and elimination of corrupt practices in the payment process in the 
extractive industry, amongst others.157 
In March 2012, NEITI ordered the third audit to be conducted on the oil 
and gas industry in Nigeria.158 The audit report was submitted on 18 
December 2012. 159  This audit report was very scathing of the 
presentation of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 
the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The report blamed the NNPC for 
failing to pay billions of dollars to the treasuries of the Nigerian 
government.160 For instance, “a breakdown of the revenue lost to the 
activities of the NNPC as contained in the report showed that financial 
flows from the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG), which incorporates 
dividends and loan repayment, with $4.84 billion was received by the 
NNPC, and was not reimbursed by the Corporation.”161 The revenue that 
went to the federal government in the period under review was a 
combination of earnings from the crude oil business, royalties, gas-
flaring penalties and petroleum profit, amongst others.162  The main 
corporations covered by the audit included the major multinational 
companies in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria such as, Agip, Chevron, 
Shell, and Total amongst others, and agencies of the federal 
government such as the NNPC, DPR, Central Bank of Nigeria and Federal 
Inland Revenue Services, among others.163 According to the Chairman 
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of NEITI, Dr Ledum Mitee, some oil and gas companies, such as 
NECONDE Energy Ltd, SEPTA Energy Ltd, Emerald Energy Resources 
and Energia Ltd, declined to participate in the audit process.164 Dr Mitee 
stated that a suitable sanction would be given to those corporations that 
refused to participate in the audit process.165 
Before the establishment of NEITI, in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria, 
payment or oil revenues accruing to the federal government were 
hidden. NEITI reports have been the main spur in revealing the 
concealed aspect of Nigerian government activities in the oil and gas 
sector.166 If no publication of the reports existed, Nigerians and other 
investors “would have slight information on the size of the sector or the 
extent and nature of the challenges in the management of revenue 
streams from it”.167 By publishing the various audit reports, NEITI has 
improved access to information that will, therefore, perpetually lead to 
enhanced transparency in monitoring oil revenues receipts by the 
federal government in Nigeria.168 
Questionably, the influence of the audit reports on transparency in the 
oil sector has been low. For instance, in both the first and second audit 
reports, the NEITI is said to be “increasingly becoming toothless and 
institutionally moribund”.169 The third NEITI audit report was severely 
criticized by the NNPC. In a statement broadly spread by the NNPC in 
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Nigerian newspapers and on the internet, the NNPC refuted the 
controversy of the third audit report on the discrepancy in the payment 
paid to the federal government. 170  The NNPC posited that: “NEITI 
without taking into account of the extant laws and regulations, rules and 
terms of applicable contracts in NNPC's activities, which repeatedly has 
shown the NNPC in a bad light to the public."171  
It is argued that the main fault of the third audit report can be inferred 
from a letter written by the accountants to the Executive Secretary of 
the NEITI and attached to the audit report.172 In the second paragraph 
of the letter, the accountants state that the audit report or 'engagement' 
was conducted in line with the International Standard on Related 
Services applicable to agreed-upon procedures engagements". 173 
Therefore, the audit report was conducted in line with the best 
international audit and accounting standards.  
NEITI is yet to attain much in the oil and gas industry. The corruption in 
the oil and gas industry and the lack of political motivation from the 
government to execute the NEITI, amongst other inherent difficulties, 
have accentuated the conundrum.174  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Having gone through the laws and regulations governing the oil industry 
and the environment in Nigeria, it can be concluded that there are 
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lacunae, and they are inadequate to provide the level of protection 
required to ensure that there is accountability for human rights 
violations as a result of oil extraction. However, this chapter has also 
succeeded in showing that the inadequacy of the current legislation is 
not the biggest problem when it comes to the proper regulation of the 
Nigerian oil industry, as Nigeria has laws and regulations in place 
capable of regulating and holding MNCs accountable for their activities, 
but fails to ensure enforcement and compliance. The possession of well-
developed and large environmental laws does not guarantee adequate 
remedies. There is a need for the Nigerian Government to address these 
inadequacies and ensure that the laws are effectively applied and 
enforced by all those charged with the responsibility of enforcing the 
laws. 
In addition to these issues raised, other pertinent problems highlighted 
is that it weakens the litigants hope of getting justice, as seen in 
Gbemre’s case above.  The non-enforcement of the laws perpetuates 
the deprivation, alienation, exclusion and insecurity of the local 
inhabitants and breeds their contempt for the MNCs and government. 
The next chapter will examine the international mechanisms attempted 







International Mechanisms Aimed at Holding MNCs Accountable 
 
5.1 Introduction 
There are a number of international mechanisms that exist to attempt 
to hold MNCs to account. These include various voluntary codes and the 
US Aliens Tort Claims Act (ACTA). Voluntary codes of conduct can be 
adopted by companies in order to demonstrate their commitment to 
being accountable. Those codes can lay down standards that a company 
can agree to follow. In regard to MNCs, the codes can act to “promote 
socially responsible” conduct, while in developing countries, they are 
seen to help prevent abuse by MNCs.1 As such it is important to describe 
the leading codes of conduct in order to demonstrate how they may, or 
may not, positively affect the behaviour of MNCs in Nigeria. A distinct 
mechanism that might act to hold MNCs accountable is under the US 
ACTA statute. It also merits discussion. 
The state-centric view asserts that international human rights 
mechanisms levy only indirect accountability on MNCs.2 Although some 
say that the mechanisms already impose direct accountability on 
corporations, they lack enforcement mechanisms, however.3 
In its fourth session in 2007, the Human Rights Council stated that: 
“... corporations are under growing scrutiny by the international human 
rights mechanisms. And while states have been unwilling to adopt 
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binding international human rights standards for corporations, together 
with business and civil society they have drawn on some of these 
instruments in establishing soft law standards and initiatives. It seems 
likely, therefore, that these instruments will play a key role in any future 
development of defining corporate responsibility for human rights.”4  
As a result of struggles involved in holding MNCs directly accountable 
for human rights violations under international law, and the lack of 
appropriate mechanisms to be enforced in countries where oil 
exploration was carried out, multilateral organizations were guided to 
urge corporations to turn to voluntary codes. The UN Global Compact 
(2000), the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (1976, revised 
in 2000) and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977) are some of the 
codes.5 
These codes of conduct levy no legal, only moral, obligations on 
corporations, and they are not capable of being enforced by the 
application of outside sanctions. Commitment to the codes by 
corporations is voluntary, although as a condition for membership or 
licensing agreements, some corporations have accepted the codes.6  
Currently, no framework regulating the activities of MNCs or binding 
treaty in international law exist. One main reason for this position is the 
fact that there is no legal status for MNCs in international law.7 The 
attention of international instruments on the activities of MNCs is either 
 
4 HRC, 2007a, 14.  
5 Freddy Mynongani, ‘Accountability of Multinational Corporations for Human Rights Violations under 
International Law’ (PhD Thesis, University of South Africa 2016). 
6 ILO, ‘Codes of Conduct for Multinationals’< https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---
emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf >accessed 21 June 2020 
7 Edwin Mujih, Regulating Multinationals in Developing Countries: A Conceptual and Legal Framework 
for Corporate Social Responsibility (Farnham: Gower Publishing, 2013) 253. 
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through binding treaties which are directed to states – which can also 
be made applicable to MNCs (such as bilateral agreements and ILO 
conventions) – and mechanisms, or soft law concentrated on the 
activities of the MNCs. 8  Many literatures on private actors in 
international law and regulating MNCs, are available.9  
 
5.2 International Labour Organizations Tripartite Declaration 
The first mechanism to look at is the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinationals and Social Policy.10 As a result of 
the activities of MNCs in the 1960s and 1970s there was a motivation to 
create international instruments for the control of MNCs, and also to 
outline their relations to host countries, most importantly in the 
developing countries.11 In 1977, the Governing Body of the ILO adopted 
the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, amended in 2000.12 The aims of the ILO’s 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy13 are “to encourage the positive contributions of the 
MNEs to economic and social progress”14 and “to minimize and resolve 
difficulties to which their operations may give rise”.15 The principles, 
 
8 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) Intl. Comm. Law Review 20(1), 30–68. 
9 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
10 ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
(Geneva: ILO, 2001) < 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf 
>accessed 20 July 2020. 
11 ILO, ‘Introduction’, in Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy (Geneva: ILO, 2001). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Declaration’. 





which were non-binding and established in the Declaration, have their 
origins in major ILO conventions and recommendations.16 However, the 
success of the Declaration depends on the co-operation which exists 
between employers, employee groups and MNCs, as well as with MNCs’ 
local associates or partners.17 As a voluntary declaration, its purpose 
was to guide MNCs, governments and workers’ organizations.18 
The Declaration is commended as an instrument which plays an 
important role in securing the protection of basic labour standards in 
this globalization period.19 The instrument encloses a wide range of 
rules that ought to be complied with by MNCs. The Declaration has some 
inherent strengths, as it generates good social policy advantage.20 As 
provided by Paragraph 12:  
“governments of home nations should endeavour to promote good social 
practices in respect of the declaration, having regard to the social and 
labour law, regulations and practices in the host countries as well as to 
important international standards. This is to the benefit of the 
developing countries. It also has the advantage of a dispute 
procedure.”21 
Regarding grievances, Paragraph 8 states that the right of workers to 
have their grievances addressed should be respected by both MNCs and 
national enterprises,22 while Paragraph 59 posits that MNCs and national 
 
16 ILO, A Guide to the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy (Geneva: ILO, 2002) 4. 
17 Ibid. 
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enterprises working in union with workers’ representatives, seek to 
create voluntary resolution machinery so as to settle disputes that arise 
in the industry.23 
The Declaration is not devoid of several setbacks, one of which is its 
dependence in Paragraph 8 on “sovereign rights of states”. It has been 
argued that reference to the importance of national law weakens the 
Declaration,24 which may be as a consequence of states’ insufficient 
development and effective legal systems to be able to impose effective 
sets of labour standards or law.25 It sometimes makes MNCs relent in 
trying to improve labour standards above the fundamental standards in 
a country.26 Such reliance on state sovereignty permits some amount of 
regulatory competition in the area of labour rights/standards; however, 
this might be an advantage to certain countries, and might convince 
some states to weaken labour standards in order to remain 
competitive. 27  The ‘Good Social Policy’ of the Declaration is weak 
because it does not “envisage the extraterritoriality application of 
superior home country standards to employees in host states”.28 
The Declaration is said to be encouraging,29 non-binding and a set of 
voluntary rules agreed by governments, and employers’ and workers’ 
organizations.30 As such MNCs can decline to accept it because sanctions 
are not forced on them. The dispute procedure has been said to be weak 
 
23 Paragraph 59 of the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy. 





28 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) Intl. Comm. Law Review 20(1) 30–68. 
29 Muchlinski (n24) 460. 
30 Ekhator (n28). 
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because it is “not judicial in nature”.31 It doesn’t follow compliance and 
is hardly invoked.32 It is restricted by the Annex to the Declaration – 
Paragraph 2 of the Annex provides that: “the procedure should not be 
in conflict with already existing national or ILO procedures.”33 Despite 
the weaknesses of the Declaration, it “still embodies the least 
international labour standards that states have agreed should apply to 
the operations of MNEs”. 34  The Declaration was a good start at 
regulating labour standards. 
 
5.3 Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The second mechanism to look at regarding the international regulation 
of MNCs is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines on MNCs. The OECD Guidelines on 
MNCs 35  were first adopted in 1976, and revised in 2000. 36  The 
Guidelines are “recommendations on responsible business conduct to 
MNCs operating in or from the adhering countries”.37 The Guidelines are 
known to be voluntary and non-binding.38 Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines’ 
General Principles do encourage self-regulation by MNCs, and the 
 
31 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) Intl. Comm. Law Review 20(1) 30–68.  See also, Muchlinski (n24) 459. 
32 Bob Hepple, ‘Labour Regulation in International Markets’, in S. Picciotto and R. Mayne, Regulating 
International Business: Beyond Liberalization (London: Macmillan, 1999), 193. See Ekhator (n28). 
33 Paragraph 2 of the Annex of the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy. See also, Ekhator (n28) 
34 Muchlinski (n24) 481. 
35 Ekhator (n28) see also OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 2000) 
< http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf >accessed 20 July 2020. 
36 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 





Guidelines are very exhaustive.39 They are proposed to be domesticated 
into national law or corporate governance by OECD members.40 Part IV 
of the guidelines is about ‘Employment and Industrial Relations’. 41 
Paragraph 10 of its General Principles ensures that the guidelines are 
applicable to firms and subcontractors.42 
The enforcement process of the guidelines is advantageous. Its National 
Contact Points (NCP) are created by states to “promote the guidelines, 
collect information, deals with requests and help in solving problems 
which may arise between business and labour in matters covered by the 
Guidelines”. 43  Some weaknesses do exist though; for example, the 
Guidelines are weak in enforcement essentially because the NCP are 
almost non-existent in many countries,44 and only reasonably small 
issues were covered in the Guidelines. The OECD is made up of 
financially buoyant nations, thus omitting a lot of countries, particularly 
developing countries. The Guidelines, nevertheless, are a “timely 
addition to the range of transnational regulatory instruments”.45 In 2007, 
the OECD, the European Commission, the European Parliament, NGOs 
and trade unions, to mention but a few, convened to adopt or develop 




41 Part 1V of The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2000.  
42 Paragraph 10 of The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2000. 
43 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) Intl. Comm. Law Review 20(1) 30–68.see  Hepple (n32) 193. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) Intl. Comm. Law Review 20(1) 30–68. See also, Jill Murray, ‘A New Phase in the 
Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: The Role of the OECD’ (2001) 30(3) Industrial Law Journal, 255–
270 at 268. 
46 Friends of the Earth (England, Wales and Northern Ireland), ‘A History of Attempts to Regulate the 
Activities of Transnational Corporations: What Lessons Can Be learned’, cited in E. Emeseh ‘Corporations, 
CSR and Self-Regulation: What Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis?’ (2010), 1(2) German Law 
Journal, 234–252 at 240–241. 
139 
 
“the aims of the Model NCP include making every effort to resolve 
questions of fact, equal treatment of all parties and the development of 
clear-cut procedures and timelines. Model NCPs expectedly will not 
assume that parallel legal proceedings take precedence and will not 
apply the lack of investment nexus as a pretext to exclude a specific 
instance.”47 
The OECD Guidelines on MNCs were modified and adopted by states 
which adhered to it in 2011.48 This was the fifth revision or update of 
the Guidelines and contained wide recommendations for accountable 
business conduct that states should reassure their corporations or 
enterprises to adhere to.49 In May 2011, all the OECD states, Argentina, 
Brazil, Latvia, Lithuania, Egypt, Peru, Morocco and Romania, who were 
countries that kept to the OECD Guidelines, as well as the European 
Community, were directed to adhere to the part of the Guidelines 
(National Treatment) decreasing within its scope. 50  Like the 2000 
edition, the 2011 version of the OECD Guidelines encompasses 
voluntary principles and standards for business conduct which are 
compatible with the extant laws and international measures. 51 
Additionally, the basics of the Guidelines can be concluded from the 
following provision: 
“... countries adhering to the Guidelines make a binding commitment to 
implement them in accordance with the Decision of the OECD Council 
on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Furthermore, 
 
47 Emeseh (n46) 241. 
48 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) Intl. Comm. Law Review 20(1) 30–68. See also, OECD website, ‘Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: 2011 Update’ < 
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matters covered by the Guidelines may also be subject of national law 
and international commitments.”52 
A major improvement in the revised OECD Guidelines is the addition of 
a new human rights chapter localized in Chapter IV of the Guidelines. 
Additionally, Chapter IV explains the human rights responsibilities or 
obligations of MNCs.53 Some of the human rights obligations of MNCs 
rooted in the Guidelines include the requirement that they should 
respect human rights, try not to cause or aggravate human rights 
impacts while carrying out their activities, pursue means to reduce or 
prevent human rights impacts directly attributed to their business, have 
a policy commitment to promoting and respecting human rights, as well 
as carry out due human rights diligence as appropriate and expected to 
co-operate in the reversal or stopping of adverse human rights where 
negative impacts exist. 54  Therefore, the 2011 edition of the OECD 
Guidelines gives more acknowledgement to the importance of human 
rights dialogue in the international and national surface,55 though it 
remains affected by the difficulties witnessed in earlier displays of the 
Guidelines, including the fact that it is soft law, voluntary and so not 
enforceable. However, some observers state that the Guidelines’ non-
binding nature is not an impediment. For example, the Guidelines are 
used to promote corporate accountability activities in different 
countries,56 and they “represent an agreement on what makes up for 
 
52 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2000  
53 Mujih Edwin, Regulating Multinationals in Developing Countries: A Case-study of the Chad-Cameroon 
Oil and Pipeline Project Farnham (Gower Publishing 2012) 165. 
54 Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria (n 47). 
55 Ibid. 
56 OECD Annual Report (2006) < https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/annrep-2006-
en.pdf?expires=1592394878&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=A0A7D13FDFB140B6184121C9BAF67
6AB >accessed 20 June 2020. 
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good corporate behaviour in an increasing global economy”.57 Moreover, 
the Guidelines may grow into hard and binding international law if 
countries adhere to and seek to constantly apply them in their business 
relationships with MNCs.58 
 
5.4 Other Attempts 
Other attempts at the international regulation of MNCs include the draft 
Code of Conduct on Multinational Corporations by the United Nations 
Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), which was 
previously proposed as a set of binding legal rules (code of conduct) 
expected to regulate the conduct of MNCs in the international territory.59 
The code was designed towards the MNCs, even if it ought to have been 
adopted by all countries.60 Therefore, the countries were anticipated to 
implement or enforce the codes.61 It has been argued that the draft 
codes were very comprehensive and intended to be binding on the 
countries.62 Notwithstanding the different consultations on this code of 
conduct, it was never formally adopted.63 In accordance with this, the 
UNCTC was disbanded on the eve of the Rio Earth Summit and its 
activities taken over by the United Nations Commission on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) 64  which promoted voluntary initiatives 
 
57 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Corporations in International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the United 
Kingdom Asbestos Case’ (2001) 50(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1–25, 24. 
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59 Ekhator (n 47). 
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62 Emily Carasco and Jang. Singh, ‘Human Rights in Global Business Ethics Codes’ (2008) 113(3) 
Business and Society Review, 347–374, 357, cited in Mujih (n53) 136. 





developed by the MNCs instead of developing a binding regulatory 
regime.65 
Another effort at regulating MNCs in the international territory is the UN 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights for Business.66 It is 
stated that the Norms enjoy higher status in international law compared 
to voluntary codes because they “embody moral and political 
commitments of governments and corporations and represent standards 
of law in development (or soft law)”.67 The Norms also set out a list of 
human rights obligations anticipated by companies and also various 
modes of monitoring and enforcement. 68  Also, the UN Norms are 
practical measures to ensure states are meeting the agreed regulatory 
standards, and it is a significant reference and advocacy tool for NGOs.69 
Codes of conduct are less imposing than the Norms. However, MNCs 
have to be accustomed to it, due to its non-binding nature. NGOs and 
states have to monitor and implement standards under national laws. It 
is apparent from the above-mentioned analysis that international 
regulation or holding of MNCs is tilted towards the benefit of the 
companies.  
Another attempt at regulating the activities of MNCs in the international 
plane was through the United Nations Global Compact. The Global 
 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ekhator (n 47)  see also  
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Compact has been defined by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
thus:  
“the Global Compact asks companies to embrace universal principles 
and to partner with the United Nations. It has grown to become a critical 
platform for the UN to engage effectively with enlightened global 
business.”70  
The UN Global Compact is a combined or strategic determination for 
businesses that are keen to commit their operations to conform to the 
10 principles, particularly in the areas of labour, environment, human 
rights and anti-corruption. 71  The UN Global Compact cautions 
companies to observe and support a range of core values. Over 10,000 
participating companies are currently under the Global Compact, from 
more than 130 countries and is the largest corporate responsibility 
measure or initiative in the world.72 Some academics still maintain, 
notwithstanding the large number of corporate participants in the Global 
Compact initiative, many companies remain indifferent to it.73 
Another soft law international mechanism that is said to ‘regulate’ MNCs 
in the international domain is the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights (VPSHR). This was a US/UK-led initiative for business and 
civil society organizations.74 The VPSHR was established in 2000 to help 
companies improve human rights protection while maintaining the 
security and safety of their operations or activities. 75  The VPSHR 
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embodies three core parts: “risk assessment, interactions between 
companies and public security, interactions between companies and 
private security”.76 Under the VPSHR, MNCs are expected to evaluate 
the impact or risk when conveying equipment, including dangerous 
equipment, to private and public security firms in order to lessen or ease 
any accidental act, including human rights abuses.77 In May 2012, seven 
countries, 11 NGOs and five organizations were observers and 20 
companies participated in the VPSHR mechanism. 78  An outstanding 
strength of the VPSHR is that it is a “tripartite multi-stakeholder 
initiative”.79 Oshionebo asserts that regular application of the VPSHR in 
the extractive industries may improve the security situation and as a 
result, best security practices might surface.80 However, an inherent 
limitation of the VPSHR is that it is voluntary and non-binding on the 
MNCs. Thus, MNCs might decide not to enforce or implement the VPSHR 
in their operations. There are no sanctions attached to the non-refusal 
of MNCs to localize the VPSHR in their operations. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is another 
mechanism. The EITI is a voluntary initiative made up of stakeholders 
such as governments, NGOs, MNCs, international organizations and 
businesses.81 One of the major objectives of the EITI is to ensure that 
the revenue realized from receipts from a country’s natural endowments 
contributes to poverty alleviation and sustainable development, thereby 




78 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights’< 
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lead to corruption, poverty and conflict in the extractive industries.82 
The EITI sets a global standard for transparency in oil, gas and mining.83 
It aims to promote transparency and accountability in payments made 
by extractive corporations to governments and government agents.84 
Nigeria is an active participant in the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). Currently, under the EITI, there are 31 compliant 
countries, 48 implementing countries and 38 countries which have 
produced EITI reports, including Nigeria.85 In Nigeria, the initiative is 
called NEITI (Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). A 
number of oil MNCs that have signed up to this include Chevron Group, 
BG Group, Shell, Statoil, Total, CNOOC (China) and ONGC (India), 
amongst others.86 
The voluntary nature of the international instruments regulating MNCs 
have been heavily criticized by academics. 87  In analyzing codes of 
conduct, Dieux and Vincke88 contended that corporate accountability is 
merely a public relations tool and should be replaced with laws of a 
binding nature.89 Likewise, other stakeholders apart from the states 
have an essential role. They further advocated that NGO’s pressure on 
MNCs could be used to keep MNCs in check. However, Picciotto, in a 
discourse on voluntary codes, argued that codes are as effective as 
laws.90 He was of the view that:  
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85 EITI website < http://eiti.org/countries >accessed 20 July 2020.  
86 EITI Nigeria website < http://eiti.org/Nigeria >accessed 20 July 2020. 
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“codes entail a degree of formalization of normative expectations and 
practices and, even if they do not directly take the form of law, they 
may have indirect legal effects.”91  
He further stated that voluntary codes can be enforced in various ways 
such as through private law (contractual agreements), via enforcement 
by private parties based on a state regulatory law, and in international 
law codes which can be of a legal and binding nature (for example, WTO 
agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade).92 
To redress the irregularities in the international regulation of MNCs, 
various strategies have been suggested. They include the use of Ruggie 
principles (this will be examined extensively in the next chapter), CSR 
principles, self-regulation by MNCs, participation by communities, and 
civil regulation, amongst others. Amao contended that while CSR 
practices by MNCs are becoming well established, this development 
cannot replace the need for effective host state regulation.93 Bradford94 
argued on the ineffectiveness of self-regulation in MNCs and advocated 
“the exploitation of legislative opportunities, domestic as well as 
international, to develop soft law into hard law and create a binding legal 
obligation that compels corporate legislative targets”.95  
The lack of consistency occurs in soft law regulation of MNCs when 
different standards are applied by MNCs in different countries. For 
instance, after the Deepwater Horizon spill of April 2010 (also known as 
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the Gulf of Mexico oil spill), action was taken immediately by BP to 
provide compensation to the victims, and the company actually carried 
out a plan to ameliorate the damage. However, the opposite is the case 
in the Niger Delta where oil MNCs do not imitate such standards in oil 
spill management or control. For example, Shell is yet to clean up the 
damage done to Ogoniland.  
 
5.5 Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is a United States law, enacted in 1789,96 
which provides that: 
“the court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or by a treaty 
of the United States.”97  
For a long time, however, ATS was only implemented in matters 
concerning government officials who abused people with their powers, 
until the middle of the 1990s when human rights activists started using 
it to institute cases against companies accused of violating human rights 
outside the United States.98 For more than three decades, the ATS has 
been an important tool in helping victims and survivors of some terrible 
abuses – including torture, crimes against humanity and genocide – to 
sue those liable in the United States.99 However, in 2013, the Supreme 
Court placed limitations on ATS lawsuits, ruling that they must “touch 
and concern” the United States.100 The extent of this limitation is not 
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clear, however, and the ATS remains an important legal tool to protect 
human rights. 
The Act only applies to companies that have a connection to the US 
because they are registered in the US or listed on the US Stock 
Exchange.101  
 
5.5.1 Corporate Accountability under the ATS 
Early human rights ATS cases were mostly brought against individuals, 
but in the 1990s a number of cases were filed against MNCs for their 
complicity in human rights abuses.102 Some corporations became used 
to getting away with crimes as long as those crimes were committed 
outside the US, in countries with weak legal systems, such as Nigeria, 
that were unable or unwilling to deliver justice to victims of abuse for 
crimes committed by MNCs, and where the government may have been 
complicit also. 
Doe v. Unocal103 was the first ATS case filed against a corporation, and 
established that corporations and their executives could be held legally 
responsible under the ATS for violations of international human rights 
law. Since the Unocal case, courts have continuously maintained that 
ATS cases can proceed against corporations if they commit the most 
serious abuses or if they “aid and abet” abuses by members of the 
government. The positive use of the ATS as a tool for corporate 
accountability also made the statute a target. The George W. Bush 
administration specifically challenged the use of the ATS by human 
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not be used in human rights cases and could not be used to address 
abuses that occurred outside the United States.104 
Natalie Bridgeman is of the opinion that plaintiffs are most possibly 
going to be able to get redress in US courts, as successful litigation on 
abuses is not common, even though corporate environmental abuse in 
foreign jurisdictions is.105 Borchien Lai notes that out of all the numerous 
human rights and environmental violations cases, none has come to an 
end, neither has there been any successful judgement held against any 
corporate defendants.106  
Using extra-territorial jurisdiction in the US to hold MNCs accountable is 
difficult for plaintiffs because they have to prove personal and subject-
matter jurisdiction, forum non conveniens and a cause of action within 
the scope of the law of nations.107
 
In a judgment delivered by Chief Justice Roberts in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.,108 the Supreme Court held that the presumption against 
extra-territoriality applies to the ATCA, wherein it was unanimously held 
that “federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear lawsuits against 
foreign corporations accused of aiding in human rights abuses abroad” 
under the ATCA 1789.109 It held that they must “touch and concern” US 
territory which was satisfactory. While affirming the judgement of the 
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105 Natalie L. Bridgeman, ‘Human Rights Litigation under the ATCA as a Proxy for Environmental Claims’ 
(2003) 6 Yale Hum.Rts. & Dev. L.J., 1–43. 
106 Borchien Lai, ‘The Alien Tort Claims Act: Temporary Stopgap Measure or Permanent Remedy’ (2005) 
26 Northwestern JILB, 139–166, at 140.  
107 Olubayo (n97) 313. 
108 Suit No. 06-4800-CV, 06-4876-cv [2010 ]WL 3611392 2d Cir. Sept. 17 [2010]. The Supreme Court 
judgement was delivered on 17 April 2013.  
109 Thisday, ‘US Supreme Court Backs Shell in Nigeria Human Rights Case’< 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/us-supreme-court-backs-shell-in-nigeria-human-rights-
case/145177/  >accessed 26 June 2020. 
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Court of Appeal, the court further held that corporations “are often 
present in many countries” and the fact that they are not present in the 
US alone is not enough to trigger cause of action in ATCA against their 
criminal complicity.  
Although the Kiobel decision was unsatisfactory, it is uncertain today 
the impact it has made, however. Federal courts have given different 
meanings to the “touch and concern” requirement, and the Supreme 
Court has not given any further clarification. 110  Some courts have 
dismissed ATS cases under the Kiobel decision, even where they involve 
a US defendant, US conduct and significant US national security 
interests. Other courts have reached different conclusions in cases 
involving foreign conduct.111 
Corporations have also set another attack on the ATS, arguing that only 
individuals, not corporations, can be sued for violating international law. 
Following the above judgement, one could infer that corporate litigation 
has no future in respect to holding US corporations accountable for 
human rights violations abroad.  
 
5.5.2 Zero Draft 
The Zero Draft is a first official draft, published in 2018, which has a 
legal binding instrument in order to regulate in international law the 
activities of multinational corporations and other businesses. 112  The 
draft was published by the UN Human Rights Council’s Open-ended 
 
110 < https://earthrights.org/how-we-work/litigation-and-legal-advocacy/legal-strategies/alien-tort-
statute/ >accessed 20 June 2020. 
111 Ibid. 
112 < https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/zero-draft-summary > accessed 17 June 2020. 
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Intergovernmental Working Group on Multinational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights (OEIWG).113 
The purpose of the Treaty, as provided in Article 2, states that it is to: 
“Strengthen the respect, promotion, protection and fulfilment of human 
rights, to ensure effective access to justice and remedy to victims of 
human rights violations in the context of transnational business 
activities and to advance international cooperation in this regard.” 114 
Jurisdiction is vested in the court of the host state of the MNCs, where 
the violation occurred or where the offender is domiciled.115 Article 8 
affirms the right of victims to fair and effective access to justice.116 
A new revised draft was released in July 2019, which made notable 
improvements to the previous one.117 For instance, the revised draft 
aligns with the provisions of the UN Guiding Principles and proposes a 
comprehensive article on business enterprises that is more in tune with 





As shown in this chapter that holding multinational corporations 
accountable for human rights violations is an underlying issue, it 
contends that although voluntary codes have an important role in 
 
113 Ibid. 








ensuring that MNCs are accountable, they may not be sufficient to 
prevent environmental- related human rights violations by MNCs. 
Voluntary codes, while a welcome signal of corporate commitment, are 
nonetheless voluntary, and as such unenforceable, and so can easily be 
violated by unscrupulous MNCs.  
Also, the ATCA has not been successful in holding MNCs accountable. 
While still hoping for an international legal binding instrument for 
holding MNCs accountable, the foreign victims of MNCs violation such as 
the Niger Delta people can continue to use ATCA to hold MNCs 
accountable for violations. In the long term, MNCs may be best served 
by finding ways to make voluntary codes more meaningful and effective. 




The Ruggie Principle on Multinational Corporation 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Internationally, adapting a human rights regime to provide a better 
effective protection against corporate violations of human rights is still 
novel.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, multinational oil corporations are dominant 
forces which have the ability to create economic growth, alleviate 
poverty and expand the rule of law, thereby making human rights 
protection attainable. However, if corporations are held accountable 
through rules and institutions, violations could be ameliorated or 
prevented.  
The conflict that currently exists between business and human rights is 
as a result of the governance/accountability gap created by globalization, 
stemming from the power of state and non-state actors, and the inability 
of developing states to manage the corporations. This accountability gap 
creates an avenue in the environment for multinational oil corporations 
to commit harmful acts without adequate sanctioning or reparation for 
their actions. Attempting to narrow and eventually bridge the gaps 
between human rights and accountability is a fundamental challenge. 
Although the issue of accountability for corporate human rights is still 
ongoing, there exist avenues where protection of human rights through 
corporate accountability can be enforced. Over the last decade 
significant development has occurred, and human rights being 
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respected by non-state actors has been a part of the UN document.1 An 
example of the development is the UN Guiding Principles on business 
and human rights on the implementation of the “protect, respect, 
remedy framework”, also known as the Ruggie Principle,2 which was 
developed by John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, and was endorsed by the human rights 
council.3 
 
6.2 Introduction to the UN Guiding Principles 
The Guiding Principles is a soft law, and therefore not binding on states. 
In its resolution, the UNHCR provides that the UN Guiding Principles can 
be further improved. 4  The status of the UN Guiding Principles in 
international law can therefore be seen as mere strong 
recommendations. It is a better and vivid expression of the human 
rights aspects of corporate accountability.  
Many issues are still to be addressed and settled, considering the novel 
nature of the UN Guiding Principles. If the UN Guiding Principles turn out 
to be more explicit than any previous international guidelines on 
corporate accountability and human rights, the interpretations of the UN 
are immense; however, its interpretations and practices are still to be 
reconciled, and this process is to be led by a “working group on human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises” 
formed by the UNHCR. Academically, the continuous procedure of 
 
1 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 33–35.  
2 A/HRC/17/31. 
3 A/HRC/17/4. 
4 UNHCR A/63/286. 
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reconciling interpretations and practices is a possible vision for 
researchers within human rights, ethical philosophy, international law 
and organizational culture. Does the principle change the ethical, 
normative and legal expectations we have of corporations and states? 
To what extent will the principle actually change the behaviour of 
corporations and states in relation to human rights? What practical 
challenges does its implementation have currently and how are they to 
be solved? What effects will the framework have on various sizes of 
corporations? However, for individuals who suffered and continue to 
suffer the consequences of corporate violations with regards to human 
rights, a more pertinent question is: to what extent will the UN Guiding 
Principles lead to justice and improved human rights for those who 
experience human rights violations due to the conduct of corporations 
and states? For the UN Guiding Principles to have a significant effect on 
human rights as regards corporations, then aiming at attaining an 
increased level of justice and human rights implementation must be 
considered as the primary goal. 5  Similarly, any examination of the 
extent to which existing, or suggested, structures can help in the 
provision of justice and human rights implementation has to be of 
fundamental importance to all research related to this area, including 
the research presented in this thesis.  
 
6.3 History of the UNGP 
Many businesses were faced with a human rights abuses and business 
agenda for the first time after the endorsement of the UNGP. The UN’s 
 
5 < http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:557656/fulltext01 >accessed 12 July 2020. 
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agenda for several decades attempted to define human rights duties for 
businesses, especially multinational corporations. 
An attempt to convey the UN Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations 6  was abandoned in the late 1980s, and followed by 
opposing discussions over the Draft UN Norms on Human Rights 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises (UN Economic and Social Council, 2003). 7  The Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted 
these Rights in 2003, but they were subsequently rejected by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in 2004. Hence, neither of those efforts 
have yielded success, although undoubtedly they have contributed to 
advancing discussion and identifying the most contentious issues. 8 
International organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), in the 1976 OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Corporations, proved to be more successful in addressing 
the challenges raised by companies’ activities and defining their 
responsibilities, 9  which binds member states and are made up of 
propositions by governments to corporations on significant areas of 
business ethics, with ideas to carry out corporate lawful acts, conform 
with standards approved internationally and adhere to what is expected 
by society. Another example is the 1977 International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. Neither framework included 
 
6 The Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (last version of the proposed draft code: UN 
Doc E/1990/94, 12 June 1990) required corporations to respect host countries’ development goals, observe 
their domestic law, respect fundamental human rights and ensure consumer and environment protection. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Karin Buhmann, ‘Business and Human Rights: Analysing Discursive Articulation of Stakeholder Interests 
to Explain the Consensus-based Construction of the “Protect, Respect, Remedy UN Framework” (2012) 
1(1) ILR 88–101 at 97.  
9<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO_STU(2017)578031_EN.pdf 
>accessed 21 July 2020. 
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a better detailed reference to human rights in their text, until the 
paradigm shift 2000 revision. 
To overcome the debate on rules for companies and create grounds for 
a more practical discourse than that of 2004 when the existing UN 
Commission on Human Rights rejected the Draft UN Norms, the 
mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on 
Human Rights and Business (SRSG) was created in 2005. Unlike its 
predecessors, the SRSG decided against developing a new legal 
standard and focused on ways to improve respect for human rights in 
business. His approach was based on a mixture of brilliant models, which 
included existing, binding legal obligations for states, stemming from 
ratified international human rights treaties, which accepted the 
ethical/moral responsibility of business enterprises, coming up with 
what was soon to be described as principled pragmatism. This novel 
approach, which was controversial at the onset, proved successful. The 
Human Rights Council endorsed the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework presented by the SRSG in 2008, and also extended his 
mandate so that he was tasked with its operationalization.10 The UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights developed 
subsequently by the SRSG were collectively endorsed by the HRC on 16 
June 2011.  
The UNGP explained the duties and responsibilities of both states and 
businesses on confronting human rights risks related to business 
activities, after years of research with several actors. Summarized into 
three principles, made up of 31 Foundational and Operational Principles, 





Principle I, State’s Duty to Protect: “States have existing obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil human rights against adverse impacts by non-
state actors, including business.”  
Principle II, Business Responsibility to Respect: “The responsibility of 
business enterprises to respect human rights.’’ 
Principle III, Access to Remedy: “The need for state and non-state based, 
judicial and non-judicial remedies to ensure that rights and obligations 
are matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached.” 
 
6.4 The Special Representative of the Secretary General on 
Human Rights and Business (SRSG) 
In 2008, the SRSG came forward with the framework known as the 
Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework11
 
and in 2011 developed the 
framework into a single comprehensive combination known as the 
UNGP. 12
 
The Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework was 
conceptualized in 2008 and finally adopted in the UNGP, as the previous 
framework was geared towards a voluntary rather than regulatory 
framework for corporations.13
 
The 2006 Interim Report was nothing 
other than a mere treatise assessing the motive behind the mandate 
and appointment of Ruggie as the SRSG. 14  Ruggie’s mandate was 
significant, considering many factors such as the rising status of MNCs15 
 
11 Chapter 1 section 1.2. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Larry Catá Backer, Nabih Haddad, Tomonori Teraoka and Keren Wang, ‘Democratizing International 
Business and Human Rights by Catalyzing Strategic Litigation: The Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights from the Bottom Up’ (2014) 
Working Paper, 12(1) Coalition for Peace and Ethics 1–34 at 6–7. 
14 John Ruggie, ‘Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (2006), UN Doc. 




and the inability of the government or international frameworks to hold 
MNCs accountable.16 The role of globalization has also contributed to the 
fast growth of the status of MNCs17 and its effects on the regulatory role 
of the states. This has contributed to unbalanced distribution of good 
and bad impacts of the globalized economy on both developed and 
developing countries.18 According to the report, two instances where 
negative impacts can reflect are human rights violations by 
companies,19 and the differences between the scope of the markets as 
against corporations and the inability of the community to maintain its 
standards.20 
In a report, Ruggie examined the existing voluntary initiatives 
critically,21
 
including the UN Norms,22
 
and came to the conclusion that a 
state-based international order was outdated due to globalization, 
where factors which were novel are not within the scope of the territorial 
state; therefore, they only take up significant public roles. 23  While 
recognizing that the rule of law should be linked to economic 
development,24 he expressed the hope that extra-territorial jurisdiction 
of MNCs by home states should be crucially taken into account in the 
new framework, 25  which was described as an ethical method of 
pragmatism so that the protection and promotion of human rights in the 
corporate sector could be achieved satisfactorily.26 He was also of the 
 
16 Ibid. para. 16. 
17 Ibid. see paras 11 and 12. 
18 Ibid. para. 13. 
19 Ibid. para. 15. 
20 Ibid. para. 18. 
21 Ibid. paras 31–53, 73–75, 77 and 78. 
22 Ibid. paras 56–61 and 63–69. 
23 Ibid. paras 9 and10. 
24 Ibid. para 21. 
25 Ibid. para 71. 
26 Ibid. para 81. 
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view that respect for human rights should be the ultimate objective of 
any government, either at the state, regional or international level.27 
The 2007 Report28
 
looked at ways in which the state can effectively 
regulate corporations, the standards of assessing corporate human 
rights responsibility and accountability for corporations and of fishing 
out complicity in human rights violations.29
 
It noted instances of best 
practice in human rights accountability by states and companies.30
 
The 
report acknowledged five standards of corporate human rights and 
responsibility, which were developed and expanded to become the 
Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework of the UNGP.31 Legal, social 
and moral standards were the forms of governance.32  Obligated to 
protecting human rights in the business sector, the SRSG reasoned that 
governments and social actors had to compulsorily put together abilities 
in order to cover the present loophole, as corporate abuse was not 
redressed with adequate sanctioning or reparation as a result of society 
not being able to regulate the market, even if they could achieve it by 
using social and market institutional frameworks.33
 
 
The development of the tripartite Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework of the UNGP into a report was done in 2008.34 Consideration 
and rejection by the SRSG, and some other approaches to CHRR and 
accountability, occurred before he eventually adopted and incorporated 
 
27 Ibid. para 19. 
28 General Assembly of the UN, ‘Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of 
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts’, Report of the SRSG on the Issue of Human Rights 






34 John Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’, Report of 
the SRSG on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
Human Rights Council (7 April 2008). 
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the tripartite framework. 35
 
Amongst some of the approaches he 
contemplated and then rejected were the rules-based approaches 
characteristic of American efforts, as well as mechanisms which were 
dependent on the production and enforcement of human rights affecting 
businesses.36
 
The framework, especially the principle on state’s duty to 
protect, follows the orthodox law, which depicts the states as duty 
bearers of human rights under international law.37
 
However, the report 
is not successful for corporations and some governments who are critics 
of the UN Norms, as it adopts a horizontal corporate accountability policy 





is similar to the 2008 Report as they addressed the 
legal fundamentals of the duties, policy justifications and scope of the 
framework.40
 
The 2009 Report created the mechanisms and operational 
approaches developed in 2008 in protecting human rights duties, 
obligations and responsibilities of states and corporations.41
 
Therefore, 
corporations are obligated to follow due-diligence mechanisms, while 
states are persuaded to use a regulatory and judicial framework in 
performing their responsibilities.42
 
The scope of the 2009 Report went 
further than the 2008 Report and other previous ones on CHRR and 
 
35 Larry Catá Backer, ‘The Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights at a Crossroads: The State, 
the Enterprise, and the Spectre of a Treaty to Bind Them All’ (2014), Coalition for Peace and Ethics 
Working Paper 7(1). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Buhmann (n8) 97. 
38 Ibid. 97–98. 
39 John Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework’, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Human Rights Council (22 
April 2009) < http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf >accessed 
16 July 2020. 
40 John Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework’, Report of the SRSG on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Human Rights Council (9 April 2010) para. 16. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. para. 2. 
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accountability by creating opportunities for evolving norms for corporate 
human rights responsibilities. 43
 
The report is of the view that 
opportunities should be reachable as there may be some areas where 
corporations have to take up added responsibilities.44 The report was of 
the view that thinking was a necessity and a factor for all corporations 
to respect and carry out their responsibilities.45 It has been contended, 
however, that the report makes room for the option that corporations 
also have certain affirmative obligations to protect to attain human 
rights.46
 
In the 2010 report the SRSG asserted that the missing link in the 
governance gap in market regulation which encouraged corporate 
human rights violations without effective sanctioning was supposed to 
be covered by the framework.47
 
The 2010 Report devised further means 
that can perform the primary duties and obligations of states to protect 
their citizens from corporate human rights violations,48
 
as demanded by 
the Human Rights Council.49 Substantial operational guidance on the 
responsibility of companies to respect human rights was provided and 
explained,50
 
and several ways that victims of corporate human rights 
violations could have unimpeded access to effective remedies were 
suggested. 51
 
With regard to states, five important measures were 
identified: 52  they must not do anything that would crumble their 
capacity and ability to protect corporate human rights violations in their 
 
43 Ibid. para. 46. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ruggie Report (n40) paras 59, 61–65. 
47 Ibid. para. 2. 
48 Ibid. paras 20–53. 
49 Ibid. paras 88, 54 and 16. 
50 Ibid. paras 54–87. 
51 Ibid. paras 88–113. 
52 Ibid. para. 19. 
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jurisdiction;53 they can promote human rights while doing business with 
corporations, as economic actors also;54 they can create a culture of 
human rights responsibilities in their jurisdictions, as well as their roles 
as economic actors;55 early conciliation with embassies of home states 
of companies can help the issue of corporate complicity in human rights 
violations, in states where conflict exists;56
 
and states should provide 
means of redress and a policy for sanctioning, after caution has been 
taken to ensure that corporations do not partake in human rights 
violations overseas, but violations still occur.57 
A given solution rests on several remedial judicial and non-judicial 
injustice mechanisms for corporate human rights violations by states 
and corporations.58 To strengthen common standards for states and 
corporations within jurisdictions, commendatory regional and 
international mechanisms have to be put in place. 59
  
Lastly, every state is obligated to embrace adjudicative extra-territorial 
jurisdiction and should likewise put into consideration the interest of the 
claimant, defendant and states in circumstances where the possibility of 
the host state not being able to provide redress to the victims is great.60 
The 2010 Report was criticized by some scholars who desired a binding 
international legal framework for corporate accountability.
 
However, it 
was commended by some liberal scholars61
 
who were of the opinion that, 
 
53 Ibid. paras 20–25. 
54 Ibid. paras 26–32. 
55 Ibid. paras 33–43. 
56 Ibid. paras 44–45. 
57 Ibid. paras 47–49. 
58 Ibid. paras 114–116. 
59 Ibid. para. 115. 
60 Ibid. para. 107. 
61 Backer (n35) 68 and 80. 
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until the desired result is achieved, every little step towards that is 
welcomed.62 
As noted earlier, it is imperative to remember that the 2010 Report is 
not final. However, as the forerunner to the final report, the SRSG 
reflected on what needed to be added to the report to make it complete. 
According to the SRSG, it was imperative that the 2011 Report initiate 
a set of Guiding Principles, co-operating elements and procedures for 
the operation of the framework.63
 
In addition, in his view, the final 
report should suggest the establishment of a new body that will be in 
charge of advisory and competence-building tasks for the framework as 
the successor to the mandate of the SRSG, in order not to leave the 
mandate open without a monitoring establishment. 64
 
Following this 
forecast, the SRSG released his final report in March 2011. 
 
6.5 Critical Analysis of the UNGP 
As previously stated, it is the responsibility of states to protect against 
human rights violations by third parties, as provided for in Principle I of 
the tripartite framework of the UNGP. Adopting the UNGP was 
dependent on the existing responsibility of states to respect, protect and 




Therefore, as indicated in the UNGP, states’ duties to be carried out 
should meet their responsibilities on corporate human rights 
 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ruggie report (n8) para. 124. 
64 Ibid.paras 125–126. 
65 UNGP, paras 1a and 3(1)< 





violations.66 The UNDP, though, warns that there should be a restraint 
on audacious interpretation of these duties. The record of states’ duties 
by the UNGP should not be seen as creating new obligations for states, 
but just reiterating or clarifying the existing duties of states under the 
principles of international law.67
 
The UNGP delimits the duty of states to 
protect into two major differences: that is, the ability to take efficient 
precautionary and corrective actions to deal with the problems 
associated with corporate human rights violations.68 It states that states 
are obligated to prevent corporate human rights violations from 
repeating, and if violation reoccurs despite such preventive measures, 
justice must be given to the victims, and the offenders should be 
sanctioned.69  It suggests that states can discharge these duties by 
making provision for an effective regulatory, judicial and thorough policy 
framework.70
 
If these provisions are enforced, they must be subject to 
continuous review and reform so as to guarantee their viability, that 
they are adequate and strong enough to achieve their purpose,71
 
which 
is to effectively combat corporate human rights violations when faced 
with them. As noted by the UNGP, it is a standard of conduct for the 
state to protect; they are not indirectly liable for corporate human rights 
violations.72
 
Though most states have ratified international and regional 
treaties, the outcome of such ratification is that they would follow the 




66 Backer (n13) 108–123.See also, Osuntogun J, ‘Global Commerce & Human Rights: Towards an African 
Legal Framework for Corporate Human Rights Responsibility and Accountability’ (DPhil thesis, 
University of Witwatersrand 2015). 
67 UNGP (64) paras 2 and 3(1). 
68 Ibid. para. 3(1). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid; see Operational Principle, para. 4(3). 
72 Ibid. Commentary to Principle 1 of the Framework. 
73 < http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf >accessed 12 July 2020. 
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they do not adhere to adequate, protective or remedial measures in 
protecting their people from human rights violations by third parties, 
they may be held liable for committing a breach of such human rights 
obligations, or even be held liable for complicity in human rights 
violations committed by third parties.74 
With regard to the home states of the MNCs, the commentary to 
Principle I briefly states the current position of international law on the 
issue, which is vague. It is of the view that states are not under pressure 
to regulate the conduct of their companies doing business abroad, and 
at the same time not prevented. However, it attempts to convince them 
to adopt a regulatory extra-territorial framework for corporate 
accountability75
 
by stating that there are strong policy justifications,76
 
probably because most treaties that they entered into provided that 
they regulate the activities of their corporations extra-territorially.77 
However, unlike some scholars, it must be noted that the framework 
does not superimpose extra-territorial regulations for corporations.78  It 
states that home states have a duty to make sure that from the 
inception of MNCs, they do not violate human rights obligations.79
 
Likewise, adjoining states or multilateral or regional institutions have to 
co-operate, to play a crucial role in ensuring accountability by providing 
relevant important additional support to that effect.80 This forms the 
basis for this research, and seeks to answer the question: What should 
be the role of the AU in ensuring accountability? 
 
74 UNGP, Commentary to Pillar 1 of the Framework. 




79 UNGP, Commentary to para. 10. 
80 Ibid.para 12. 
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Principle II addresses the responsibility to respect. The main distinction 
between Principle I and Principle II is the fact that the state has a duty 
to protect but the corporation only has a responsibility to respect,81
 
while both (protect and respect) are the same and equally exclusive as 
well. Therefore, the corporation should not neglect carrying out its 
responsibility to respect, just because the state failed to carry out its 
duty to protect.82
 
The responsibility to respect human rights is much 
more than a state’s territorial boundary; it is a worldwide standard which 
all corporations ought to comply with globally in the running of their 
businesses, and as such, why corporations should undertake their own 
responsibility independent of the state’s approach towards it.83 They 
may, however, have a negative effect on every part of the international 
dimension that acknowledges human rights84 as they go about their 
business,85
 
unless pre-emptive measures are taken by them to avoid 
the occurrence of unfavourable human rights impacts that could affect 
their business operations. 86
 
Apart from that, the UNGP also 
recommends a wide scope;87
 
in as much as corporations alone are not 
the only perpetrators of such unfavourable impacts which occur, they 
are still obligated to guarantee that negligence on their part while 
carrying out their activities was not the cause of the violations. However, 
 
81 Surya Deva, ‘Treating Human Rights Lightly: A Critique of the Consensus Rhetoric and the Language 
Employed by the Guiding Principles’, in Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations 
of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 78–104, 93, noting that the UNGP deliberately used responsibility to respect ‘to denote non-legal 
duties’. 
82 UNGP, para. 13(11). 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid.Commentary to paras 13–14. 
86 Ibid.para 15 
87 Backer (n13) 126. 
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if for any reason they do encounter negative impacts, they should be 
responsible for tackling them instantly.88 
So as to efficiently adhere to their responsibility to respect, three major 
fundamental principles affecting corporate operations are essential for 
performance by the corporations under the UNGP. The administrative 
policies of the UNGP consist of three principles and procedures regarding 
human rights agreements to be adopted by different corporations, 
depending on their classification.89 Firstly, they must have a human 
rights mission statement, which must be provided for in their 
administrative concept and without compromising their administrative 
standard and supply-chain related decision-making processes.90 The 
mission statement on its own cannot improve human rights in the 
corporate sector without an efficient regulatory regime in the state that 
sanctions corporate human rights violations. As Larry Backer argues, 
principles are not instructions in the proper way in which the crafting of 
policy commitments should be adopted. 91
 
Principles which require 
“interpretation of the UNGP and the existence of institutional structures” 
must be applied. 92
 
Likewise, Ruggie notes in his 2008 Report that 
companies need to adopt a human rights policy, but that largely looking 
at the way corporate responsibility to respect human rights is portrayed, 
it has not efficiently guaranteed human rights compliance in the 
corporate sector, which cannot be done without the adoption of a strong 
functional framework required to give those commitments meaning.93 
 
88 UNGP. para. 15. 
89 Ibid. para. 15(15). 
90 Ibid. para. 16 (15a and 16). 
91 Backer (n13)494. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ruggie Report (2008), para. 60. 
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Subsequently, the second principle is a due-diligence requirement which 
seeks to decrease the risk of corporations being involved in human 
rights violations. So corporations should assess and confront the actual 
and possible human rights impacts of their business by instilling human 
rights due diligence.94 This can be done by providing remedy if risks of 
adverse impacts do exist and also by avoidance or reducing of possible 
risks. 95
 
However, according to scholars, the prerequisite is just a 
recommendation and not thorough enough to act as guidelines for 
corporations.96
 
Due-diligence mechanisms as prescribed by the UNGP 
are able to assist companies in complying with their human rights 
responsibilities as well as in recognizing avenues through which tangible 
contributions to society beyond its basic economic impacts could be 
made, irrespective of its inadequacies.97
 
However, since one focus of 
this study is to find out if implementing the UNGP through a regulatory 
framework is the solution, it would be imperative to determine if due 
diligence is not seen as a mere voluntary tool in the hands of 
corporations, but could be used as a regulatory framework for corporate 
accountability. According to scholars, the role of the state is to ensure 
that the existing regulatory tools acquire business due diligence for 
human rights in their territories, and to boost compliance by providing 
proper incentives.98 According to the UNGP, states should also establish 
such responsibilities.99
 
Thus, a due-diligence mechanism as seen by the 
UNGP is not just a voluntary tool but a regulatory framework for 
 
94 Ibid.para. 18(17). 
95 Ibid.para. 18; see also Principles 18–22. 
96 Backer (n13) 495. 
97 Mark B. Taylor, Luc Zandvliet and Mitra Forouhar, ‘Due Diligence for Human Rights: A Risk-Based 
Approach’ (2009), Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 53, 1–23 at 18. 
98 Olivier De Schutter, Anita Ramasastry, Mark B. Taylor and Robert C. Thompson, ‘Human Rights Due 
Diligence: The Role of States’ (2012) < http://humanrightsinbusiness.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/De-
Schutter-et-al.-Human-Rights-Due-Diligence-The-Role-of-States.pdf >accessed 18 June 2020. 
99 UNGP, Pillar 1 of the Framework, Principles 2 and 3a. 
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corporate accountability. Failure to obey due-diligence mechanisms 
requires full sanction of the law. 100  This takes us to the third 
administrative principle which is entirely legal. It states that 
corporations are obligated to respect human rights which are recognized 
globally, obey laws in existence and handle either direct or indirect 
violations of human rights during company activities as a violation of 
legal fulfilment.101 This principle is the foundation on which corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights rests. Compliance cannot be 
based on existing state domestic laws, as most state laws are inefficient. 
Focus needs to be extended to appropriate regional and international 
human rights treaties, as Backer argued that corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights should go beyond just a duty to conform with 
domestic law.102 Corporations have a responsibility to respect certain 
multinational norms that are created through international law and 
norms, even though they are still obligated to conform with the domestic 
laws in jurisdictions where their exploration takes place.103
  
According to Ruggie, granting corporations the right or licence to carry 
out their business should be because these corporations are aware that 




Principle III is access to remedy where, according to the UNGP, the state 
has the key responsibility of providing reparative acts within judicial and 
non-judicial redress mechanisms for complaints.105
 
Principle 25 plainly 
 
100 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for 
Corporate Law, Governance and Regulation’ (2012), 22 BEQ 145– 177. 
101 Ibid.; see Principle 23 and its Commentary. 
102 Backer (n13)493. 
103 Ibid. 
104 John Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (2008) 3(2) 
MITI 189–212 at 199. 
105 Backer (n13) 140, noting that: ‘The effect on the ability of corporations, along with other non-state 
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states that it is the sole responsibility of the state to see that victims of 
corporate human rights violations in their jurisdictions are not denied 
access to proper and efficient remedy through judicial, administrative, 
legislative or other ways applicable.106
  
At the beginning of a complaint brought between victims and a 
corporation, mechanisms which are non-judicial, such as arbitration and 
mediation, should be the first resort, which can be done through state 
parastatals or other business stakeholders; in the event that mediation 
and arbitration prove ineffective, they can resort to litigation.107
 
At the 
beginning stage of a redress, a corporation can only complement the 
state and help in determining an effective functioning complaint 




Perhaps one of the main reasons for criticism of the UNDP is because it 
sees corporations as entities who should only share corresponding roles 
with states, rather than sharing responsibilities.  
The major obstacle in providing a solution to the issue of an 
accountability framework is deciding what exact role corporations are 
expected to play, compared to that of the state, in protecting human 
rights.109
 
Since the Ruggie Principle emphasizes the fact that the state cannot 
assign or share liability for human rights violations because it maintains 
that the state has the primary responsibility, then the UNGP is not 
 
actors, to develop social norm-based remediation structures is thereby marginalized and diminished.’ 
106 UNGP., para. 28 and Principles 26–31. 
107 Ibid., Principles 27 and 28. 
108 Ibid., Principles 29, 30 and 31. 
109 The UN norms created joint obligations for states and corporations to respect human rights and were 
rejected on that ground for creating a non-existing rule of international law. 
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have been criticised for the same reason. Critics fear that 
if the role of the corporation to respect human rights is based solely on 
a voluntary background, corporations will go ahead violating human 
rights in states without strict regulatory frameworks to limit them.114
 
Though the fears of NGOs and human rights activists are justified, there 
is a probability that legal obligations can surface from the state’s duty 
to respect.115
 
Also, if states do not carry out their obligation to protect, 
regional and international human rights bodies can provide reparative 
support so that victims of corporate human rights violations have access 
to justice, as directed by the UNGP.116 The reparative support to be 
given to assist weaker states, and how this support should be given, as 
well as how it could address the issue of corporate human rights 
accountability, also drives this research. 
 
6.6 Nigeria and the UNGP 
The case of Nigeria exemplifies how the culture encourages states and 
MNCs in extractive resource control from being held accountable for 
 
110 Pini Pavel Miretski and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, ‘The UN “Norms on the Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”: A Requiem’ 
(2012) 17 DLR 1–41 at 37. 
111 Jonathan Bonnitcha, ‘Is the Concept of “Due Diligence” in the Guiding Principles Coherent?’, available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208588, accessed 12 July 2020. 
112 Wesley Cragg, ‘Ethics, Enlightened Self-Interest, and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human 
Rights: A Critical Look at the Justificatory Foundations of the UN Framework’ (2012) 22 BEQ 9–36 at 14. 
113 Jonathan Kaufman, ‘Ruggie’s Guiding Principles Fail to Address Major Questions of Obligations and 
Accountability’, Earth Rights International, 5 April 2011, available at https://earthrights.org/blog/ruggies-
guiding-principles-address-some-but-not-all-eri-concerns/, accessed 23 June 2020. 
114 Michael K. Addo, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations – An Introduction’, in Michael K. 
Addo (ed.), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (The Hague: 
Kluwer, 1999), 11. 
115 Astrid Sanders, ‘The Impact of the “Ruggie Framework” and the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights on Transnational Human Rights Litigation’, London School of Economics 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, 18/2014, 9. 
116 UNGP., Principle 28. 
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their actions in sub-Saharan Africa, as most African states are coping 
with bad governance, unlike other developed states. The divided debate 
on whether a voluntary or legal framework is required shares the same 
motive, which is to strengthen accountability for corporate abuses,117 
and considerably different methods should be adopted in order to be 
successful. 
The foregoing is based on two salient observations: firstly, African states 
are unwilling to enforce their domestic laws or court judgements when 
it comes to business and human rights disputes. 118  Instead of the 
African continent seeking responsibility internationally and continuing to 
accept being treated like helpless people seeking protection from across 
the ocean,119African leaders should focus attention on the domestic 
implementation of policies and the strengthening of regional institutions. 
Gas is still being flared haphazardly, despite rules and laws prohibiting 
it.120 Pollution of the oceans and seas happens daily, and so much more. 
One would have thought that the Ogoni incidents and other 
degradations associated with multinational corporations would have 
been a history put behind us, but unfortunately violations are still 
recurring in modern times. 
Secondly, even if MNCs, through their activities, partook in human rights 
violations, they were ignorant of the consequences of their actions and 
therefore not in a position to curb the potential risk involved. 
 
117 Available at< https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jsdlp/article/view/140517/13025 >accessed 17 July 2020. 
118 Jonah Gbemre v. SPDC and Others, Unreported Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, 14 November 2005. The 
court indeed noted that the Attorney-General of Nigeria regrettably did not put up any appearance, and/or 
defend the proceedings.  
119 Doe v. Nestle USA Inc. [2013] 738F.3d1048; Akpan v. SPDC, [2013] C/09/337050/HAZA 09-1580 
delivered by the District Court of The Hague. 
120 Section 3 of the Associated Gas Reinjection Act, Cap A25, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
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MNCs are unable to cope with the fast-growing business and human 
rights system, hence the many litigations brought against them.  
Indigenous people claim that companies are not doing enough in terms 
of being socially responsible, like ensuring they provide clean water, 
clean up damaged lands after exploration, as well as provide adequate 
compensation when violations do occur, but rather corporations are in 
a hurry to claim that the local communities sabotage their efforts by 
protest or violence. If the companies respected the rights of the local 
communities and gave them what they deserved, communities would 
be willing to co-operate with the multinational corporations. So 
therefore, why do corporations choose to show little or no concern or 
respect for human rights? In instances where weak states are unable to 
carry out their duties by protecting human rights, should the 
corporations see it as an avenue to continue with their atrocities because 
they claim it is not their duty to protect human rights?  
 
6.7 Can the Guiding Principles Be Implemented in Nigeria? 
Corruption and lack of laws, which can hinder the development and 
dynamics of globalization, are present, so implementing the UNGP will 
be a difficult task. 121  Through the statutory body, Nigeria has a 
production sharing formula (PSF) between MNCs and the federal 
government. 122  The local people who directly benefit from the 
agreements are not consulted, because contracts are agreed and signed 
without the knowledge of members of the community, and also to 
 
121 Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 105; E.M. Macek, 
‘Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations Have No Incentive to Define Human Rights’ (2002) 11 
MJGT 101, 104.  
122 The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation is the statutory body of the state government that 
regulates activities in the oil and gas industry.  
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ensure that the corruption and bribery that ensued would not be 
known.123 As it is, the solution to human rights issues in Nigeria would 
be a binding framework, as the principles of the UNGP could only be 
implemented if there was some transparency and accountability. Sadly, 
past experiences such as the Ogoni violation have not taught Nigerians 
to take environmental degradation seriously. 
Extractive rights should be controlled by indigenous people, and MNCs 
who want to get a licence to carry out extractive activities should adhere 
to the existing terms set by the host state. The Guiding Principles do not 
provide new duties for states other than the ones currently in existence, 
which were established under international law. The UNGP, however, 
only creates an avenue for allowing corporations accountable for human 
rights violations to be tackled strongly. 
 
6.7.1 State Duty to Protect Human Rights 
UNGP I states that: states must protect against human rights abuse 
within their territory, including business enterprises, which requires 
making conscious efforts to prevent, investigate, punish and redress 
abuse through efficient policies, legislation, regulations and 
adjudication. 124  States are obligated to prevent the occurrence of 
corporate human rights violations and also provide access to remedies 
where such violation occurs.125 This pillar also directs states to clearly 
set out ways to ensure that companies domiciled in their territory 
respect human rights.126 
 
123 NNPC, ‘Joint Venture Activities’, available at < 
http://nnpcgroup.com/nnpcbusiness/upstreamventures/jointventureactivities.aspx >accessed 21 June 2020. 
124 Commentary to UNGP 1.  
125 Ibid. 
126 Commentary to UNGP 2.  
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In Nigeria, at the point of incorporation of a company, MNCs should be 
made aware of the UNGP by including them in each set of incorporation 
forms. Furthermore, the UNGP indicate that states are not as such 
responsible for human rights abuse by private actors.127  
Indeed, states have various obligations with respect to human rights. 
Firstly, they must respect human rights;128 secondly, they must protect 
human rights;129 and thirdly, they must fulfil human rights.130 Therefore, 
where states fail, as is mostly the case in weak states, to take practical 
and effective action towards fulfilling their human rights duties, or to 
prevent, investigate, punish or redress private actors’ abuse,131 they 
would be held accountable for breach of their human rights obligations 
under international law132. 
Morally states have the legal, ethical and moral right to control and 
regulate the extra-territorial activities of corporations domiciled in their 
jurisdiction or territory, irrespective of the reason.133 The Alien Tort 
Statute in the United States was created for this purpose,134 to check 
the activities of its corporations in diaspora.135 The US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act instructs accounting transparency which is essential under 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as well as prosecutes the 
bribery and corruption of foreign officials.136 Prohibiting US corporations 
 
127 Commentary to UNGP 1.  
128 HR/PUB/12/02, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretative Guide’ 




131 Commentary to UNGP 1.  
132 Ibid. 
133 Commentary to UNGP 2.  
134 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum  Company [2013] 133 S. Ct. 1659.  
135 The commentary advises states to regulate extra-territorial activities of its companies as this will ensure 
predictability for business enterprises by providing coherent and consistent messages, and preserving the 
state’s own reputation.  
136 T. Markus Funk, ‘Getting What They Pay For: The Far-reaching Impact of the Dodd-Frank Acts 
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and its officials, citizens and residents from manipulating anyone with 
personal payments or rewards was the purpose for which the Act was 
created.137 The image of the state is what acts like this are there to 
protect. 
There are several international human rights instruments that ought to 
be policy pointers for MNCs operating in a country to respect human 
rights and to protect their reputation, which Nigeria is signatory to, but 
unfortunately, because of weak governance, these instruments are not 
been enforced. Additionally, the importance of states imposing laws that 
have the effect of compelling corporations to respect human rights has 
been stressed in UNGP III, to ensure that laws and policies governing 
the operations of corporations, such as company law, foster respect for 
human rights.138 Therefore, the enforcement of existing laws is key to 
closing the governance gap created by globalization. 
 
6.7.2 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights 
By having a responsibility, it means that corporations are being 
demanded to ensure that they adhere to good moral manners while 
carrying out their activities. Corporations taking their responsibility to 
respect human rights seriously is a conduct that ought to be a global 
standard. 139  For corporations to carry out their obligations, it is 
necessary that they adhere to three fundamental principles. 
 
“Whistleblower Bounty” Incentives on FCPA Enforcement’ (2010) 5(19) White Collar Crime Report 1–3.  
137 Fred Luthans and Jonathan Doh, International Management: Culture, Strategy, and Behaviour ( 9th edn 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014).  
138 Commentary to UNGP 3.  
139 Commentary to UNGP 13.  
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Firstly, corporations should have and obey operation statements that 
seek to foster human rights compliance. 140  A lot of MNCs have 
statements regarding compliance with human rights standards.141 There 
must be an operational regulatory rule that ensures that there are 
sanctions for violation of human rights standards. These statements are 
mere ambitions, so in order to bring them to reality, policies with 
institutional and functional structure must be put in place to reach 
human rights compliance.142 
Secondly, corporations must be committed to due diligence so that the 
risk of compliance with human rights norms would be reduced. 143 
Companies must weigh existing and potential human rights impacts 
during their activities.144 In situations where violations of human rights 
occur, corporations should be quick to provide compensation for those 
damages. 
Unfortunately, sometimes the government of a state is complicit in 
MNCs’ violations, and because corruption has become a basic part of 
them, the motivation to enforce environmental laws against companies 
that err is absent.145 Even with these shortcomings, due diligence and 
environmental impact assessments are key tools needed to conform 
with the UNGP. Nigeria should strengthen its environmental impact 
assessment regime to ensure that companies conduct due diligence 
intermittently so as to avoid potential violations. To additionally inspire 
corporations to adhere to due-diligence compliance, the Nigerian 
 
140 Commentary to UNGP 16.  
141 Ibid. 
142 A/HRC/8/5, John Ruggie, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (2008), para. 60.  
143  Commentary to UNGP 17.  
144 Ibid. 
145 The Ogoni case in the Niger Delta. 
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government can make incentives available to corporations that 
comply.146  
Under the Environmental Impact Assessment Act,147 Nigeria could seek 
to ban the activities of corporations who fail to adhere to due-diligence 
instructions. This will most likely create an avenue for the indirect 
application of human rights due diligence as contained in the UNGP, 
since corporations are subject to domestic laws. 
Thirdly, multinational corporations ought to adhere to all laws and 
respect internationally recognized human rights within the scope of their 
activities. 148  MNCs should adhere to international human rights 
mechanisms, irrespective of whether the domestic laws of a state are 
inadequate to address corporate human rights challenges. 
It is imperative to treat compliance with domestic and international 
human rights laws legally, because extractive activities are challenging 
and therefore attract a high level of risk for corporations to violate 
human rights, even with combined efforts from the state. 
Corporations, therefore, have no excuse to avoid compliance with 
domestic and international human rights laws. Complying with the laws 
secures their social licence to operate, even though they may have been 
legally permitted to conduct business. 
 
6.7.3 Access to Remedy 
This pillar emphasizes states’ duty to protect against corporate human 
rights abuse by guaranteeing that, through judicial, administrative, 
 
146 Olivier De Schutter and Anita Rawasasty, Human Rights Due Diligence: The Role of States (December 
2012) 59; < https://corporatejustice.org/hrdd-role-of-states-3-dec-2012.pdf >accessed 11 April 2021. 
147 Cap E12 LFN, 2004, see Section 62. 
148 Commentary to UNGP 23. 
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legislative or other applicable avenues,149 those impacted by abuse will 
be given access to effective remedy.150 This duty and responsibility rests 
on the state. There are two main remedies pictured by this principle: 
procedural and substantive.151 The substantive mechanism could be an 
apology, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial 
compensation and punitive sanctions,152 while the procedural approach 
could be extraordinary; and as corruption cuts through the Nigerian 
government, bureaucratic procedural formalities, burden of proof, legal 
fees, legal representations, corrupt judiciary and other extenuating 
factors, access to effective remedies through the Nigerian courts could 
be challenging.153 Thus, states must ensure that an independent and 
transparent judiciary is in place to apply the UNGP. 
Responsibility represents a moral act by corporations, while duty implies 
legal obligations that change to rights for the communities. Civil 
societies and critics of the UNGP are against their voluntary 
implementation.154 They claim that MNCs choose to respect the laws 
that suit them, particularly when the laws become a financial liability for 
them.155 It is relevant, however, to maintain that corporations only have 
a duty to adhere to the domestic laws of the host state, but it is not 
their responsibility to do so, although that is not to say that the concerns 
of the civil society are not significant. Sadly, there is no strong 
regulatory tool that guarantees that corporate human rights compliance 
does exist. Besides that, MNCs continue to take advantage of the 
 
149 Commentary of UNGP 25. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Commentary to UNGP 25. 
152 Ibid.  
153 Ibid. 
154 Surya Deva, ‘Multinationals, Human Rights and International Law: Time to Move beyond the “State-
Centric” Conception?’, in Jernej Letnar Èerniè and Tara Van Ho (eds), Direct Human Rights Obligations of 




government’s reluctance to see to the enforcement of stricter control of 
their activities. The next section attempts to look at methods that might 
help address the problem in Nigeria. 
 
6.8 Regulatory Measures for Implementing the UNGP 
6.8.1 The Nigerian Constitution 
The Nigerian Constitution does not make provision for a Bill of Rights, 
as provided in other constitutions in Africa.156 The socio-economic rights, 
which guarantee indirect implementation of the UNGP, are provided for 
in Chapter II of the constitution.157 The constitution makes no mention 
of business and human rights, other than Chapter II. A solution would 
be to guarantee the International Bill of Rights in Nigeria’s constitution. 
This Bill of Rights will be applicable to individuals and corporations as 
well. If this is done, MNCs will tighten their belt because they would not 
want to go against the provisions of the constitution of their host states. 
 
6.8.2 The Companies and Allied Matters Act 
The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) is the only legal document 
that regulates corporations in Nigeria. Unfortunately, there is no human 
rights provision contained in the 696 sections of the Act. According to 
Section 299, in situations where a loophole is identified during the 
operation of the company, to remedy the wrong and ratify the irregular 
conduct can only be done by a law suit and ratification made by the 
 
156 Article 8(2) of the South African Constitution, 1996 provides that a Bill of Rights binds a natural or 
juristic person.  
157 ‘Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policies’. The justiceability of this section 
has been a subject of debate for decades. The section contains economic, social and cultural rights, such as 
the rights to environment and health.  
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company. 158  Looking at the provisions, it appears that when the 
company engages in a violation of human rights, it is only the company 
that can reprimand itself by suing, though the matters of the company 
are subject to several stages of interpretation. This provision protects 
minorities against illegal and unjust behaviour.159 Trying to comprehend 
why a company who complies with the UNGP would violate human rights 
and yet still prosecute itself is difficult. It could be said to be an 
impossible thing to do. There is a need for CAMA to be amended and 
expanded so as to accommodate the interests of other stakeholders, 
including communities and extractive corporations. 
The CAMA provides that directors should have a duty of care towards 
their shareholders.160 It also states that directors shall carry out their 
duties in utmost good faith towards the company,161 meaning that the 
company directors are to ensure that the human rights of the 
communities where oil exploration is done are not violated. Directors 
should consider human rights responsibilities as one of the best interests 
of the company.  
For instance, the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in South 
Africa. It enshrines the rights of the people in South Africa, and affirms 
the values of human dignity, freedom and equality. Section 7(a) of 
South Africa’s Companies Act states that the purpose of the Act is to 
ensure that the Bill of Rights provided in the constitution is complied 
with. 162  This therefore means that documents for incorporation of 
companies have to obey to human rights standards. South Africa’s 
 
158 Section 299 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 (hereinafter ‘CAMA’).  
159 Part X of CAMA.  
160 Section 279 of CAMA.  
161 Ibid. 
162 Section 7(a) of the Companies Act of South Africa, 2008.  
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Institute of Directors went a step further to promote transparency and 
accountability by commissioning the King Report on Corporate 
Governance in South Africa,163 and by circulating periodic documents on 
their social responsibility tasks.164 
The CAMA was enacted in Nigeria 26 years ago, but it is yet to go 
through a notable amendment process. States with weak governance 
are getting worse, while MNCs are becoming stronger and horrific, 
without any sign of potential improvement. Since Nigeria has had its fair 
share of corporate abuse, it is time for Nigeria to take the lead in taking 
action to tackle business and human rights issues in Africa. The CAMA 
should be amended to guarantee that on incorporation, all extractive 
corporations adhere to the UNGP. Corporations’ incorporation forms 
should contain the Guiding Principles which companies must abide by.165 
The case of West v. Jack & Ors166 proves that the legal system is 
gradually tilting towards embracing liability for human rights violations. 
As was held by the Supreme Court, no person or body of persons, 
natural or legal, or institution is exempted from the above provision, 
irrespective of where a breach occurred or who committed the 
violation.167 Therefore, natural and artificial persons are both bound to 
adhere to human rights provisions under applicable laws. The court 
overruled, in the case of Peterside v. IMB,168 that corporations are 
 
163 Kings Code for Governance Principles for South Africa, 2009. Available at< 
http://www.ngopulse.org/sites/default/files/king_code_of_governance_for_sa_2009_updated_june_2012.pd
f >accessed 20 June 2020. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Nigeria’s environmental laws create provisions for recognition of human rights; see Section 7 of the 
Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act, Cap H1 LFN, 2004; Section 6 of the Oil in Navigable 
Waters Act, Cap 06 LFN, 2004; Section 3(1) and 4 of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, Cap 08 LFN 
2004; Section 62 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, Cap E12 LFN, 2004.  
166 West v. Jack & Ors [2009] SC.15/2009.  
167 Ibid., per Ngwuta, J.S.C.  
168 Peterside v. IMB [1993] 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 377.  
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unable to be held accountable for human rights violations. To this end, 
it is suggested that Chapters II and IV of the constitution have a vertical 
application – meaning that duties are placed on the state not to violate 
human rights – and also a horizontal application which regulates private 
individuals; 169  thus those provisions bind the state, individuals and 
corporations. 
The Nigerian Constitution has to make several changes, with express 
indication of the fact that all persons are bound by the provisions of the 
constitution. This should definitely imply that private bodies and 
individuals could no longer continue with the violation of fundamental 
rights of other citizens without been checked. They must not hide behind 
the veil of privacy or autonomy. The constitution should give the courts 
the power to find them liable for violations. 
 
Right to Property 
The right to own immoveable property anywhere an individual is legally 
allowed to reside is one of the alienable rights of every individual.170 The 
activities of the extractive industries have the potential to take away 
those rights from individuals. In circumstances where they have to give 
up their houses because they have become uninhabitable, little or no 
adequate compensation is given to members of indigenous communities. 
The right of individuals to the exclusive possession and use of property 
is spelt out in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.171 
 
169 ICT Access to Justice: Human Rights Abuses Involving Corporations – Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(2012) 5.  
170 Section 43 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).  
171 General Assembly Resolution 217 A, 10 December 1948.  
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Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides 
that the right to property shall be guaranteed.172  
The fact that MNCs seek to cut down cost should not mean that innocent 
indigenes should be displaced from their homes, worse still be displaced 
without any form of reparation. Even though states have the discretion 
to use land owned by communities for a project beneficial to the public, 
exercising such a decision should be done mostly to benefit the 
indigenes who feel emotional about losing their lands, and as such 
should be compensated accordingly for it. 
Most times these lands are sold to MNCs by them having to bribe the 
state and even the head of communities, who then fail to allot the money 
to displaced indigenes. These indigenes have a cultural and ancestral 
attachment to their lands – just like every other human being probably 
does – and for them to be ejected without reparation is an abuse which 
is horrific, inhumane, unjust and goes against any form of morality and 
ethics.  
Besides, any form of agreement or contract made by MNCs and the state 
to acquire lands owned by a community should be done by consulting 
members of that community, and they should participate in the decision 
making of relinquishing their lands in the interests of the public – by so 
doing, due lawful process is being followed. Unlawful displacement from 
land which is not of public interest would basically not attract 
compensation. 173  In SERAC v. Nigeria, 174  the court held that 
procurement of the land belonging to the Ogoni people of Nigeria, using 
their powers, without reparation was a violation of Article 14 of the 
 
172 Adopted 27 June 1981.  
173 Section 28 of the Land Use Act, 1978.  
174 SERAC v. Nigeria [2001] AHRLR 60 ACHPR [2001]. Communication 155/96.  
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.175 Indeed, whether right 
to property as enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution is respected in 
practice is not convincing. Ideally, projects carried out by MNCs ought 
to be beneficial to the public, as they generate revenue for the 
government, create employment for the community, even make the 
communities attract more investors. Currently there is no framework 
that guarantees community participation in decision making regarding 
acquisition of their ancestral habitat. Looking forward, in attempting to 
implement the UNGP, there should be an agreement that ensures the 
right procedure is carried out before acquiring lands for activities, and 
in cases where lands are acquired after consultation with communities, 
the right compensation should be allocated towards those lands.  
Government must map out the specific duties of MNCs under the 
Nigerian Constitution and corporate laws, and as regards procedures for 
discretionary displacement of land, since technically the constitution 
provides for a right to property, there should be strict lawful procedures 
to go against that. By so doing, and putting other mechanisms in place, 
it will help determine the liability of MNCs under the law. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter critically examined the UNGP. There is no doubt that a 
binding regulatory framework at international level would be an 
appropriate solution to the problem of corporate human rights violations 
in the world. 
As mentioned previously, the UNGP adopted a polycentric process, 





society holding MNCs accountable, instead of a treaty-based regulatory 
framework176
 
that is contemplated by the outcome of the new process. 
Thus, the endorsement177
 
of the two resolutions178
 
that initiated the 
process of a binding international legal instrument to control the 
activities of corporations’ human rights is a significant development that 
was approved by the NGOs.179
  
A debate arose prior to endorsement,180 as unfortunately, the EU, the 
US and Japan voted against the resolution, as well as deciding that 
indeed they did not want to get involved in any of the process.181
 
According to the US representative, attempting to endorse another 
resolution was evading and dismissing the value of the UNGP, as the 
UNGP needed more time to be implemented. Subsequently, it is 
pertinent to ask whether endorsing another process which might create 
a binding legal regime to hold corporations accountable internationally 
might turn out to be a more suitable solution than implementing the 
UNGP? It is unpredictable. While rejection of the resolution by some 
states might be for ulterior motives,182
 
they need to face reality and 
 
176 Backer (n13) 3. 
177 UNHROHC, ‘Human Rights Council Concludes Twenty-sixth Session after Adopting 34 Texts’, 27 
June 2014, Resolution A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, available at< 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14798&LangID=E >accessed 21 
July 2020. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Richard Girard, ‘Social Movements Celebrate Historic UN Vote against Impunity’, Transnational 
Institute (26 June 2014). 
180 Carey L. Biron, ‘Contentious Start for UN Process toward Business and Human Rights Treaty’ (Mint 
Press News, 10 July 2014); also available at< http://www.mintpressnews.com/contentious-start-u-n-
process-toward-business-human-rights-treaty/193731/ >accessed 31 July 2020. 
181 Kinda Mohamadieh, ‘Human Rights Council: Historic Resolution Adopted for a Legally Binding 
Instrument for TNCs’, TWN Third World Network, 30 June 2014; also available at< 
http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2014/cc140602.htm >accessed 21 July 2020. 
182 H.L.D. Mahindapala, ‘US, EU Refuse to Cooperate with UNHRC on Human Rights’ 3 July 2014 < 
https://www.sinhalanet.net/us-eu-refuse-to-cooperate-with-unhrc-on-human-rights > accessed 13 April 
2021. Quoting one commentator as saying: ‘the ganging up of leading market forces is clearly seen in the 
Western alliance of US, EU, Norway etc., rejecting the UNHRC resolution on TNCs’, and another one 
saying: ‘their decision to protect profits at the expense of human rights is unacceptable.’ 
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realize that international law regarding corporate accountability can no 
longer be silent.  
Both a new binding treaty process and implementation of the UNGP are 
geared towards one course, which is to hold corporations accountable. 
A regulatory approach is what is needed to implement the UNGP. 
This thesis is of the view that the UNGP are still relevant and should not 
be put aside because of the initiation of a new process for a binding 
treaty, as they can both work hand in hand. As Backer argues, the 
process of creating a binding treaty must begin by reflecting on the 
UNGP.183
 
The timeframe for the new treaty is unrestricted. A lot of 
obstacles have to be climbed before a new treaty can exist,184
 
and it will 
certainly take a long time before it does.185
 
In the interim, Ruggie 
argues that implementation of the UNGP should currently be more given 
attention. Justine Nolan argues that for corporate accountability and 
adherence to the principles in the UNGP, there was a need for a stricter 
mechanism, which is a legally binding law.186
 
Which leads this study to 
seek an avenue regionally – which is the African Union – to improve 
accountability, which would be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
183 Backer (n13), 542, noting that the construction of a new treaty for corporate accountability as an 
international rule of law must begin with determination of ‘the extent of the current landscape of the state 
duty to protect ... and the operationalization’ of the UNGP. 
184 Backer (n13), 196, discussing the challenges and bottlenecks that the new treaty will pass through to see 
the light of the day. 
185 During informal meetings before the vote, Ecuador revealed that the timeframe of the treaty process 
might take a decade; John Ruggie, ‘Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty 
Sponsors’, Institute of Business and Human Rights, 9 September 2014, available at< 
https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-to-business-and-
human-rights-treaty-sponsors/ >accessed 11 June 2020. 
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Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate 







African Commission, African Court and the Accountability of 
Multinational Corporations for human rights violations 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters looked at the available framework with regards 
to oil exploration in Nigeria, and it was concluded that available 
frameworks are weak, and therefore there is no established rule of law 
holding multinational corporations accountable when they violate 
human rights. Also, previous chapters looked at the UNGP and 
concluded that on their own, they were not enough to hold MNCs 
accountable. So, this chapter will look at the role that the African Charter 
has played. 
The African heads of state and government adopted the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights during the 18th ordinary assembly in 
Nairobi, Kenya in June 1981. The charter then became part of Nigerian 
law by virtue of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Application and Enforcement) Act1 of 1983. The African Charter has 
been acknowledged by the new African Union as the primary instrument 
for the protection and promotion of human rights in Africa,2 though the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), within which the charter is designed 
to function, had been replaced by the African Union( AU).3 The charter 
not only provides for traditional individual civil and political rights, but 
apparently also seeks to promote economic, social and cultural rights, 
 
1 Chapter A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. 
2 John C. Mubangizi, ‘Some Reflections on Recent and Current Trends in the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights in Africa: The Pains and Gains’ (2006), 6 African Human Rights Law Journal,146–165, 




including third generation rights, thus making it the first international 
human rights convention to guarantee all the categories of human rights 
in one document.4 The detailed and protected socio-economic rights in 
the charter include equitable and satisfactory conditions of work,5 right 
to health, 6  right to education, 7  protection of family, 8  right to self-
determination,9 right to dispose of wealth and natural resources,10 right 
to economic, social and cultural development,11 right to peace,12 and 
right to a satisfactory and favourable environment. 13  The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is a quasi-judicial body 
established within the African Union, by virtue of Article 30 of the African 
Charter, to promote human and peoples’ rights and to ensure their 
protection. 14  Article 24 of the charter specifically provides that all 
peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment 
favourable to their development. 
The purpose of the commission is to promote as well as protect. It is the 
duty of the commission to exercise its protective mandate through its 
decisions or recommendations resulting from the reflection of 
complaints brought before it.15 Human rights education, sensitization 
and raising awareness of the African Charter are the promotional 
mandates of the African Commission.16 The commission has kept on 
 
4 Ibid., 148. 
5 Article 15. 
6 Article 16. 
7 Article 17. 
8 Article 18. 
9 Article 20. 
10 Article 21. 
11 Article 22. 
12 Article 23. 
13 Article 24. 
14 African Charter, Article 30. 
15 Olubayo Oluduro, Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing 




using communication or interactive procedures to constantly interpret 
the African Charter, which has led to its abundant jurisprudence.17  
Since the charter was incorporated into Nigerian law, it has become part 
of Nigeria’s legal system, with the full force of law and enforcement 
machinery.18 Section 1 states that: 
“As from the commencement of this act, the provisions of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which are set out in the schedule 
of the act shall, subject as thereunder provided, have force of law in 
Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect and applied by all 
authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive or judicial 
powers in Nigeria.”19 
The ratification of the charter is important, since it is currently possible 
to appeal suspected violations of the charter before Nigerian courts, 
including the right to a general satisfactory environment.20 
 
7.2 The African Charter vis-à-vis the Nigerian Constitution 
The extent to which domestic courts will apply international human 
rights treaties, if they are willing, depends on whether a monist 
approach is adopted by domestic law, meaning international law 
automatically forms part of the domestic law or has a dualist approach.21 
A dualist approach with regards to the domestic effect of international 
 
17 Japhet Biegon and Magnus Killander, ‘Human Rights Developments in Africa Union during 2009’ 
(2010) 10 African Human Rights Law Journal, 212–232, 224. 
18 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Rights under the Nigerian Courts’ (2004) 
2(1) Benin Journal of Public Law, 55.  
19 African Charter, Section 1. 
20 Oluduro (n15) 449. 
21 Amos Enabulele, ‘Implementation of Treaties in Nigeria and the Status Question: Whither Nigerian 
Courts?’ (2009) 17 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 326–341. 
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treaties is what Nigeria adopts, 22  meaning international treaties in 
Nigeria do not operate automatically; however, they are to be 
incorporated into domestic legislation to be legally enforceable.23 As a 
result of the non-justiciability of Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution 
in Section 6(6)(c), Nigerian courts rejected adjudicating directly on any 
of its provisions, except when they are incorporated in a legislative or 
executive act.24 The African Charter does not only include civil and 
political rights, but also socio-economic, cultural and social rights. Some 
rights exist under the African Charter which are enforceable; however, 
the constitution expressly identifies them as unenforceable,25 though it 
can be argued that the African Charter generally complements the 
constitution and does not undermine it. 26  The African Charter 
contemplated its status in Abacha v. Fawehinmi.27 The Supreme Court 
held that the charter is a part of Nigerian law, therefore it was stronger 
than any domestic statute. It was held, however, that the charter was 
not superior to the constitution, because the National Assembly or 
federal military government can repeal an international instrument.28 
Therefore, the constitution is superior to the African Charter, even 
though the latter is an international mechanism. 
This means that if a conflict ensues between any sections of the 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria and Article 24 of the African Charter, the 
constitution will take precedence. Thus, several scholars are not sure if 
the charter could be used to promote environmental rights,29 meaning 
 
22  Oluduro (n15). 
23 Section 12 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Edwin Egede, ‘Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the Domestication of Human Rights 
Treaties in Nigeria’(2007)  5(2) Journal of African Law 249–284, 255. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Abacha v. Fawehinmi [2000] S.C. 45 1997. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Atsegbua (n18). 
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doubting the effectiveness of the charter in holding multinational 
corporations accountable for human violations as a result of their 
extractive activities. 
 
7.3 Jurisprudence of the African Commission 
The case of Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Anor 
v. Nigeria,30 which was a well-known case on the issue of environmental 
degradation and socio-economic rights brought before the commission, 
was filed by the socio-economic rights non-governmental organization 
(NGO) against the federal government of Nigeria. The state oil company, 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which is a major 
shareholder associated with Shell, was directly involved with the 
government in oil production. It was stated in the case that rights to 
health, a healthy environment, housing and food were violated due to 
the alleged prevalent contamination of soil, water and air and the 
destruction of homes in Ogoni communities. The plaintiffs went further, 
criticizing the Nigerian government for not addressing issues raised, but 
rather being an accomplice in violating international standards by 
making military powers available to the oil companies in order to 
threaten protesters with weapons, and as such denying communities 
access to information about the dangers of the oil activities, as well as 
ignoring the grievances brought by communities. The African 
Commission directed that the right to a satisfactory environment should 
be a right that entails the government taking reasonable measures to 
prevent pollution and ecological sustainable degradation,31 control the 
 
30 Communication 155/96. 
31 Para. 52 of the Communication.  
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use of natural resources,32 assume environmental and social impact 
assessment before commencing industrial development or extraction,33 
provide access to information to communities where oil exploration 
occurs,34 and ensure that communities affected by the activities of MNCs 
be allowed to participate in decision making prior to oil exploration.35 
Article 2 on non-discriminatory enjoyment of rights, Article 4 on the 
right to life, Article 14 on the right to property, Article 16 on the right to 
health, Article 18 on family right, Article 21 on the right of peoples to 
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources and Article 24 on 
the right of peoples to a satisfactory environment were being violated 
by the Nigerian government. The commission further commented on the 
impact of globalization in developing countries, as it said:  
“the intervention of multinational corporations may be a potentially 
positive force for development if the state and the people concerned are 
ever mindful of the common good and sacred rights of individuals and 
communities.”36  
The commission concluded that the right to housing and shelter could 
be found in the combined reading of Articles 14, 16 and 18 of the charter, 
irrespective of whether rights to housing were clearly expressed. The 
commission held that the right to shelter exemplifies the individual’s 
right to live in peace, and the individual having the choice to live in a 
shelter or not,37 as well as the right to housing extending to protecting 






36 Communication 155/96. 
37 Para. 61 of the Communication. 
38 Para. 62 of the Communication. 
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fulfil its obligations by failing to ensure that all human rights in the 
African Charter are assured. The commission made a formal request to 
the government to guarantee the protection of the environment, health 
and livelihood of the Ogoni people, as well as the whole Niger Delta, 
among other things, by:  
“Stopping all attacks on Ogoni, Niger Delta communities by the Rivers 
State internal securities task force, conducting an investigation into the 
said human rights violations and prosecuting officials of the security 
forces, NNPC and relevant agencies involved in the human rights 
violations, and undertaking a comprehensive clean-up of lands and 
rivers damaged by oil operations, ensuring appropriate environmental 
and social impact assessments for any future oil development, and the 
safe operation of any further oil development, and as well as providing 
information on health and environmental risks and meaningful access to 
regulatory and decision making bodies to communities likely to be 
affected by oil operations.”39 
The African Commission explicitly states both procedural and 
substantive rights: procedural rights are rights to access environmental 
information and an avenue for fair hearing when environmental rights 
are being or are likely to be violated, while substantive rights are the 
obligation of the government to avert ecological degradation and 
pollution, in addition to promoting protection and sustainable 
development. 40  This resolution reflects the qualities mentioned in 
 
39 Para. 69 of the Communication. 
40 Morne van der Linde and Lirette Louw, ‘Considering the interpretation and implementation of article 24 





international environmental principles, which include preventive 
principles and duty of care principles.41 
The African Commission, in the SERAC case, held that responsibility for 
violations by the MNCs was to rest solely on the state, instead of 
acknowledging the presence of inequalities within power that exist 
between MNCs and developing countries such as Nigeria, and as such 
the decision was criticized. This is not surprising as it stems from there 
not being any regional human rights framework in Africa to hold 
corporations directly accountable for human rights violations. 42 
Although, it is the primary responsibility of the state to protect human 
rights in international law, the commission ought to have looked at the 
circumstances of the case, however, and deliberated on the 
accountability of the MNC, especially in situations when the criminal law 
or the regulatory framework of the host state are considered too weak 
to have a positive impact.43 Shell’s business enterprises carried out 
violations which were supported by the state, and Shell was involved in 
some violations, as well as using military force to intervene during 
protests by members of the communities objecting to the activities of 
the MNCs, and as such there were reasons to hold Shell liable .44 
Oloko-Onyango was of the opinion that the commission should be made 
to apply the provisions within the charter that articulate the issues of 
accountability and duty, and to seek an appropriate balance between 
state accountability and that of the non-state actors to tackle the abuses, 
 
41 Michael Kidd, Environmental Law: A South African Perspective (Juta & Co. Ltd 1997) 8, quoted in van 
der Linde and Louw (n40) 178–179. 
42 Tineke Lambooy and Marie-Eve Rancourt, ‘Shell in Nigeria: From Human Rights Abuse to Corporate 
Social Responsibility’ (2008) 2(2) Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, 229–275.  
43 J. Oloka-Onyango, ‘Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: International 
Mechanisms, Non-state Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples’ Rights in Africa’ (2003) 18 Am. U. Intl L. 
Rev. 851–913, 903. 
44 Ibid. 904–905. 
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since they encounter stumbling blocks when attempting to use national 
institutions, as seen in the SERAC case.45 
The commission should have been more practical in putting more effort 
into ensuring that liability was not just on the state – due to the negative 
effect that the activities of MNCs have on developing states such as 
Nigeria – but should have extended liability to Shell as well.46 However, 
this approach would be contrary to the international law provision which 
is purely state-centric, which means that by international law, only the 
state bears responsibility. This approach could help reduce violations by 
MNCs, so as to protect the human rights of the communities that have 
grievances. 
To protect and promote human rights against violations, the African 
Union should seek to revise or amend the charter, so that it could extend 
liability for human rights violations to private persons regionally.47 This 
resolution has further identified the loopholes that need to be bridged in 
order for the charter to be an effective tool in promoting protection for 
weak states who suffer from the negative effects of MNCs. It will be a 
welcome development if the gap is bridged, since the commission 
expressly states that under the charter, all rights are applicable.48 
If the above resolution is effective, it would mean that protection of 
social and economic rights is enforceable under the African Charter,49 
and Heysns describes it as an astonishing move towards making social 
 
45 Ibid. 
46 Oluduro (n15). 
47 Evaristus Oshinebo, Regulating Transnational Corporations in Domestic and International Regimes: An 
African Case Study (University of Toronto Press 2009). 




and economic rights justiciable50 and represents a giant stride towards 
the realization of economic and social rights. This expansion strengthens 
the effectiveness of the charter in being able to guarantee the protection 
and enforcement of rights mentioned in it.51 The SERAC case is also 
important because it further seeks to enhance the responsibilities of 
African governments in ensuring that the activities of MNCs operating in 
their countries are being monitored and controlled, in order to guarantee 
respect for social, economic and cultural rights.52 Victims of human 
rights violations and civil society groups, through this decision, could act 
as a yardstick to exert force on the state to regulate the activities of 
MNCs by ensuring that corporations found violating the human rights 
specified under the charter are held accountable. The decision to enlarge 
the scope of liability for violation from a state-centric one to holding 
non-state actors liable under the charter can only be effective if the 
commission expressly acknowledges the fact that MNCs are indeed 
proficient in violating human rights.53 Over the years the Niger Delta 
people could have their lands and claims to natural resources revoked 
by the government based on the theory of ownership, which confers all 
natural resources to the federal government, and as such the decision 
of the commission would have an effect on the Nigerian government, 
 
50 Christof Heyns and Killander Magnus, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System’ in Felipe Gomez 
Isa & Koen de Feyer (eds), International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges 
(University of Deusto 2006). 
51 Justice C. Nwobike, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Demystification 
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which has used revocation of rights as a justification.54 Enforcement of 
the recommendations made by the commission would ensure that 
victims whose rights have been violated by the activities of MNCs could 
participate with the Nigerian government and MNCs in order to work out 
a solution, and in turn this would help foster confidence among the Niger 
Delta communities towards the Nigerian government and the MNCs.55 
In the case of the Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Anor v. Kenya, 56  a complaint was filed on behalf of the Endorois 
community against the state by the Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (CEMIRIDE) and Minority Rights Group International 
(MRG). A complaint was brought against the government of Kenya 
alleging that the community had been displaced from its ancestral lands 
without adequate compensation for the destruction of its properties and 
the interruption of its pastoral business, and as such this violated the 
African Charter, which includes the right to practise one’s own religion 
and culture, as well as the entire stages of developing a community.57 
As alleged by the complainants, the Endorois Welfare Committee, which 
represented the Endorois community, carried out fake and made-up 
consultations, as well as obtaining make-believe consents on behalf of 
the community.58 It was held by the commission, therefore, that the 
charter’s rights to freedom of religion, property, cultural life, free 
removal of natural resources and development were violated, because 
the aggrieved victims were forcefully removed from their ancestral land 
 
54 Nsogurua J. Udombana, ‘Between Promise and Performance: Revising States’ Obligations under the 
African Human Rights Charter’ (2004) 40 Stan. J. Int’l L., 105–142.  
55 Christopher Mbazira, ‘Enforcing the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on 
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African Human Rights Law Journal, 333–357.  
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with little compensation. 59  It was the recommendation of the 
commission that Kenya reinstate the Endorois community to its 
ancestral land, compensate the community sufficiently with damage 
payments, as well as pay royalties to the Endorois community for 
activities embarked upon on their property.60 It was held that with 
regard to participation, the community had no sufficient participation as 
they did not have the opportunity to agree to terms before projects were 
carried out by the state. As no environmental impact assessment was 
undertaken, communities had no realistic advantage to gain from the 
projects; likewise, they did not benefit from reparations either.61  
Article 14 of the charter, the right to property, is violated when the 
above characteristics are not present. The fact that effective 
participation and an equitable share in the profits of the land were not 
guaranteed violated the right to development.62 This case – being the 
first decision to establish who indigenous peoples are in Africa, and what 
rights they have – had a tremendous input on the jurisprudence of the 
rights of indigenous peoples, as it was a key precedent for possibly 
similar groups of people and indigenous communities in Africa, including 
the Niger Delta communities in Nigeria.63 Apart from the charter being 
the first international convention establishing the right to development, 
it was the first time that the commission decided that a violation of the 
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A lot of positive improvement has been made by the commission, 
contrary to past opinions by scholars about the inefficiency of the 
commission, which they described as a pain for African governments.65 
Meanwhile, from 1996, complaints filed before the commission have 
been brilliantly looked at and involved on the issues of law and facts – 
and as such adequate judgement has been given66  – and this has 
fostered meaningful development of international human rights law 
which mirrors African practice. 
 
7.4 State Accountability for Human Rights Violations of Non-
State Actors, Including MNCs 
The state is not the only one to bear all the responsibilities under the 
African Charter, as it does not state that the charter cannot hold persons 
who fail to carry out their roles under the charter. Thus, the charter can 
inquire about the role played by both state and non-state actors, 
especially MNCs, in violating rights protected by the charter.67 In spite 
of that, it is imperative to be aware of the fact that interpreting the 
charter can be extremely complex, as even some scholars and the 
African Commission has attested to interpreting it,68 and as such anyone 
can wrongfully interpret it.  
 
65 Makau wa Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective’ (1993) 3 ACHPR 
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66 Chidi Anslem Odinakalu and Camila Christensen, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
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235–280,278.  
67 Oluduro (n15). 
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Rules of Procedure, is opaque and difficult to interpret’. See Rachel Murray, ‘Serious or Massive 
Violations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comparison with the Inter 
American and European Mechanisms’ (1999) 17 NQHR 109,133. Chidi Odinkalu, ‘The Individual 
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In interpreting the charter, the African Commission follows a state-
centric approach to accountability, as proved by international law, which 
is possibly why interpreting the responsibilities of duty holders proves 
difficult. The African Commission might not have much influence in 
changing the state-centric approach to accountability, as it is the 
standard established by all regional and international organizations, as 
Rachel Murray stated: “It would be illegitimate for the African system to 
jettison the ‘underlying concepts of international law’.”69 
Having a state-centric approach has both favourable and unfavourable 
consequences, leaving the burden of protecting human rights on the 
state and also ensuring that the state is held liable for violations of 
human rights done by non-state actors within the state. 
A second reading of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts was adopted in 2001 by the International 
Law Commission (ILC), which is the body responsible for its making, as 
it seeks to devise, by a method of codification and ongoing development, 
the basic rules of international law which relate to the responsibility of 
states for internationally wrongful acts.70  The draft articles are not 
directly binding, because of the non-existence of a treaty;71 however, 
indirectly it may be binding as customary international law.72 Emphasis 
is placed on the secondary rules of international law, which concern 
state responsibility, and they help make available the mechanism which 
controls the duty of state when it has been violated, and what would be 
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the legal consequences of such violation. 73  There is said to be an 
internationally wrongful act of state when any conduct consists of an act 
or omission of two elements:  
(a)  It is attributable to the state under international law. 
(b)  It contributes to a breach of its obligation under the same law.74 
Admittedly, as the conduct of any state organ shall be related to an act 
of the state,75 it should be determined when the conduct of collective or 
individual entities can be relatable to states. Article 4, however, covers 
legislative, executive, judiciary and other functions. 76  So, Article 5 
provides that the conduct of a private entity shall be regarded as 
resulting from the state if the private entity is empowered by the law of 
that state to exercise elements of governmental authority under 
international law, as long as during the specific time that they were 
acting, the private entity was authorized to exercise in that capacity.77 
The definition of entity in this regard has been interpreted widely and 
liberally to include:  
“All human beings, corporations or collectivities linked to the State by 
nationality, habitual residence or incorporation, whether or not they 
have any connection to the government.”78 
 
73 ILC, ‘Commentaries to the Draft Articles, Extract from the Report of the International Law Commission 
on the Work of its Fifty-third Session’, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, 
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.2, available at< 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf >accessed 21 June 2020. 
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Following from the above, it is implied, therefore, that any act of MNCs 
would be the conduct of the state if they were empowered by the state 
to exercise any form of governmental authority.  
Article 8 also states another instance that relates to conduct by private 
persons. It states that the conduct of a private person or group of people 
shall be said to be an act of a state under international law, if that private 
person or group of people were given the go-ahead to act or were under 
the influence or control of the state.79 
The basic principle, however, is that one cannot attribute the conduct of 
a private person/group of people/MNCs to the state under international 
law, but in situations where there is a particular actual relationship 
between the MNC and the state, then as such the MNC acts on behalf of 
the state.80 
There exist two instances where the conduct of MNCs would be 
attributed to the state: firstly, when a private person or MNC carries out 
a wrongful act on instruction from the state; secondly, when private 
persons or MNCs are directed or controlled by the state to carry out an 
act.81 
Attributing the conduct of MNCs to the state is largely seen as acceptable 
under international jurisprudence.82 In such situations, it would not 
matter if the person involved was a private person or if they were 
carrying out government activity.83  
 







Generally, circumstances like this occur when the state recruits another 
subsidiary or initiates a private person to play a supplementary role, 
while they stay out of the official structure of the state.84 
Although corporations’ actions may be attributed to the state, it is 
imperative that these corporations’ actions are consistent with the 
international obligations of the state to act.85 As known, international 
law acknowledges the doctrine of separateness of corporate entities at 
domestic level, except in circumstances where a corporate veil is used 
as an avenue to commit fraud or evade action.86 
It is noted that the state may exercise control or give certain directions 
to a private person or a group of people, and so has to be accountable 
for their actions.87 The facts of the case would determine whether the 
state has a responsibility or not. According to Article 8, three elements 
have to be present for it to be said to be attributable to the state, and 
it is adequate to establish any one of the three.88 These elements are 
control, direction and instruction, and they must have resulted in an 
action which led to an internationally wrongful act.89 
Additionally, it should be noted that there are two elements attributed 
to state responsibility under international law: firstly, private persons 
being attributed to the state to act; secondly, private persons or 
corporations breaching their obligations. However, a state may be held 










if the state did not provide adequate measures to prevent a negative 
outcome. 
 
7.5 African Commission on Human Rights 
Some academics are of the opinion that the African Commission has 
failed to ensure that the charter acts as a regulator for human rights in 
Africa. In the opinion of Mohammed Radwan, in promoting, protecting 
and implementing the provisions of the charter, the African Commission 
has not been strong.90 Likewise, Oloka-Onyango supports the opinion 
that the current situation of human rights violations in Africa has not 
changed, even with the presence of the African Commission, and there 
continues to be disappointment in the way the state runs.91 Nsongurua 
Udombana criticized the African Commission by stating that it has made 
it clear time without number that it is not fit to protect and ensure that 
Africans have standard human rights.92 Following from this, there has 
not been any clear instance when the commission has interpreted the 
charter to see human rights accountability as not just state-centric.  
However, the commission has showed its ability to protect in a small 
way the provisions in the charter that seek to minimize or limit some of 
the rights guaranteed under the charter; so in order to see that those 
rights are protected, the African Commission has made it difficult to 
bridge by ensuring that when the charter is interpreted, it guarantees 
 
90 Mohammed Abdelsalam A. Radwan, ‘Article 58 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
A Legal Analysis and How It Can Be Put into More Practical Use’, a paper delivered at the 1996 Annual 
Conference of the African Society of International and Comparative Law, 290–309. 
91 Joseph Oloka-Onyango, ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Development in Contemporary Africa: A New 
Dawn, or Retreating Horizons?’ (2000) 6 BHRLR 39, 71. 
92 Nsongurua J. Udombana, ‘Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late Than 
Never’ (2000) 3 YHRDLJ 45–111,73. 
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human rights obligations under the charter and domestic laws are not 
used by the state to limit rights.93  
The African Commission also interpreted the charter so as to reflect or 
contain the rights to food, shelter and housing, although not expressly 
available in the charter in the SERAC case. According to Dejo Olowu, 
when the African Commission will apply the decision in SERAC case to 
African countries who are not parties to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) cannot be determined 
now; although it cannot be determined, Olowu is hopeful that the 
decision will possibly be developed into a standard for the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights in the African 
regional system.94 Some liberal scholars are of the opinion that, despite 
the limitations of the charter, it has proven to be a fast-growing 
regulatory institution in Africa.95 Although at its inception the African 
Commission was faced with issues, as of now it has established itself as 
a regional institution that seeks to protect human rights in its region.  
 
7.5.1 Application of the Jurisprudence of the African Commission 
on Social-Economic Rights and the Environment by the Nigerian 
Courts 
The SERAC case decision has become ground-breaking, and in some 
African courts – including those in Nigeria and wherever human rights 
 
93 Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria [2000] AHRLR 200 ACHPR [1998]. 
94 As a result of uncertainty, he advocates a new approach that can be used to enforce the new rights. See 
Dejo Olowu, An Integrative Rights-Based Approach to Human Development in Africa (Pretoria: Pretoria 
University Law Press, 2009) 154. 
95 Odinkalu (n68) He notes: ‘The Commission has tried, with substantial success, to address these 
shortcomings through its practice, evolving procedures, and jurisprudence’; Vincent Nmehielle, 
‘Development of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade’ (2004), 11(3) HRB, 1 at 6–11. He 
notes: ‘The protective mandate of the Commission has progressively developed to some degree, to the 
point where it has arguably entrenched itself as an institutional supervisory mechanism.’ 
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guaranteed by the charter are violated – the jurisprudence of the 
commission is used in judgements. Some have commended the court’s 
decision in Gbemre’s case 96  on international law principles. The 
complaint of the applicant was on the basis of Articles 4, 16 and 24 of 
the charter, and the failure to make reference to domestic African 
jurisprudence – most importantly the SERAC case which addressed ESC 
rights – was viewed to be inadequate.97 The court, by virtue of the 
constitutional provisions, did not encourage legislative measures to 
implement the principles in the charter by failing to apply the rights.98 
In the case of Ikechukwu Opara v. Shell,99 the judge failed to mention 
the importance of upholding socio-economic rights, as he did not cite 
any instrument dealing with socio-economic rights. At this point, it is 
pertinent for the Nigerian government to examine Chapter II of the 
constitution with deals with socio-economic rights, so as to make these 
rights justiciable. The people of the Niger Delta have continued to suffer 
as a result of the non-justiciability of socio-economic rights. The Gbemre 
case was not brought to the Appeal Court or the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria, and now we are left to wonder if these courts would have upheld 
the decision of the Federal Court.  
Nigerian judges should avail themselves of the decision in the Gbemre 
case, in order to protect human rights. The constitution of Nigeria, as 
well as the African Charter, imposed the duty of protecting and 
 
96 Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company and Others [2005] Suit No.FHC/B/CS/53/05; 
AHRLR 151 NgHC 
97 Oluduro (n15). 
98 Deji Adekunle, ‘Domestic Protection of Socio-economic Rights: Case Studies on the Implementation of 
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Review, 15–16 at 16; < https://journals.co.za/content/esrrev/11/3/EJC33362 >accessed 11 July 2020. 




promoting the environment in Nigeria on the Nigerian government,100 
but sadly this has not been the case because socio-economic rights are 
non-justiciable under the Nigerian Constitution. 101  International 
tribunals are not as good as national courts when it comes to ensuring 
binding and enforceable relief, either through remuneration or injunctive, 
as well as enforcing international law, for they have authority over the 
assets of the most common polluters, corporations and individuals.102 
Also, states are more willing to uphold the judgements and decisions of 
their own local courts rather than international institutions because they 
are not confident of international judgements.103 Although victims were 
aware of the provision of socio-economic rights in the charter and the 
decision of the commission, the fact that the judicial system in Nigeria 
is not liberal means that Niger Delta indigenes who are victims of 
degradation are sceptical of instigating litigation based on violation of 
their socio-economic rights.104 Courts in Nigeria will be fulfilling the 
purpose of the charter by depending on the jurisprudence of the 
commission, and also ensuring that victims of human rights in Nigeria 
get adequate remedy; however, these victims are prevented from 
getting redress because the Nigerian courts are holding on to the fact 
that the constitution makes no provision for holding multinational 
corporations accountable.  
 
100 Section 20 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria; see also Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Chapter A9, Vol 1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004. 
101 Section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution. 
102 Linda A. Malone, ‘Enforcing International Environmental Law through Domestic Law Mechanisms in 
the United States: Civil Society Initiatives against Global Warming’, in LeRoy Paddock et al. (eds), 
Compliance and Enforcement in Environmental Law: Toward More Effective Implementation 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012) 118. 
103 Udombana (n92). 
104 Rhuks T. Ako, ‘The Judicial Recognition and Enforcement of Rights to Environment: Differing 




7.5.2 Benefits of the Application of African Commission 
Jurisprudence by Nigerian Courts 
The government of Nigeria can promote human rights by ensuring that 
the charter is interpreted widely to make provisions for socio-economic 
rights, as well as giving the courts in Nigeria a legal system that can 
apply socio-economic rights, 105  therefore improving further the 
provisions of the charter, as indigenes, including non-state actors, would 
be more abreast with reporting issues to the commission.106  At an 
ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPRs), held in 1999, lawyers were encouraged to see the 
importance of the charter as a regional and international human rights 
instrument during their advocacy.107 Judges were also admonished to 
participate hugely by integrating the charter and the potential 
jurisprudence of the commission while giving judgements, which would 
help promote and protect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
charter. 108  It admonished judges to ensure that their thinking and 
judgements rely on all relevant human rights instruments, either as 
applicable authoritative laws or as influential aids to interpretation of 
constitutional and legislative provisions on fundamental rights, 
freedoms and obligations. 109  Hence, in situations where legal 
practitioners avoid making reference to the charter and fail to refer to 
the commission’s decisions while their case is being held, judges in 
Nigeria should emulate Ngcobo J. of the Constitutional Court of South 
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Africa, who was an outstanding judge for making reference to the 
charter to strengthen his resolutions.110 
National mechanisms for the enforcement of the people’s decisions is 
quite easy, as domestic courts are much nearer to the people; therefore, 
applying decisions of the commission by national courts in Nigeria will 
help to overcome the problem of enforcement of the commission’s 
decision.111  
 
7.5.3 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
A proposal to produce an African court was made at a 1961 African 
conference centred on the rule of law.112 The African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (the African Court) was founded by a protocol and 
implemented on 10 June 1998, and was eventually ratified by the 
stipulated 15 states in January 2004, after which 11 judges took their 
oath on 2 July 2006.113 It is hoped that the charter will take a lead from 
Europe and America on how to respect the right to a healthy 
environment. Scholars are hopeful of an African Court that could curb 
the shortcomings of the commission, so as to carry out their duties 
efficiently.  
It seems like the African Court is bidding to rescue the African 
Commission from its shortcomings. Definite decisions would be carried 
out by the African Court, and according to the protocol it is established 
that there is a time frame in which parties ought to comply with the 
 
110 Richard Gordon Volks No v. Ethel Robinson & Ors. [2005] CCT 12/04 
111 Mbazira, 
112 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment. < 
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judgement of the court and ensure execution.114 Following the inter-
American and European courts of human rights experiences, according 
to Article 27 of the protocol, should it be discovered by the court that 
the human rights of the people have been breached, a necessary 
directive to provide remedy as well as financial compensation should be 
made. In situations where cases are of severe importance and urgency, 
and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the court 
would use its discretion to embrace procedures that are provisional. 
Article 29(2) provides that the AU council of ministers shall be notified 
of the judgement and shall monitor its execution on behalf of the AU 
assembly, and Article 30 provides that states are expected to execute 
the decisions. Article 31 enjoins the court to have a report – which 
includes instances where states have not conformed with the decisions 
of the court – be submitted at AU assembly meetings.  
The Niger Delta people, as well as those affected by degradation, should 
have access to the court, as well as be sufficiently compensated when a 
violation occurs, with compliance and lawful organization being two 
completely different things. If Nigeria, as well as other African states 
who experience violations, decide to embrace and follow the decisions 
of the court, it would be a positive step.115 The inter-American Court on 
Human Rights provides, in Article 68(2), that before judgement can be 
enforced, the court’s judgement may be executed in the affected state, 
following the domestic process governing the implementation of 
judgements against the state. This method has been adopted by the 
 
114 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment. Available at< 
https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/achpr_instr_proto_court_eng.pdf >accessed 20 June 
2020. 
115 Muna Ndulo , ‘The African Commission and Court under the African human rights system’, in Akokpari 




Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice, 
and the decisions of the ECOWAS Court can be enforced in the highest 
national court of states that are members116 – in Nigeria, that would be 
the Supreme Court. If this above method was followed, then the rights 
of victims of human rights degradation in Nigeria would be sufficiently 
safeguarded. The states should decide to accept, respect and comply 
with protocol provisions, by discarding provisions that do not adhere to 
human rights violation compliance, and they should enforce the 
decisions of the court since they have guaranteed to be obligated by 
them, as agreed in the principle that agreement must be kept, by virtue 
of the provisions of Article 1 of the African Charter.117 According to the 
commission: 
“The Nigerian government itself recognises that human rights are no 
longer solely a matter of domestic concern. The African charter was 
drafted and acceded to voluntarily by African states wishing to ensure 
the respect of human rights on this continent. Once ratified, states 
parties to the charter are legally bound to its provisions. A state not 
wishing to abide by the African charter might have refrained from 
ratification. Once legally bound, however, a state must abide by the law 
in the same way an individual must.”118 
Discoveries made by the African Commission have been said to be aloof 
and strange to victims and as such they meet a brick wall while trying 
 
116 George Mukundi Wachira, ‘African court on human and peoples' rights : ten years on and still no justice’ 
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to enforce approvals.119 While still deciding a case on behalf of the late 
leader of MOSOP, Ken Saro-Wiwa, the tyranny government, under the 
late General Sani Abacha’s military government, debated against the 
commission’s right to deliberate on cases, or even make 
recommendations,120 as the government of Nigeria went further to state 
that the commission was judicially not equipped, after the commission 
accused the government of Nigeria of not fulfilling its human rights 
duties.121 Based on the above, General Sani Abacha’s government went 
ahead in executing Ken Saro-Wiwa, irrespective of the fact that the 
commission had asked the Nigerian government to adjourn the case 
until the commission had concluded its dialogue. Additionally, the 
Nigerian government has not attempted to implement the decision in 
the SERAC case given by the commission.122 To date, the Nigerian 
government has not carried out the recommendations made by the 
commission, and the violation of people’s human rights in oil exploration 
areas in Nigeria by multinational oil corporations is ongoing. Justice C. 
Nwobike stated that123 the decision taken by the Nigerian government 
in the case of the Ogoni people was against the principles of 
international human rights law.  
Decisions to abide by recommendations or advices given by the 
commission cannot be imposed on states, as a state has the discretion 
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to adhere or not.124 This behaviour gives liberty for degradations to 
continue to be done in weak regions, and victims see no need to take 
their cases up with the African Commission. 
Notably, if the state does not comply with the recommendations 
provided in Rule 112(2) within 180 days after any decision is made, or 
have failed to make contact, then a case of non-compliance can be filed 
against the state in the African Court, according to Rule 18 of the latest 
rules of procedure of the commission, pursuant to Article 5(1)(a) of the 
protocol. 125  It therefore implies that if member states who are 
signatories to the African Court protocol fail to adhere to 
recommendations made, there would be a legal enforcement towards 
them coming from the African Court. If the African Court is going to be 
efficient at ensuring that recommendations are enforced on time and 
effectively, then the above provisions would be commendable. The 
commission should be encouraged to have its own mechanism for 
enforcement, in case circumstances arise where there is a delay in 
enforcing the decisions of the African Court.126 By so doing, it would 
improve the effectiveness of the commission, so that they can in turn 
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improve on providing compensation for people of the Niger Delta region 
who have been victims of human rights violations.  
One of the major problems facing the African Court today is its 
accessibility by the people. Currently there are only two instances by 
which cases could be taken to the African Court. Cases can be brought 
before the court by two different groups. Firstly, we have the organs of 
the AU, the African Commission and inter-governmental organizations; 
these groups have direct and unrestricted contact with the court. 
Secondly, we have individuals and NGOs who have spectator status at 
the commission, and can only bring cases before the court where a state 
has made a declaration under Article 34(6) allowing such uninterrupted 
access; and, in any event, the court has the discretionary power to grant 
or decline access.127 If individuals and NGOs could have access to the 
African Court, and resolve issues that have made the African 
Commission unsuccessful, then the African Court would be said to be 
effective. Currently, there is still a lack of knowledge and understanding 
about the African Court by individuals in member states. As such, more 
information on how the court can enhance human rights protection 
should be given to the people.  
 
7.5.4 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
Blending the African Court on Human and Peoples’ rights and the African 
Court of Justice (ACJ)128 brought about a development that was novel 
 
127 Article 5 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
128 The African Court of Justice (ACJ) was established by the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2002, 
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to the African regional judiciary, by adopting an mechanism that merged 
the courts. 129  The courts were merged into one court and then 
established as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.130 Three 
states, namely Libya, Mali and Burkina Faso, had ratified the protocol as 
of August 2010.131 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which 
is the new court, has two sections: the human rights section and a 
general affairs section.132 It has a period of transition which ought not 
to be more than one year or any time resolved by the Assembly, after 
entry into force of the protocol, to facilitate the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’ obligations to the new African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights.133 
The court can include individuals and relevant non-governmental 
organizations accredited to the African Union or its organs, as a result 
of the expansion of the categories that can have access to the Africa 
Court of Justice and Human Rights.134 Individuals and NGOs will be able 
to bring forward petitions without being given a difficult time by the 
state, by doing away with the old requirement of making a further 
declaration before giving individuals and NGOs access to bring petitions 
before the court.135 This will help the victims of human rights abuse, 
such as the Niger Delta people, to approach the court directly without 
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any hindrance.136 This can be found in the European Court of Human 
Rights as well, as Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms imposes an obligation on the 
state not to obstruct the exercise of a guaranteed right.137 
The executive council is given the authority to observe the execution of 
court judgements on behalf of the assembly, under Article 43(6). This 
will help in reducing potential obstacles faced by victims of human rights 
violations regarding the decisions of the African Commission not being 
implemented. This provision is similar to what exists under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.138 
The decisions of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights are 
definite and binding on all parties. If a party does not conform with the 
judgement of the court, the court shall then transfer the matter to the 
AU assembly, which then takes into account procedures to make the 
judgement become effective.139 By so doing, the AU assembly may have 
to levy sanctions, pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the 
constitutive act.140 This further emphasizes the relevance of the AU 
assembly in helping to enforce decisions of human rights bodies, such 
as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights or the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights, as well as helping to enforce the 
recommendations of the African Commission. Irrespective of the fact 
that the decisions of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights are 
binding, if the mandatory will on the part of member states to enforce 
the decisions of the court is not present, there would be no purpose to 
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making those decisions and the whole African regional structure would 
be a misconception. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that to comply 
with courts’ decisions, sanctions are used, member states are advised 
to willingly respect their human rights obligations, and the decisions of 
the commission and court; 141  therefore, the majority of victims of 
human rights violations, especially the Niger Delta people, would be able 
to utilize the court and the commission for better protection from the 
Nigerian government and the oil MNCs. The African regional judicial 
system can hold MNCs accountable for their human rights violations if it 
is adequately reformed and checked, so as to complement the ability of 
the host state and efforts made at the international level.  
The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) has handled cases relating to the significance and 
enforcement of the provisions of the African Charter in Nigeria. In the 
Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability 
Project (SERAP) v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 8 
Ors,142 the plaintiff – a human rights non-governmental organization 
(NGO) – alleged that the activities of the oil industry in the Niger Delta 
constitutes a violation of the right to an adequate standard of living, and 
of other fundamental human rights such as the right to a clean and 
healthy environment, as well as depriving the people of the region of 
economic and social development. It further alleged that the SPDC, Elf, 
Agip, Chevron, Total and ExxonMobil, who were all defendants, were 
actively involved in human rights violations of the Niger Delta people. 
The fact that the plaintiff did not have locus standi to establish an action 
for and on behalf of the people of the Niger Delta was also one of the 
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aims of the defendants. They stated that the plaintiff was not a legal 
person under Nigerian law and as such was incapable of instituting an 
action before the court. They went ahead in alleging that the court did 
not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute brought to it 
because it was neither a member of ECOWAS nor a community 
institution. The court held, in a judgement given on 10 December 2010, 
that the plaintiff, having been registered under Nigerian laws as a 
human rights non-governmental organization, was a legal entity duly 
founded. Regarding locus standi, the court – referring to several 
international human rights law treaties, such as the Aarhus Convention, 
the American Convention on Human Rights, the Rules of Procedure of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights and the doctrine of actio 
popularis – held that the plaintiff, having been adequately founded and 
enjoying the status of an observer before ECOWAS institutions, did not 
require any particular mandate from the people of the Niger Delta to 
bring the action for the alleged violation of human rights that affected 
the people of the area.143 On the issue of the capability of the court, it 
held that the additional procedure, which modified the ECOWAS treaty, 
bestowed on it capability to resolve cases of human rights violations 
which took place in any member state of the community.144 However, 
the contention of the defendants, ranging from the SPDC to ExxonMobil, 
was that as they were not parties to the treaty or other ECOWAS legal 
instruments, they were not eligible to be sued before the Ecowas 
Community Court of Justice (ECCJ). One of the preliminary objections 
of the oil companies was not having the jurisdiction of the ECCJ 
extended to disputes between individuals. Using the current position in 
international law, the court ruled emphatically that only states and 
 




community institutions have the mandate to be defendants before the 
ECCJ involving claims of human rights violation against multinational 
corporations. This was still the ruling in the SERAP case as well. 
Depending on its previous decision in the case of Peter David v. 
Ambassador Ralph Uwechue,145 the court held that: 
“As an international court with jurisdiction over human rights violations, 
the court cannot disregard the basic principles and the practice that 
guided the adjudication of the disputes on human rights at international 
level. Viewed from the angle, the courts recalls that international regime 
of human rights protection before international bodies relies essentially 
on treaties to which states are parties as the principal subjects of 
international law. As a matter of fact, the international regime of human 
rights imposes obligations on states. All mechanisms established thereof 
are directed to the engagement of state responsibility for its 
commitment or failure towards those international instruments. From 
what has been said, the conclusion to be drawn is that for the dispute 
between individuals on alleged violation of human rights as enshrined in 
the African charters on human and peoples’ rights, the natural and 
proper venue before which the case may be pleaded is the domestic 
court of the state party where the violation occurred. It is only when at 
the national level, there is no appropriate and effective forum for 
seeking redress against individuals, that the victim of such offences may 
bring an action before an international court, not against the individuals, 
rather against the signatory state for failure to ensure the protection 
and respect for human rights allegedly violated. Within the ECOWAS 
community, apart from member states, other entities that can be 
brought to this court for alleged violation of human rights are the 
 
145 Peter David v. Ambassador Ralph Uwechue [2010] ECW/CCJLR /RUL/03/10. 
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institutions of the community because, since they cannot, as a rule, be 
sued before domestic jurisdiction, the only avenue left to the victims for 
seeking redress for grievance against those institutions is the 
community court of justice.”146 
Although the ECCJ acknowledges the right of Nigerians to enjoy a 
healthy environment, through active interpretation of significant treaties, 
however, it was unsuccessful in asserting jurisdiction or accountability 
over multinational corporations for human rights violations supposedly 
committed by them.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that, since the regulation of MNCs under 
international law and under voluntary initiatives has not been successful, 
the strengthening of regional institutions should support those efforts. 
Although this chapter has contended that weak institutions largely 
contribute to the problems of human rights abuses by MNCs in Nigeria, 
it has suggested that institutions, if effectively strengthened, have the 
potential to be part of the way out of the present situation. 
Strengthening the institutions that ensure rights protection, the rule of 
law, recognition, participation procedures, transparency and 
accountability will no doubt empower the Niger Delta people to resort to 
law to protect their rights. Identifying ways in which the domestic courts 
and local institutions can be strengthened and reformed will enhance 
the protection of the rights of citizens against human rights abuse at the 
hands of the government and MNCs, and help to enhance the capabilities 





of Nigerian crude, the profitability of the region’s oil and the fact that it 
is not possible for the multinationals engaged in resource extraction to 
move their capital to wherever labour is more accommodating, since the 
resources are immovable,147 states like Nigeria should take advantage 
of these factors to negotiate better and more sustainable exploratory 
practices with the MNCs.  
The African Commission should be empowered to have its own 
enforcement or implementation mechanism, as Article 1 of the African 
Charter provides that member states shall recognize the rights, duties 
and freedoms enshrined in the charter and shall undertake to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to them. 
Strengthening regional institutions will result in more efficient law 
enforcement, not only through improvement of the regional capacity to 
implement laws and environmental standards, but also through 
enhancement of its image. A restored public image will enable that 
Africa and its state gain the citizens’ trust, and their participation in the 
decision-making process. This will finally ensure that, in addition to 
being fair, just and equitable, environmental legislation and policies are 
implemented more efficiently.148 
 
 
147 Max Stephenson Jr. and Lisa A. Schweitzer,’Rights Answers, Wrong Questions: Environmental Justice 
as Urban Research’ (2007) JSTOR 44, 319-339. 
148 Alberto Costi, ‘Environmental Protection, Economic Growth and Environmental Justice: Are They 
Compatible in Central and Eastern Europe?’, in Julian Agyeman, Robert D. Bullard and Bob Evans (eds), 








We are encouraged to bridge the gap which exists between corporate 
accountability and multinational corporations by discovering novel 
mechanisms that would be capable of ensuring that human rights 
violations as a result of exploration activities by multinational 
corporations do not occur. The enforcement framework of international 
human rights has various loopholes.1 Trying to enhance enforcement of 
corporate human rights can be likened to a puzzle through which one 
has to find a way – a puzzle which constantly evolves through the 
passage of time, trials and persistent change.2 
Institutional and normative mechanisms which are lacking in the African 
Union (AU) are not available to apply to the activities of MNCs in the 
region. 3  There are, however, avenues set in place to reduce the 
difficulties faced. This chapter will pay attention to the recent 
development, which is the approaches made by the AU to enhance its 
institutions so as to hold corporations accountable for their activities in 
Africa, as well as the effects in Nigeria.  
 
 
1 Hannah Moscrop, ‘Enforcing International Human Rights Law: Problems and Prospects’ (2014), E-
International Relations Students, also available at< http://www.e-ir.info/2014/04/29/enforcing-
international-human-rights-law-problems-and-prospects/ >accessed 23 June 2020. 
2 Ashley Grimes, ‘Enforcement of International Human Rights Law: Barriers to Implementation’, available 
at< http://www.grimeslawaz.com/enforcement-of-international-human-rights-laws-barriers-to-
implementation/ >accessed 21 June 2020. 
3 Eghosa O. Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) International Community Law Review 20, 30–68, 32. 
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8.2 African Union Anti-Corruption Convention and the Extractive 
Industries 
Corruption is one of the major problems affecting most African states, 
and the corporations carrying out activities in Africa have been actively 
involved in the corruption outrage; its impact is clearly visible and 
cannot be underestimated. Many MNCs partake in bribing governments 
so that they can acquire natural resources contract agreements, and 
also bribe the military to rough-handle any members of the community 
who interfere during their operations in the community.4 Improving 
human rights in Africa has been unsuccessful because of the wide spread 
of corruption around the region.5 Corruption is never a victimless crime, 
and most times affects the vulnerable, poor and sidelined people. As 
such, to curb corruption and the effect of corruption in Africa, the AU 
adopted the Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU 
Anti-Corruption Convention) on 1 July 2003. The AU Anti-Corruption 
Convention, which is mandatory and binding,6 was enacted in August 
2006.  
The Convention can be used as an approach to foster accountability of 
MNCs in Africa. By charging governments to take up a wide range of 
methods, both administrative and statutory, in order that afflictions of 
corruption can be resolved in Africa, the Convention does not entertain 
 
4 Olatunde Otusanya, Sarah Lauwo and Gbadegesin Adeyeye, ‘A Critical Examination of the Multinational 
Companies Anti-Corruption Policy in Nigeria’ (2012) 1 Accountancy Business and the Public Interest 1–
52.  
5 Kolawole Olaniyan, ‘The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption: A Critical 
Appraisal’ (2004) 4(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 74–92.  
6 Ekhator (n3).; see also Olufemi Amao, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System and Multinational 
Corporations: Strengthening Host State Responsibility for the Control of Multinational Corporations’ 
(2008)  International Journal of Human Rights 12,5. 
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corruption in either the private or public sector. 7  Article 1 of the 
Convention defines private sector as:  
“the sector of a national economy under private ownership in which the 
allocation of the productive resources is controlled by market forces, 
rather public authorities and other sectors of the economy not under the 
public sector or Government.”8  
The definition involves every kind of private body, which includes both 
small and medium initiatives, partnerships and extractive industries.9 
Also, according to Article 4(1)(e) and (f), this Convention would apply 
to the below listed acts which lead to corruption and associated offences:  
“(e) the offering or giving, promising, solicitation or acceptance, directly 
or indirectly, of any undue advantage to or by any person who directs 
or works for, in any capacity, a private sector entity, for himself or 
herself or for anyone else, for him or her to act, or refrain from acting, 
in breach of his or her duties;”10  
“(f) the offering, giving, solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, 
or promising of any undue advantage to or by any person who asserts 
or confirms that he or she is able to exert any improper influence over 
the decision making of any person in the public or private sector in 
consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or 
herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the 
acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in 
consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted 
or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result.”11  
 
7 Ekhator (n3); see also African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
8 Article 1 of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
9 Ekhator (n3). 
10 Article 4(1)(e) of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
11 Ibid., Article 4(1)(f).  
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The above provisions of the Convention can assist in curbing the effect 
of corruption in Africa by building partnerships that exist amongst 
governments and the sectors of civil society and private sectors. 
Therefore, the provisions in Articles 1 and 4 impose the responsibility 
on African states to ensure MNCs’ activities in regions highlighted by the 
Convention.12 Additionally, Article 5(2) admonishes African states to:  
“Strengthen national control measures to endeavour that the 
organisation and operations of foreign companies in the territory of a 
State Party shall be subject to the respect of the national legislation in 
force.”13  
Article 11 of the AU Anti-Corruption Convention also admonishes 
governments to seek to:  
• Implement and strengthen legislative and different methods so as 
to avoid as well as fight corruption and associated offences done 
by authorities in the private sector.   
• Battle alongside unfair competition, admiration for tender 
procedures and property rights, by establishing frameworks so 
there can be enhanced participation by the private sector.   
• Adopt such other ways that encourage members of state to report 
cases of corruption, like instances of paying bribes to win offers, 
without fear.  
According to Article 9 of the AU Anti-Corruption Convention, it 
admonishes states to take up legislative and extra instruments to 
enhance their access to the important information needed to fight the 
 
12 Nsongurua Udombana, ‘Fighting Corruption Seriously – Africa’s Anti-Corruption Convention’ (2003) 7 
Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 447–488,  464–465; see also Ekhator (n3).  
13 Article (5)(2) of the AU Anti-Corruption Convention. 
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hazard of corruption and additional related offences.14 Possibly, the 
enacting of the Freedom of Information Act in Nigeria was the fulfillment 
of this provision.15Also, Article 19 of the Convention encourages state 
parties to participate in fostering regional and international co-operation 
regarding the prevention of corruption in the home countries of MNCs. 
Also, Article 22 of the Convention is of the view that an advisory board 
be created within the AU comprising 11 members elected by the 
executive council, who will help fight and stop corruption and other 
associated offences.16 Article 16 enjoins the authorities to seize the 
proceeds of corruption pending the outcome of judgements delivered. 
The AU Anti-Corruption Convention’s notable strength is contained in 
Article 12 in which it admonishes state parties to engage in promoting 
the Convention and participate in its monitoring and implementation, by 
working with civil society.17  
The AU Anti-Corruption Convention has a rights-based approach which 
can be seen in its objectives.18 One of the objectives that stands out is 
that it seeks to “promote socio-economic development by removing 
obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as 
well as civil and political rights.”19 The AU Anti-Corruption Convention 
looks at corruption as an occurrence that hinders individuals from 
enjoying human rights in general.20  
 
14 Ekhator (n3). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Olufemi Amao, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System and Multinational Corporations: 
Strengthening Host State Responsibility for the Control of Multinational Corporations’ (2008)  
International Journal of Human Rights 12,5. 
17 Ekhator (n3). 
18 Article 2 of the AU Anti-Corruption Convention. 
19 Article 2(4) of the AU Anti-Corruption Convention. 
20 Thomas Snider and Won Kidane, ‘Combating Corruption through International Law in Africa: A 
Comparative Analysis’ (2007) Cornell International Law Journal 40, 3. 
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Yet another part of the AU Anti-Corruption Convention that makes it 
stand out is its emphasis on behaviour towards the accused. Article 14, 
under the “minimum guarantees of a fair trial”,21 guarantees that: 
“subject to domestic law, any person alleged to have committed acts of 
corruption and related offences shall receive a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings in accordance with the minimum guarantees contained in 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and any other 
relevant international human rights instrument recognized by the 
concerned state parties.”22 
Therefore, the AU Anti-Corruption Convention is unique in the way that 
it pays importance to the rights of the accused and the reference it 
makes to human rights instruments.23 If a law that is to be enforced 
does not take into account the fundamental rights of those accused, 
more harm can be caused in society.24 Most especially in the African 
region, we see accused people being treated poorly by law enforcement 
agents. 
The down side of the Convention is how it pays attention to state 
responsibility and lives out any provision holding MNCs directly liable for 
corruption 25  – therefore MNCs not being directly accountable when 
involved in corruption is a major criticism of the Convention.26 Although 
 
21 Mauritius and Seychelles, ‘Compendium of Regional and International Agreements on Extraction and 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters’ (2009) Vienna, available at< 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Compendium_Mauritius_Seychelles/Compendiu
m_Mauritius_Seychelles.pdf >accessed 16 June 2020. 
22 Article 14 of the AU Anti-Corruption Convention. 
23 Snider and Kidane (n20). 
24 Ibid., 718. 
25 Amao (n16). 
26 Ekhator (n3). 
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states are to regulate the activities of MNCs, many African countries do 
not have the means of controlling the activities of MNCs efficiently.27 
Another criticism of the Convention is the fact that it does not have a 
penal and preventive system.28 
Irrespective of these criticisms of the AU Anti-Corruption Convention, to 
confront the issue of corruption, Nigeria has enacted domestic 
legislation to curb it.29 Yet still, with the presence of national laws and 
bodies on corruption30 – such as the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (Establishment) Act 200431 and the Corrupt Practices and 
Related Offences Act 200032 – as regards corruption in Nigeria, no MNCs 
have been held liable.33 There have been no cases with successful legal 
action established against MNCs by the government in Nigeria.34 During 
the outrage that broke out against Halliburton, the company was 
accused of bribing the Nigerian authorities to sway the award of a 
contract for a liquefied natural gas plant in Nigeria. The company was 
penalized a huge sum by some countries,35 as well as some of its 
officials being jailed.36  Richard Cheney, who was a previous United 
States Vice President from 2001 to 2009, and also the Chairman of 
Halliburton from 1995 to 2000, had a case of criminal conspiracy 
 
27 Ibid. 
28 Snider and Kidane (n20). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ekhator (n3). 
31 Ibid.; Cap E1 LFN 2004.  
32 Ekhator (n3); Cap 359, LFN 2004.  
33 Ekhator (n3).; see also Gbemi Odusote, ‘The Judiciary as a Critical Linchpin in Nigeria’s Anti-
Corruption Crusade’ (2012), 34(2) Liverpool Law Review 123–143, which highlighted corruption cases in 
Nigeria involving local politicians.  
34 Otusanya (n4). 
35 Ekhator (n3); see also Obiora Okafor and Benson Olugbuo, ‘The Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission and the Accountability of Corrupt Foreign Actors’ (2011), 4(3) Law and Development Review, 
2–29.  
36 Ekhator (n3); see also John Rudolf, ‘Albert Stanley, Former Halliburton Exec, Sentenced in Bribery 
Scheme’, Huffington Post, 2 December 2012.  
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brought against him by the Nigerian government for allegedly paying 
180 million dollars in bribes to the Nigerian government.37 However, a 
plea bargain was reached by Halliburton and they agreed to pay the 
Nigerian government a fine of around 250 million dollars.38 Okafor and 
Olugbuo have argued:  
“Yet the fact that the Halliburton trials, which were launched by the 
Attorney-General of the Federation of Nigeria in early September 2010, 
are among the first significant instances of the EFCC actually filing 
criminal charges in court against noncitizen individuals and corporations 
for their perpetration of acts of grand corruption in Nigeria is indicative 
of the fact that it is difficult to conclude that the EFCC has optimized its 
potential in the specific area of the prosecution of grand corruption 
perpetrated by foreign actors in Nigeria.”39  
The AU Anti-Corruption Convention takes into account the unique 
predicament that African states experience, of which Nigeria is no 
exception. The Convention recognizes the existing realities faced by 
Africa, and it does not just act as a crime control mechanism, but also 
balances the battles that Africa faces in order to realize accountability, 
good governance, rule of law and development.40 However, the benefits 
of the Convention cannot be entirely reached if there is no corresponding 
obligation on the part of the home country.41 For example, it seems as 
though the Nigerian government does not have the will to hold MNCs 
 
37 See< https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/02/dick-cheney-halliburton-nigeria-corruption-
charges >accessed 21 July 2020. 
38 Eghosa O. Ekhator, ‘Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A Case for the 
African Union?’ (2018) International Community Law Review 20, 30–68, 32. See also < 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/15/nigeria-dick-cheney-plea-halliburton >accessed 22 June 
2020. 
39 Ekhator (n38). 




accountable yet, and as such may persist until the government sits up 
and holds corporations accountable for corruption.  
Currently, the only way to legally fight corruption would be for states 
that are party to the AU Anti-Corruption Convention to comply with the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), so as to resolve 
issues of corruption between international regions, because unlike the 
AU Anti-Corruption Convention, which only has preventive measures, 
the UNCAC has penal and deterrence measures.42 
 
8.3 Roles of NEPAD in the Holding of MNCs Accountable 
A developmental initiative with the support of the AU is the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which promotes 
collective action in Africa, by helping African states overcome their 
developmental challenges. 43  Stephen Gelb describes the concept of 
NEPAD as: 
“an attempt by African leaders to promote collective action by African 
states within a coherent framework to address the continent’s lack of 
development. It is intended both to respond to global systemic risks 
originating from Africa, and to establish conditions for the continent’s 
increased integration with global markets … its essential focus is to 
overcome the problems of weak and incapable states.”44 
 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ekhator (n38). 
44 Stephen Gelb, ‘The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’ (2002) ; see also Sanusha 
Naidu, ‘The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in the Context of Responsiveness and 
Accountability’, < 




The history of NEPAD can be discovered from three parallel initiatives.45 
Three African leaders at the time, Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mbeki 
of South Africa and Bouteflika of Algeria, formed the initiative at the 
request of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in order that a 
developmental plan be drafted for Africa.46 These three leaders were at 
that time representatives of three large intergovernmental groups that 
represented Africa. They were the Non-Aligment Movement (NAM), the 
G77 and the OAU respectively.47 NEPAD was born out of the New African 
Initiative (NAI) in October 2001, and this initiative seeks to foster the 
economic growth and development of Africa through improved 
governance.48 The major objective of NEPAD is basically to pull Africa 
out of underdevelopment, so as to make Africa stronger in the eyes of 
the global market;49 simply put, it aims to develop Africa by increasing 
its foreign investment.50  
In Africa, as regards the extractive industries, the objective of NEPAD is 
to improve the value of natural reserves information, ensuring that there 
is an accountability mechanism which is appropriate for development in 
the oil sector, that best practice guarantees that the production and 
extraction of high-standard natural resources are established, as well as 
that policies that regulate compliance with operational costs and 
promote diversification of production and exports are put in place.51 
Oshionebo is of the view that NEPAD’s focus is on foreign investment, 
rather than sustainable development.52 
 
45 Naidu (n44). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ekhator (n3). 
49 Ibid.; Paragraph 1 of the NEPAD Document. 
50 Ekhator (n3). 
51 Paragraphs 156 and 157 of the NEPAD Document.   
52 Oshionebo (n48). 
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Although NEPAD has been criticized for being too ambitious, for having 
an unidealistic assessment of power within the global economy, it is not 
in the best interests of Africa, however, if it should deny that NEPAD is 
a potential instrument which could promote good governance, human 
rights and economic development in Africa.53 However, for the initiative 
to achieve its purpose, it will require a responsive government ready to 
embrace a global standard of good governance and strengthen the 
relationship between its state and others. 
As noted in the G8/Africa Kanansakis Summit G8 Africa Action Plan,54 
NEPAD supports self-regulation in the extractive industries in Africa,55 
as it is mentioned that the G8 works with African governments as well 
as civil society to discourse the connection which exists between armed 
conflict and oil exploitation in Africa, and achieves it through 
encouraging voluntary regulators and adapting voluntary principles of 
corporate social responsibility by those involved in the development of 
Africa’s natural resources.56 In Nigeria, NEPAD is below the presidency, 
with a Chief Executive Officer who runs the office and acts as a special 
adviser to the president on NEPAD.57 The closeness that exists between 
the federal government of Nigeria and NEPAD may lead to abuses of 




53 Naidu (n44). 




57 Ibid.; see also NEPAD Nigeria, < http://nepad.gov.ng >accessed 21 July 2020. 
58 Ibid.; see also Chris Landsberg, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism: A Political Retort on the AU’s 
Most Innovative Governance Instrument’ (2012) 42(3) African Insight, 104–118, 110–113, on how the 
NEPAD and APRM process was hijacked by South African government officials to the detriment of the 
participation of CSOs.  
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8.4 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Role in 
Regulating MNCs in Nigeria 
The APRM is a mutually agreed self-monitoring framework which is 
voluntary and has been recognized by African Union member states. The 
APRM was first introduced in 2002 and then established in 2003 under 
the execution framework of NEPAD development.59 AU member states 
can be parties to the APRM.60 
Attention is given to the procedure which APRM plays in facilitating the 
delivery of accountability, good governance, peace, as well as security, 
during the operation of MNCs in Nigeria. The APRM review process has 
been done twice by Nigeria. There are four review processes which 
ought to be made by APRM:61 the first review, known as a base review, 
is conducted by a country within the first 18 months after joining the 
APRM initiative;62 then every two to four years a periodical review is 
done, and the member state is obliged to make a request to be reviewed 
outside the periodic review of the initiative; lastly, if it is brought to the 
APRM’s knowledge that a member state’s actions could threaten a 
political and economic crisis, then a conduct review may be done on 
impulse.63  
Although the APRM does not have sanctions, it has been an exceptional 
achievement of NEPAD’s development in Africa. The agendas lined up 
by NEPAD run into ten areas: climate change, natural resource 
management, agriculture and food security, integration of regions, as 
 
59 Mouzayinn Khalil-Babatunde, ‘Lessons from Implementing the APRM National Programme of Action in 
Nigeria, Governance and APRM Programme’, December 2014, < https://www.saiia.org.za/policy-
briefings/658-lessons-from-implementing-the-aprm-national-programme-of-action-in-
nigeria/file >accessed 22 July 2020. 
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid. 
62 NEPAD Nigeria (n57). 
63 Ekhator (n3).  
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well as infrastructure, human development, economic and corporate 
governance, and other areas such as gender, capacity development and 
ICT.64 A peer review mechanism, the APRM, was invented in order to 
help hasten the realization of the projects which were under NEPAD.65 
Countries who are parties to APRM devote themselves to adopting 
appropriate laws, policies and standards, as well as building relevant 
human and institutional capacity to ensure that the primary purpose is 
realized,66 even if it is a voluntary initiative.67 APRM comes with a broad 
public participation process which is initiated by member states, revised 
and collected in the National Programme of Action’s (NPOA) publication, 
which is made up of objectives and recommendations which 
stakeholders are guided by, so that the government, private sector and 
civil society can achieve the idea of the member state. 68  APRM 
development can be achieved when a self-assessment process is 
undertaken and dialogues that are beneficial to all stakeholders have 
been made. 69  To help member states develop their action in the 
preliminary programme, APRM depends on a self-assessment 
questionnaire (SAQ). 70  The APRM process, while considering states’ 
submissions with different types of African and international human 
rights conventions and standards, places emphasis on four premises.71 
Corporate governance and socio-economic development, economic 





67 Olivier De Schutter and Anita Rawasasty, Human Rights Due Diligence: The Role of States (December 








the confined parts expressed in the APRM process. The Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed by 33 countries, consenting to the APRM, 
including Nigeria, Algeria, Burkina Faso and Ghana.72 The AU recently 
adopted the APRM as the mechanism for monitoring the sector in Africa 
that pertains to natural resources;73 this was done to restructure the 
APRM country self-assessment questionnaire and included a section that 
involved the governance of extractive industries, as it was seen as a 
positive way of developing an Africa-centred scheme. 74  The APRM 
Country Review Report of Nigeria is where the process of how to monitor 
the oil and gas sector is situated.75 The report states that as a result of 
the consistent push from indigenes on MNCs, it has improved on its 
current widespread participation in corporate accountability 
activities.76Previously, the extractive industries were of the view that 
they had neither a moral nor a legal obligation to the communities where 
extraction was being carried out, other than to pay taxes and royalties 
to the government.77 MNCs in the Niger Delta currently map out new 
policies and approaches to get the indigenes involved in community 
development projects, and are joining hands with NGOs to ensure that 
community development initiatives are funded; all these were advised 
because of the constant pressure being mounted on MNCs in the Niger 
Delta to stop the use of militants to subdue the indigenes, as well as to 
stop the abuse of human rights in the communities as a result of their 
 
72 Ibid.; see also Ekhator (n3). 
73 Ekhator (n3).; see also Kofi Annan, ‘Foreword’ in African Progress Panel Report (2013), Equity in 
Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources for All, < http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/event-
perspectives-on-progress-an-agenda-for-action/ >accessed 12 July 2020. 
74 Ekhator (n3).; see also UNECA, Harnessing the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Potential to 
Advance Mineral Resources Governance in Africa: Issues Paper (2013), 4.  
75 Ekhator (n3).; see also APRM, APRM Country Review Report No. 8: Federal Republic of Nigeria (June 
2008),  < http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/aprm/Documents/CountryReports/Nigeria.pdf >accessed 12 July 
2020. 




exploration.78 There is a notion that shareholders are beginning to see 
that multinational corporations are not proactive in investing in 
communities where they operate.79 In Nigeria, reviews always boil down 
to the fact that all sizes of business should be accountable for their 
activities.80 
The findings from the review state that, although an environmental 
regulatory mechanism exists in Nigeria, it is not sufficient to ensure that 
environmental laws are respected by the extractive industries in Nigeria, 
however.81 Consequently, NGOs and the media should continue to urge 
MNCs to respect environmental laws in Nigeria and expose those who 
violate human rights by their activities.82 Also, the report of the review 
highlights recommendations which Nigeria is being encouraged to 
initiate. As part of the recommendations made, it was stated that the 
Nigerian government should consider implementing labour laws in the 
private sector, as well as trade unions, and as mentioned earlier, help 
to spread the negative effect of environmental degradation by using the 
media or social media. Finally, it should have an accountability 
commission with the purpose of creating an understanding about 
corporate accountability in Nigeria.83  
Nigeria made two progress reports, in wish they expressed their desire 
to implement the APRM report, responding to the APRM report. From 
the initial progress report created,84 members of the community were 
urged to have a discussion with multinational corporations and the 
 
78 APRM, APRM Country Review Report No. 8 
79 Ibid., 233. 
80 Ibid 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 231. 
83 Ibid., 237–238. 
84 Ekhator (n3). 
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Nigerian government on how good practices could be promoted.85 The 
government also stated that a decline in violent crimes in the Niger Delta 
has been recorded because the government declared an amnesty for 
armed militants in the Niger Delta.86 Furthermore, Chevron is working 
hand-in-hand with other corporations to create new ways to find a 
solution to the issues in the Niger Delta.87  
In its second progress report,88 the Nigerian government was able to 
point out plans to help out those in society that were unable to afford 
legal aid assistance.89 The Nigerian government also affirmed that there 
had been progress in access to justice for victims in human rights 
enforcement in Nigeria, as a result of the development of the 
Fundamental Human Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules of 2009.90 
According to the Nigerian government, the current developed corporate 
governance code has led to a realization of the significance of fostering 
accountability in Nigeria.91 To improve the need for corporations to take 
part in corporate accountability, a new national tax policy has been 
introduced by the government to encourage a fair system for donations 
to be deducted under tax laws.92 In other words, the extent to which 
responsibility in areas such as skills procurement initiatives, grants and 
providing for important services, as well as various others, can be 













In the report, which was centred on the impact of the APRM on mineral 
resources governance in Africa, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) particularly looked at the significance of 
reliable public participation in the administration of natural resources in 
Nigeria.94 Also, findings showed that indigenes of the Niger Delta seem 
not to participate in the management of their own natural resources.95 
With regards to corporate accountability practices of MNCs in the Niger 
Delta, UNECA states:  
“Ensuring access to state power by the local communities, including 
minority representation; and utilizing public-private partnerships and 
dialogue between communities and oil companies to support the 
implementation of a corporate accountability platform which is 
important towards development approaches and eventually increase 
growth.”96 
It could mean, therefore, that MNCs try to ameliorate clashes and 
promote transparency in the administration of mineral or natural 
resources by getting a social license to operate.97  
The fact that the APRM is voluntary, without any sanctions or obvious 
penalties, makes it weak and not dependable. However, from above, it 
can be seen that the APRM and NEPAD processes promote accountable 
MNCs, and have had a positive impact on MNCs. The two institutions, 
although not directly making provisions on how to hold MNCs 
accountable for their violations, rather indirectly stress the notion that 
AU mechanisms can help hold MNCs accountable. In different country 
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reports on the APRM, the Nigerian government stated that they have 
accepted APRM report recommendations, as well as concentrated on 
reforms in the extractive industries in Nigeria.  
  
8.5 African Mining Vision 
The African Mining Vision is a declaration that was adopted by African 
heads of state at the February 2009 AU summit as a result of the 
meeting held in October 2008 by African ministers in charge of mineral 
resource development.98 The African Mining Vision is a complete effort 
put in place by African leaders incorporating mining policies at the 
national and regional levels.99 The African Mining Vision is an effort by 
Africa to solve the threat of having a wealthy amount of natural 
resources but yet continuous poverty and hardship in African states100 
such as Nigeria. Weak states in Africa continue to undergo hardship as 
a result of a lack of strong governance mechanisms, as well as 
corruption. Irrespective of the profits that African countries with natural 
resources make, it does not in any way infer that the presence of MNCs 
will bring development to indigenous communities, 101  even if the 
government does create good policies. 
At the indigenous level, the objectives of the African Mining Vision are 
to ensure that it provides development by enabling staff and 
communities to benefit from large-scale mining activities and ensuring 
that the environment is protected.102 In addition, the objective of the 
African Mining Vision is to try to guarantee African states a chance to 
 







negotiate contracts with mining MNCs, in order to make significant 
revenues and localize participation in their activities.103  
At the regional level also, the African Mining Vision wants to promote 
the incorporation of mining into industrial and trade policy, in reducing 
transaction costs and so much more.104 Therefore, the aim of the African 
Mining Vision is to foster development that enhances growth by building 
economic and social connections that are beneficial to Africa,105 as well 
as encouraging public participation and fostering transparency in the 
mining industry in Africa. 106  Additionally, corporate accountability 
practices are encouraged to be incorporated by mining companies, to 
further improve development in Africa.107  The African Mining Vision 
encourages African states to move from narrow to broader development 
needs that will incorporate development and natural resource 
policies.108  
However, one of the criticisms of the African Mining Vision is that it has 
excluded other forms of extractive corporations, and rather refers only 
to mining. No African state has adopted or implemented the African 
Mining Vision.  
 
 
103 Ibid.; see also Ekhator (n38).. 
104 Ibid.; African Mining Vision. 
105 Ibid. 
106 UNECA, Minerals and Africa’s Development: The International Study Group on Africa’s Mineral 
Regimes (2011) < https://www.uneca.org/publications/minerals-and-africas-development >accessed 21 
June 2020. 
107 Ekhator (n38); see also Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Realising the Africa Mining Vision: The Role of Government-
initiated International De-velopment Think-tanks’ (2016), 7(1) Journal of Sustainable Development Law 
and Policy, 158–182, 162.  
108 Kofi Annan, ‘Foreword’ in African Progress Panel Report (2013), Equity in Extractives: Stewarding 
Africa’s Natural Resources for All, < http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/event-perspectives-on-progress-
an-agenda-for-action/ >accessed 12 July 2020. 
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8.6 Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and 
Human Rights Violations 
The working group is a supplementary mechanism formed under the 
African Commission.109 Examples of supplementary instruments made 
by the African Commission include special rapporteurs, committees and 
working groups.110 The African Commission controls the obligation and 
responsibility of the subordinate instruments and all in charge of a 
subordinate instrument have to make known its dealings with the 
African Commission at each ordinary session of the commission.111  
The working group’s development can be linked to the resolution of the 
African Commission at its 39th Ordinary Session which was held in 
Banjul, The Gambia, in May 2006, to conduct a study on human rights 
damages by MNCs in Africa.112 The main purpose of the study was to 
identify problems that needed to be subsequently researched, in order 
to be part of the development of a jurisprudence by the African 
Commission to hold MNCs accountable for human rights violations, as 
provided in the African Charter.113 
The African Commission received reports in abundance from investors 
and NGOs; one consequence of the study was the creation of a Working 
Group on the Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights 
Violations by the African Commission at the 46th Ordinary Session – 
held at Banjul, The Gambia, in November 2009 – by virtue of Resolution 
 
109 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, < http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/ >accessed 
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ACHPR/Res. 114  (XLVI) 09 (Resolution on the Working Group on 
Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights Violations).115  
The Resolution states:  
“Examine the impact of extractive industries in Africa within the con- 
text of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; research the 
specific issues pertaining to the right of all peoples to freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources and to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development; undertake research on 
the violations of human and people’s rights by non-state actors in Africa; 
request, gather, receive and exchange information and materials from 
relevant sources, including Governments, communities and 
organizations, on violations of human and people’s rights by non-state 
actors in Africa; to inform the African Commission on the possible 
liability of non-state actors for human and people’s rights violations 
under its protective mandate; formulate recommendations and 
proposals on appropriate measures and activities for the prevention and 
reparation of violations of human and people’s rights by extractive 
industries in Africa; collaborate with interested donor institutions and 
NGOs, to raise funds for the Working Group activities; prepare a 
comprehensive report to be presented to the African Commission by 
November 2011.”116  
The report shields activities of the working group in the inter-session 
period within May and October 2013.117 The Legal Resources Centre 
 
114 Ibid.; see also Ekhator (n38). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ekhator (n38); African Commission website, ‘46th Ordinary Session: Resolution on Working Group on 
Extractive Industries’ (2006) ACHPR Res.364 
117 Ekhator (n38); see also Pacifique Manirakiza, ‘Inter-Session Report’ Presented at the 54th Ordinary 
Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2013), < 
http://www.achpr.org >accessed 14 June 2020. 
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worked hand-in-hand with the working group118 to set up a workshop 
involving various civil societies operating in South Africa, Zambia, 
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.119 The meeting was an opportunity for 
working group members to discuss with significant investors regarding 
best practices which would assist the working group’s obligation to 
survey the activities of the extractive industries in Africa and their 
effect.120  
The person in charge of the working group report gave quite a number 
of recommendations. It was recommended that every investor, 
including oil extractive corporations, should co-operate specifically with 
regards to the mapping of the extractive industries in Africa, which the 
working group is now involved in.121 The report also recommended that 
African states which were not signatories to the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) should adopt it, so as to improve 
transparency throughout the exploitation of natural resources. 122 
African states are encouraged by the report to execute decisions of the 
African Commission and to comply with the periodic reports of the 
commission.123 Lastly, the report directs African states to co-operate 
with the working group, particularly involving discussions about getting 
permission to work on research and data operations.124  
In 2016 the African Commission authorized the working group to discuss 
further regarding reporting guidelines that the state sees as a sufficient 
guide, and on the information which should be incorporated in their 
 
118 The Legal Resources Centre is South Africa’s largest public and human rights law clinic which was 
established in 1979; < http://lrc.org.za/lrcarchive/ >accessed 24 May 2020. 








periodic report, due to lack of extractive industries reporting 
guidelines. 125  Currently, though, the guidelines have still not been 
totally developed by the working group. 
Consequently, from above, the working group is most likely to 
experience a direct impact of MNCs being held accountable for their 
activities in Africa imminently. 
 
 
8.7 Role of the NGO in Holding Multinational Corporations 
Accountable 
In Nigeria, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) perform 
accountability functions via their activities in the oil and gas sector, 
particularly pertaining to MNCs. For example, NGOs can challenge MNCs 
through boycott, public campaigns and other forms of pressure. 
According to Oshionebo, 126  This is related to the impact of state 
regulation, and misdemeanours of such MNCs can lead to social 
sanctions. Secondly, NGOs are independent of MNCs and the Nigerian 
state. Thus, they are in a position to advise and influence both the MNCs 
and the state without bias. Furthermore, NGOs can also influence 
accountability through litigation, publications, lobbying of MNCs and the 
state, and public awareness campaigns, amongst other strategies.127 
NGOs have been very proactive in litigation, especially in the areas of 
oil pollution, environmental degradation and human rights. Such 
 
125 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 364: Resolution on Developing Reporting 
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litigation has added to a growing jurisprudence on the regulation of 
MNCs by NSAs in Nigeria.128 This is evident in human rights protection 
in Nigeria, where the courts have produced "pro-human rights 
alterations and reformations".129 Thus, the Nigerian government is more 
sensitive to the environmental and social responsibilities of oil 
companies,130 and MNCs are expected to negotiate and agree on a 
memorandum of understanding with the host the communities, honour 
agreements, and endeavour to be more responsive to their problems.131 
NGOs have played a major role in elevating the plight of victims of 
environmental degradation in the Niger Delta from local to international 
recognition and awakening the international community.132 This was 
especially evidenced by the Ogoni crisis, where an NGO (MOSOP, in 
coalition with both local and international NGOs) brought to the 
attention of the world the human rights violations and environmental 
degradation in that part of Nigeria. This action by MOSOP also had an 
effect on the major MNC (Shell) operating in Ogoni. Shell revised its 
code of conduct to include human rights, and it now also (along with 
other MNCs) regularly organizes training and consultation with 
stakeholders in the Nigerian oil sector.133 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the activities of NGOs in the oil 
and gas industry are akin to accountability. Hood et al. stated that any 
 
128 Ekhator, ‘Improving Access to Environmental Justice under the African Charter’(n121).. 
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analysis of a regulatory regime strengthens two distinct connotations or 
dimensions. 134  They posited that one dimension of any risk in a 
regulatory regime entails: three components upon which the basis of 
any control system is formed, which are, ways of setting standards, 
ways of gathering or targets, and ways of changing behaviour to meet 
the standards or targets.135 Information gathering, standard-setting and 
behaviour modification are sine qua non of a regulatory regime.136 The 
second feature of a risk regulatory regime is the distinction or difference 
between regulatory regime 'context' and regime 'content'. 137  The 
regime context is the background wherein the regulatory regime is 
localized, recognising the level of risk, several indications and how such 
risks can be reduced, the level of public reaction towards risk and also 
how the different actors are affected by the hazard as a result of such 
risk regimes.138 However, the regime content is said to be the interplay 
of policy setting of the state and other organizations or institutions 
involved in holding accountable or addressing the risks and attitudes or 
bias of the regulators.139  
The first feature of the risk regulatory regime stated above is similar to 
the regulatory process. For example, in command and control-based 
regulatory framework, the state or regulatory agencies partake in the 
 
134 Christopher Hood et al., The Government of Risk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). A similar 
model was also proposed by T. Beer et al., ‘NGOs: Between Advocacy, Service Provision, and 
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regulatory process by engaging in information gathering, standard-
setting and behaviour modification. However, it has been argued that 
CSOs can also partake or contribute to the aforementioned three control 
components of the risk regime, as enunciated by Hood et al.140 The 
contention of this thesis is that civil society groups have engaged in 
holding MNCs accountable in Nigeria via the three control components 
of the risk regulatory regime, as enunciated by Hood et al. 
Still, irrespective of the significant efforts made by the NGOs in 
promoting the cause of the Niger Delta people, particularly those on 
human rights, they have not been able to participate essentially in the 
promotion of MNCs accountability and regulatory effectiveness in Nigeria. 
The reasons for this include lack of expertise, lack of funds, lack of 
cooperation among the grassroots NGOs and ethnic community 
relationship, the rise of NGOs, especially in the Niger Delta oil-rich 
region, with no good intention to pursue social goals but operating for 
personal enrichment exist. Hence access to regional bodies like the AU 
should not be fettered. 
 
8.7.1 Human Rights Under the AU and the Role of the NGOs 
The AU Act enhances the promotion of peace, security and stability in 
Africa, promoting institutions, principle, popular participation and good 
governance, the promotion and protection of human rights and peoples' 
rights by the African Charter and other relevant instruments.141 The AU 
principles, with its human rights element, related to the participation of 
the African peoples in the activities of the Union; the right of the Union 
to intervene in a member state according to a decision of the Assembly 
 
140 Ibid.  
141 Article 3 of the AU act. 
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in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity; promotion of gender equality; respect for 
human principles, the rule of law, human rights, promotion of social 
justice to ensure balanced economic development, promotion of good 
governance, respect for human life, condemnation and rejection of 
unconstitutional changes of governments. 142  There is a strong 
development towards making a new organisation more people-centred. 
The AU has the objective of promoting common participation and 
operates based on the principle of the involvement of the African peoples 
in the activities of the Union.143 In connection with this objective, the 
AU planned its first ministerial conference on human rights, which 
adopted the Kigali Declaration.144 The meeting not only recognised the 
importance of NGOs, but it also called for their protection in the following 
statement: 
“The Assembly recognises the critical role of civil society organisations 
(CSOs) in general and particularly, human rights defenders, in the 
protection and promotion of human rights in Africa, calls upon the 
Member States and regional institutions to protect them and encourage 
the participation of CSOs in decision-making processes to consolidate 
participatory democracy and sustainable development, and underscores 
the need for CSOs to be independent and transparent”.145 
It is thus apparent that the objectives of the AU embrace the protection 
and promotion of human rights. These objectives cannot be realised 
effectively and come into life fully without the involvement of NGOs and 
 
142 Article 4 of the AU act. 
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civil society in the activities of the AU.146 In this regard, implementing a 
treaty or a convention aimed at protecting and promoting human rights 
has always been difficult. The international experience shows that the 
UN would not have monitored the implementation of the various human 
rights treaties by member States without the participation and expertise 
of NGOs.  
 
 
8.7.2 Roles of Civil Society Organizations (CSO) in AU 
Mechanisms 
Civil society organizations have a great part to perform in trying to foster 
many AU mechanisms and conventions. The presence of participation 
by civil society in government or NGO initiatives over the years has led 
to positive impacts. With the non-involvement of civil society, the 
degree to which states adhere to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights147 has been largely insignificant.148 Under the African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights process, there is not direct access 
to the court by members of state.149  
In 2012, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
(ADC), which fosters the principles of human rights, democracy and 
governance,150 was endorsed.151 The ADC is said to be “the first binding 
 
146 The Declaration adopted by the meeting of the African Parliaments on the Pan African Parliament, 30 
June -01 July 2003, Cape Town, South Africa, reaffirmed the same principle. 
147 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM. 58, entered into 
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regional instrument adopted by member states of the African Union that 
attempts to comprehensively address all of the elements necessary for 
the establishment of liberal democracies.”152 Article 27(2) of the ADC 
avers that states are charged to take up the responsibility of “fostering 
popular participation and partnership with civil society”.153 However, no 
CSOs are involved in the ADC process, and CSOs could play a monitoring 
role through the ADC process.154 CSOs can help bring about knowledge 
of ADC to African states, and get involved in its execution in African 
states.155 An issue which got the attention of the AU is the fact that 
CSOs have not been given an avenue to participate.156  
Initiatives like NEPAD have been criticized for not having the 
participation of CSOs; thus, it was stated that African CSOs have not 
been properly put in place to face the existing problems.157  
Distinct from NEPAD, corporate participation in the APRM process by 
CSOs was operational. 158  Good governance practice was restored, 
irrespective of the many problems encountered by CSOs involved in the 
APRM process.159 Nonetheless, the APRM process is a voluntary one and 
some African countries are signatories,160 including Nigeria.  
CSOs have been active at using the African Commission to hold African 
governments accountable for human rights violations,161  as well as 
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socio-economic rights.162 With regards to management and control of 
natural resources, CSOs in Africa have been instrumental in holding 
governments responsible for environmental degradation in Africa.163  
The AU has adopted various initiatives and frameworks; however, 
execution has been the main issue: the vigorous participation of civil 
society, as well as individuals in a state, is significantly needed for the 
successful execution of AU initiatives. Professor Landsberg stated that:  
“... the real strength and success of the AU, NEPAD and other 
continental initiatives will be determined by the extent to which they 
empower people and create opportunities for them to improve their lives. 
In the future, the AU, NEPAD, APRM, PAP and other structures, 
institutions and programmes will continue to be tested on the basis of 
the impact they have on the lives of ordinary African citizens. Indeed, if 
they wish to build their credibility in the eyes of the African populace at 
large, they will have to begin to show that they can be sources for the 
betterment of their lives, not just economically, although this is very 
important, but also in the human rights, peace-making, peace-keeping 
and democratic governance realms.”164  
 
8.8 African Justice and the Malabo Protocol 
The African Union (AU) adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Malabo Protocol) in May 2014, which, if ratified, will create the first-
ever regional criminal court (RCC).165 It is an important instrument 
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which extends the jurisdiction of the yet to be established African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to crimes under international law 
and transnational crimes.166  
The set-out plan for the ACJHR was a court with two sections: that is, a 
general affairs section and a human rights section.167 The international 
criminal law section is the third section which is being introduced by the 
Malabo Protocol.168 Therefore, if the Malabo Protocol is passed, the 
ACJHR will then have jurisdiction to try 14 crimes, including trafficking 
in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of unconstitutional 
change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenaries, corruption, 
money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, and the 
crime of aggression.169 This means that the international criminal law 
section of the ACJHR will serve as an African regional criminal court, 
hence similar to the function of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
although in a smaller terrain or landscape, but with a large extension of 
crime list.170 The African Union (AU) sees a potential alternative to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) which could extend and strengthen 
the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR). The presence of the protocol will at least give victims recourse 
to a regional instrument first, before proceeding to international law. 
Matiangai Sirleaf is of the opinion that there are various methods by 
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which African courts could attempt to close the justice gap, as states 
would be met with less resistance than those of international 
instruments, since states share a similar history, culture and 
geographical location.171 Sirleaf also argues that the African Court would 
not replace the ICC, but rather, it would be a place of first instance if 
national courts fail. Therefore, if the ACJHR is unable to provide justice 
for the victims, they can proceed to the ICC.172 
Embracing the Malabo Protocol obviously leaves room for great 
improvement, as the particular principles and values which form the 
basis of the protocol are commendable.173 These values include respect 
for human rights and sanctity of life; condemnation, rejection and 
fighting of impunity; strengthening of AU’s commitment to promote 
sustained peace, security and stability; and prevention of serious and 
massive violations of human rights.174  
The presence of a regional criminal court can have a good effect on the 
African continent, subsequently ameliorating the suffering and hurt 
borne by the complicities, and helping to free the region from crimes 
under international law and other serious violations and abuses of 
human rights.175 Thousands of civilians, mostly indigenes, have lost 
their lives as a result of degradation and conflict in the region, with 
thousands being displaced from their homes forcefully or because it was 
unhealthy to live there as a result of gross pollution.176 These conflicts 
are not devoid of terrible accounts of killings, torture, rape of women, 
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child labour, as well as malicious destruction of property.  
 
8.9 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the potential of putting more focus on regional 
institutions in holding MNCs in Africa accountable for their activities. This 
has not been entirely successful, notwithstanding the deficiency of the 
accountability framework found in the AU mechanisms. This chapter has 
contended that the accountability of MNCs can be extended or inferred 
in Africa from numerous AU mechanisms, which include the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, NEPAD, APRM and the 
Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights 
Violations. The chapter also looked at the role which the NGOs and civil 
society has played in bringing AU initiatives into the limelight, and is of 
the view that with the participation of civil society in Africa and Nigeria 
in particular, MNCs will gradually be held accountable.  
This chapter is also of the opinion that the presence of a regional 
criminal court through the Malabo Protocol can have a good effect on 
the African continent and subsequently ameliorate suffering. 
There are still substantial gaps needed to be filled. Potentially, having a 
binding treaty would help hold MNCs accountable for their activities, 
meaning the AU having a binding regional treaty to hold MNCs directly 











It has been the aim of this thesis, first of all, to undertake a study on 
how to improve the issue of human rights accountability of corporations 
in Nigeria through a regional approach, thereby strengthening states’ 
human rights duties to hold multinational corporations accountable for 
the operations of the oil and gas industry, especially relating to 
exploration and production in a developing country, Nigeria. Thereafter, 
it has been the aim to consider what lessons may be drawn for legal, 
regulatory and judicial reform in Nigeria, as well as regional institutions 
in Africa. Bearing in mind that the sorts of improvement needed would 
involve long-term solutions at best, given the challenges facing Nigeria, 
the soft laws were analyzed; the conclusion reached was that they 
haven’t been successful. Also, the United Nations Guiding Principles 
(UNGP) in particular were examined and it was found that the UNGP are 
still relevant and should not be ignored due to the commencement of 
the new process for a binding treaty. One is not an impediment to the 
other, and processes to attain the objectives of the two can work 
concurrently; however, more emphasis should be put on holding MNCs 
accountable for their activities in Africa, and Nigeria in particular, 
through the AU having a binding regional treaty. 
In the preceding chapters, the modus operandi of oil companies in their 
different host countries formed the bedrock of this work. The differing 
standards employed by these companies in developed countries, when 
viewed in juxtaposition with developing countries, is such that it has left 
many dissatisfied and even outraged.  
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This thesis opened with an overview of the Nigerian oil industry in 
Chapter Two, through its history and development. Chapter Four set out 
to do an extensive review of the legal regime adopted in Nigeria, with 
specific reference to the extractive industries. Issues dealing with the 
inadequacy of legislation were addressed, as well as the complex 
problem of proper enforcement and also compliance by the industry. 
The adequacy of penalties imposed for breaches was another pertinent 
issue which it was agreed had played a huge factor in the decision of 
many oil companies operating in Nigeria to choose not to be accountable 
for human rights violations in weak states where they carry out their 
operations. Chapter Three looked at the relevant concepts with regards 
to the research. Chapter Four also revealed the extent to which 
environmental degradation by MNCs is a significant problem in Nigeria, 
which is not only responsible for a large amount of environmental 
pollution, but has also led to the forfeiture of a significant amount of 
revenue for the Nigerian government and the public. The shortcomings 
of the judiciary in preserving its fairness and the problems of corruption 
and judicial approaches to powerful economic actors were other issues 
covered by this chapter. Chapter Five examined international 
frameworks that are available, and why they are not sufficient. 
Furthermore, Chapter Six examined the UN Guiding Principles and their 
importance, but concluded, however, that Africa did not only need a 
voluntary instrument. Chapter Seven analyzed the African Charter and 
its importance to the thesis.  
The question of how to achieve the goal of making MNCs accountable 
became a pressing issue, so we looked into the UNGP for answers. With 
this in mind, Chapter Six dealt with UNGP and whether they could proffer 
a solution that could be applied in Nigeria. It was concluded that since 
there is an urgent need for transparency and accountability, then UNGP 
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would indeed be implemented; however, what Nigeria would need is a 
binding law. Soft laws express moral and political obligations of 
governments and corporations and signify standards of law in 
development. They also list the human rights obligations expected of 
corporations, and also the several means of their monitoring and 
enforcement.1 Although the norms were non-binding, they were framed 
to look like a treaty. 
Bearing in mind, however, the fact that the majority of the solutions 
proffered in Chapter Six could only be effected in the medium term as 
it is a soft law, Chapter Eight went further to look at the potential of 
putting the focus on regional institutions in holding MNCs in Africa 
accountable for their activities. This has not been entirely successful, 
notwithstanding the absence of a clear accountability framework in the 
AU mechanisms. Chapter Eight also contended that holding MNCs in 
Africa accountable can be extended or inferred from many AU 
mechanisms, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, NEPAD, APRM and AU conventions. Also, holding them 
accountable in Africa means there is binding regional treaty that will 
directly hold MNCs accountable for their activities in member states.2 
The connection between the African Commission and NGOs has 
enhanced the work and jurisprudence of the African Commission in 
particular and to the improvement of the promotion and protection of 
human rights in Africa in general. Therefore, it is clear from the above 
that the importance of NGOs in monitoring the implementation of human 
 
1 Amnesty International, The UN Human Rights Norms for Business: Towards Legal Accountability (2004) 
IOR 42/0002.  
2 See< 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)608636 >accessed 
23 June 2020. 
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rights objectives and policies of the AU and NEPAD cannot be over 
emphasised. 
At the outset of this thesis it was stated that the goal of this work was 
to address the issue of violations by MNCs and how to hold them 
accountable, as well as highlighting, in the process, the pertinent 
problem of proper implementation of African regional mechanisms and 
examining their role in ensuring compliance. The main research question 
to be answered was: 
i. How to improve human rights accountability by multinational 
corporations in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria? 
Subsidiary questions that were to be answered are: 
ii. What is the reason in favour of human rights accountability by 
multinational corporations in Nigeria? 
iii. What is the nature, extent and history of human rights violations 
by corporations in Nigeria?  
iv. What is the current level of regulatory, normative and corporate 
accountability frameworks for corporations doing business in 
Nigeria? 
v. Is the current level satisfactory? 
vi. Are soft laws enough to hold MNCs accountable? 
vii. How do and can AU mechanisms hold corporations accountable? 
This research has shown that: 
1. We need to learn from our negligent past and seek to redress 
damaging behavior in developing countries. An industry that is 
accountable will interest more investors than a poorly regulated 
sector. 
2. The multinational corporations in the oil industry in Nigeria provide 
a strong and well-documented example of severe environmental 
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destruction by oil multinationals and the effects of that 
environmental destruction on the local population.3  
3. The current laws in place in Nigeria are inadequate in ensuring 
that the environment is sufficiently protected, as many of the laws 
are out-dated and most of them were not enacted to cope with 
the level of degradation that the oil industry has exposed the 
country to; attempts to enact more stringent laws have been 
blocked by oil companies who threaten to take their business 
elsewhere.  
4. It has been shown that Nigeria is presently incapable of effectively 
regulating its oil industry and ensuring compliance with the law by 
the powerful economic actors, and indeed the Nigerian 
government and its agencies. 
5. As a result of the incompetence of the existing regulatory 
mechanism overriding the activities of multinational corporations, 
there are new regulatory and accountability paradigms advocated 
by scholars; perhaps the African Union and its mechanisms can 
be the basis of MNC accountability in Africa. This has been 
highlighted in Chapter Eight. 
In order for Nigeria to ensure that the environment is adequately 
protected to a standard commensurate with that applicable in developed 
countries, it is imperative that solutions which deal with the twin issues 
of enforcement and accountability are found. Some of the solutions 
proffered are enclosed in Chapter Eight of this thesis and will involve a 
long-term overhaul and restructuring of both the laws and the attitudes 
of government, companies and individuals to the way business and 
operations are conducted in the country.  
 
3 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co [2000] 226 F.3d 88 2d Cir. [2000].  
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Bearing in mind that it could take several years for the solutions 
proffered in Chapter Four to become fully effective, and in light of the 
fact that oil spills and gas flaring continue to occur in the country, it is 
necessary to find an avenue in which people or institutions who are 
affected by the operations of the oil and gas industry can have recourse 
to justice, especially when one considers the failings of the Nigerian 
judiciary. 
It is as a result of the failings highlighted in Chapter Two and the 
acknowledgement that it will take a long time for the solutions put 
forward in Chapter Four of this work to become effective that Chapters 
Six and Seven dealt with the possible short-term solution of aggrieved 
parties having recourse to justice in the courts; this is a possible means 
of securing reparation, as is evident from the plethora of cases that are 
beginning to be filed in foreign jurisdictions.  
The drive of the whole of this work has been geared towards highlighting 
the degradation crisis, with a view to improving human rights protection 
in developing countries by holding multinational corporations 
accountable for human rights violations during the course of oil 
exploration, with the emphasis on Nigeria, and achieving a standard 
similar to the developed countries, which in turn has the effect of 
securing a sustainable future for everyone, including generations unborn, 
and reducing the impact of the actions of this present generation by 
dealing with our use of resources and by minimizing adverse 
environmental impacts. Ensuring that we develop in a sustainable 
manner means living within the capacity of the planet to sustain our 
activities and, where possible, replenishing the natural resources we 
have at our disposal. It also means ensuring that the actions we take 
today do not hinder our quality of life in the future, bearing in mind 
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those who do not have access to the same level of resources, and the 
wealth generated by those resources.  
 
Recommendations 
In a bid to ensure that the aforementioned goal is met, set out below 
are the recommendations that this thesis has to offer regarding 
improving protection within the oil and gas industry, with regards to 
Nigeria in particular and other developing countries in general. The 
subsequent recommendations are made from a legal point of view. 
Therefore, the solutions identified and advocated by this work – which 
will have the effect of advancing the practices adopted by oil companies 
operating in Africa and Nigeria, holding multinational corporations 
accountable for human rights violations, improving the accountability 
and enforcement regimes currently applicable, changing the attitudes of 
the Nigerian government as well as its agencies, increasing the 
confidence of those violated as well as concerned industry watchers in 
the Nigerian judicial process, and indeed securing the growth of 
sustainable environmental development on a long-term basis within 
Nigeria – will necessarily involve the following recommendations: 
A) Soft law in Africa or Nigeria should be developed. There is so much 
reference to the Western display of soft law, therefore neglecting core 
African or Nigerian values in the codes of conduct in operation in the oil 
and gas sector. In this regard, it is asserted that African mechanisms 
should be used as a guide by the oil MNCs in their development of codes 
of conduct in Nigeria. 
B) Grant an international court power to try multinational 
corporations; establish a human rights world court; a proposed binding 
international treaty is needed potentially; and adoption of the Malabo 
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Protocol in June 2014 in Africa extended the jurisdiction of the future 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (African Criminal Court) to 
include corporate criminal responsibility. Although the protocol is yet to 
be ratified, there is urgent need for a regional criminal court in Africa. 
African states should attempt to ratify the protocol, so as to strongly 
enhance the corporate criminal liability paradigm in Africa. African 
solutions to African issues would be a welcome development, and that 
is what having direct jurisdiction by the courts would enhance.  
The African Commission Working Group on Extractive Industries, 
Environment and Human Rights Violations can be mandated by the AU 
to develop such a treaty, alongside its work on reporting guidelines for 
MNCs. African states are eager to have a binding international treaty 
regulating the activities of MNCs. For example, African states voted for 
the recent resolution that the UN Human Rights Council should establish 
a working group to negotiate the feasibility of a binding international 
treaty regulating the activities of MNCS. 4  The Malabo Protocol is 
additional proof that African states are willing to develop a binding treaty.  
Also, the treaty should focus on issues such as remedies, access to 
justice, expected due diligence by companies and remedial mechanisms. 
Some of these concepts can be localized in existing AU mechanisms such 
as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights – particularly 
Article 21, which focuses on the right to free disposal of wealth and 
natural resources, and Article 24, on the right to a general satisfactory 
environment in Africa – the African Commission and the Malabo Protocol. 
The AU should also provide civil society with the power to monitor and 
enforce the treaty.  
 
4 John Ruggie, ‘The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN Business and Human Rights Treaty’ 
(2014) 8 IHBR Commentary, 1–8.  
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C) Improve upon the current system of environmental impact 
assessments obtainable in Nigeria and ensure strict observance of laws 
and regulations involving environmental impact assessments. Currently 
in Nigeria, the public and private sectors of the Nigerian economy 
sometimes carry out unauthorized projects or activities without taking 
into account the potential effects that such projects or activities may 
have on the environment, and when it is clear that a project might affect 
the environment greatly, an environmental impact assessment should 
be done. 
Environmental impact assessments should be carried out before 
extraction, although the reality is that in Nigeria the situation is different, 
and the provisions of Sections 7 and 9 are not firm.  
D) The creation of a stronger African Union along the lines of the 
European Union, in which each member state relinquishes some of its 
sovereignty to the super-national body or authority, as applies in the 
European Union, which has overarching powers and control over 
member states and in which such countries are thus bound by the laws 
handed down by such authority. This is increasingly seen as desirable, 
especially when one views the flagrant disregard of many Nigerian 
national laws. This would have the effect of compelling the Nigerian 
government to comply with laws and directives, or else be sanctioned 
or penalized. It is usually much better to comply with directives than be 
sanctioned. The conduct of member states should be regulated by 
applying appropriate sanctions:  
(i) These would reduce bribery and corruption as a result of the law or 
appropriate regulations not being followed. 
(ii) Since member states would be required to set rules, it would lead to 
massive transparency, because each member state would be required 
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to follow set rules and where applicable publish the appropriate data or 
reports.  
(iii) Periodic environmental audits should be carried out regularly in 
Nigeria. With such a system, oil companies which continue not to be 
accountable or to follow environmental standards would face serious 
sanction and/or ultimately risk losing their operating licenses in Nigeria. 
E) The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIGB) should reflect the interests of 
various stakeholders, including civil society organizations and oil-
producing communities in Nigeria, before it is passed into law. 
In conclusion, any potential binding AU treaty on the regulation of MNCs 
should operate within the existing international regulatory framework 
consisting of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
African Commission, NEPAD, APRM, the Working Group on Extractive 
Industries, Environment and Human Rights Violations, soft law and 
national laws, amongst others. In essence, if the institutions of the AU 
actively promote good governance, the incidence of corporate 
irresponsibility might be reduced on the continent.  
The AU should support the indigenous and Nigeria human rights NGOs 
and should work closely with them. These NGOs are sometimes 
threatened by their governments concerning their activities in 
monitoring human rights. The international and regional experiences 
show that these organisations offer great help in providing information 
regarding the specific situation of human rights at the grassroots level.  
The AU should increase the participation of African human rights NGOs 
and take into account the constraints posed by limited resources in their 
participation and involvement in the activities of the AU. It is 
recommended that the AU should assist NGOs in allocating specific 
resources and facilitating their fundraising from international sources, 
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like the European Union, to enhance their capacities and ability in 
promoting and protecting human rights in Africa and Nigeria in particular.  
The revised Zero Draft should be embraced. The AU should incorporate 
the provisions into the African Charter, as the proposed Zero Draft is a 
legally binding mechanism which seeks to promote and protect human 
rights and ensure that victims of environmental degradation are granted 
effective access to justice. 
A regional action plan (RAP) should be put in place. This plan would have 
to determine how the accountability gap in the existing human rights 
protection mechanism can be filled in order to effectively protect the 
vulnerable people of the region – such as women, children and 
indigenous people – and weak states that are exposed to corporate 
human rights violations. If a member state fails to comply, the regional 
protection mechanism will come to the rescue of the victims. Africa 
should not follow the voluntary approach. 
It is concluded that if the recommendations made in this thesis were 
adopted and applied in Nigeria and other developing countries, it would 
close the gap; it would be an improvement in the way that the extractive 
industries operating in developing countries choose to carry out their 
operations; and it would invariably lead to growing general standards 
within the oil industry, which will lead to consistency of operations 
internationally and the achievement of sustainable environmental 
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